3		A SAMPLE PROPERTY OF THE PROPE
	GLAIM LANGUAGES	GLATMOF INFRINGEMENTS
4 5	155.	Products infringing: Any product using Microsoft Product Activation or Reader Activation feature.
_	A virtual distribution environment comprising	
6 7	(a) a first host processing environment comprising	computer running a Microsoft product containing the Product Activation feature, including Windows XP, Office XP, Visio 2002. Reader using its activation feature.
8	(1) a central processing unit;	CPU of computer
9 ·	(2) main memory operatively connected to said central processing unit;	main memory of computer
10	(3) mass storage operatively connected to said central processing unit and said main memory;	hard disk or other mass storage contained in computer
11 12	(b) said mass storage storing tamper resistant software designed to be loaded into said main memory and executed by said central	Microsoft Product Activation software
13	processing unit, said tamper resistant software comprising:	
14	(1) machine check programming which derives information from one or more aspects of said host processing	Product Activation software generates hardware information relating to the host
15	environment,	processing environment as part of the activation process
16	(2) one or more storage locations storing said information;	hardware information is stored in the computer's storage
17	(3) integrity programming which (i) causes said machine check	each time the Microsoft program starts up after
18	programming to derive said information,	initial activation, Product Activation checks the originally derived hardware information against current hardware
19	(ii) compares said information	each time the Microsoft program starts up after
20	to information previously stored in said one or more storage locations, and	initial activation, Product Activation checks the originally derived hardware information
21	(iii) generates an indication based on the result of said	against current hardware Product Activation software indicates whether
22	comparison; and	the test has passed or failed
23	(4) programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said indication;	
24	(i) said one or more actions	Product Activation software will allow system
25	including at least temporarily halting further processing.	startup procedures to continue, if test succeeds, or discontinue startup and offer user
26		opportunity to reactivate if the test fails
27		

Exhibit B

293482.02

28

	FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 5,892,900	
5	156.	Product Infringing: Any product using Microsoft Product Activation or Reader Activation feature.
6	A virtual distribution environment comprising	
7	(a) a first host processing environment comprising	computer running a Microsoft product containing the Product Activation feature, including Windows XP, Office XP, Visio 2002 and Reader
	(1) a central processing unit;	CPU of computer
)	(2) main memory operatively connected to said central processing unit;	main memory of computer
	(3) mass storage operatively connected to said central processing unit and said main memory;	hard disk or other mass storage contained in computer
į	(b) said mass storage storing tamper resistant	Microsoft Product Activation software
	software designed to be loaded into said main memory and executed by said central	inficiosoft i foduct Activation software
	processing unit, said tamper resistant software comprising:	
	(1) machine check programming which derives information from one or more	Product Activation software generates hardware information relating to the host
	aspects of said host processing environment,	processing environment as part of the activation process
	(2) one or more storage locations storing said information;	hardware information is stored in the computer's storage
l	(3) integrity programming which	
	(i) causes said machine check programming to derive said information,	each time the Microsoft program starts up after initial activation, Product Activation checks the originally derived hardware information
	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	against current hardware
	(ii) compares said information to information previously stored	each time the Microsoft program starts up after initial activation, Product Activation checks
	in said one or more storage locations, and	the originally derived hardware information against current hardware
	(iii) generates an indication based on the result of said comparison; and	Product Activation software indicates whether the test has passed or failed
	(4) programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said	
	indication;	Decident Assignation was distributed as 1.1.
	(i) said one or more actions including at least temporarily disabling certain functions.	Product Activation may disable the underlying software from generating new files or running user applications if the test fails
I		ees approacions it the test fails

Exhibit B

27

28

2

	157.	Product Infringing: Any product using Microsoft Product Activation or Reader Activation feature.
	A virtual distribution environment comprising	
	(a) a first host processing environment comprising	computer running a Microsoft product containing the Product Activation feature, including Windows XP, Office XP, Visio 2002 and Reader
	(1) a central processing unit;	CPU of computer
	(2) main memory operatively connected to said central processing unit;	main memory of computer
	(3) mass storage operatively connected to said central processing unit and said main memory;	hard disk or other mass storage contained in computer
	(b) said mass storage storing tamper resistant software designed to be loaded into said	Microsoft Product Activation software
	main memory and executed by said central processing unit, said tamper resistant	
	software comprising: (1) machine check programming which	Product Activation software generates hash
	derives information from one or more aspects of said host processing environment,	information relating to the host processing environment as part of the activation process
H	(2) one or more storage locations	hardware information is stored in the
	storing said information; (3) integrity programming which	computer's storage
	(i) causes said machine check programming to derive said	each time the Microsoft program starts up after initial activation, Product Activation checks
	information,	the originally derived hardware information against current hardware
	(ii) compares said information to information previously stored	each time the Microsoft program starts up after initial activation, Product Activation checks
	in said one or more storage locations, and	the originally derived hardware information against current hardware
	(iii) generates an indication based on the result of said	Product Activation software indicates whether the test has passed or failed
	comparison; and (4) programming which takes one or	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	more actions based on the state of said indication;	
	(i) said one or more actions including displaying a message	Product Activation software displays a message to the user if the test fails

Exhibit B | 3

27

28

7		
5	SESSION CEANITANGUAGE SESSION	HERECLAIM OF INFRINGEMENTERS AND THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY
ر	156.	Products infringing: Windows Media Player
6	A virtual distribution environment comprising	
U	a first host processing environment comprising	WMP with Individualized DRM client
7		(referred to hereafter as the Individualized
. ′		WMP) running on a client computer
8	a central processing unit	Client CPU
	main memory operatively connected to said	Client memory
9	central processing unit	<u>.</u>
	mass storage operatively connected to said	Local disk drive
10	central processing unit and said main memory	
	said mass storage storing tamper resistant	Individualized WMP (I-WMP) stored on disk
11	software designed to be loaded into said main	and loaded into main memory upon execution.
	memory and executed by said central	I-WMP is tamper resistant.
12	processing unit, said tamper resistant software	
,,	comprising: machine check programming which derives	Individualization module is generated by the
13.	information from one or more aspects of said	MS individualization service either when the
14	host processing environment,	un-individualized WMP tries to open licensed
* -	nost processing continuing	content that requires a security upgrade (aka,
15		Individualization) or when the user requests an
		upgrade un-provoked. The individualization
16		module is unique and signed and is bound to a
		unique hardware ID using the MS machine
17		activation process.
	one or more storage locations storing said	The aforementioned unique feature are located
18	information	in multiple places or storage locations
,,	integrity programming which	The ID is reconcreted by WAMADDM client
19	causes said machine check programming to	The ID is regenerated by WMP/DRM client when first loading the Individualized DRM
20	derive said information,	Client to access a piece of content requiring the
20		security upgrade.
21	compares said information to information	The program checks the new copy against the
	previously stored in said one or more storage	one to which the Individualized DRM client is
22	locations, and	bound.
ı	generates an indication based on the result of	Program stores the result of this check.
23	said comparison; and	
- 1	programming which takes one or more actions	If these are not equal, the user is notified via a
24	based on the state of said indication .	message stating that he/she must acquire a
.	•	security upgrade (that is, the current security
25		upgrade is invalid). If they are equal then
		processing of songs requiring Individualization
26		continues.
, , l	said one or more actions including at least	Songs targeted to this Individualization module
27	temporarily disabling certain functions.	cannot be accessed until the upgrade is correct.

Exhibit B

293482.02

3	FOR U.S. PATE	NT NO. 5,892,900
4	157. A virtual distribution environment comprising	Infringing products include: Windows Media Player
5	a first host processing environment comprising	See 156
٠	a central processing unit	See 156
6	main memory operatively connected to said central processing unit	See 156
7	mass storage operatively connected to said central processing unit and said main memory	See 156
8	said mass storage storing tamper resistant software designed to be loaded into said main	See 156
9	memory and executed by said central processing unit, said tamper resistant software	
10	comprising: machine check programming which derives	See 156
11	information from one or more aspects of said host processing environment,	·
12	one or more storage locations storing said information	See 156
13	integrity programming which causes said machine check programming to derive said	See 156
14	information compares said information to information previously stored in said one or	
15	more storage locations, and	
16	generates an indication based on the result of said comparison; and	See 156
17	programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said indication	See 156
18.	said one or more actions including displaying a message to the user.	If these are not equal, the user is notified via a message stating that he/she must acquire a security upgrade (that is, the current security
19		upgrade is invalid).
20		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24_		
25		
26		
27		
28		• .

Exhibit B

293482.02

1

3	FOR U.S. PATE	NT NO. 5,892,900
4	CLATM DANGUAGE	WARE CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT AND
5	157.	Infringing Product: Microsoft's Windows File Protection and System File Checker features, embodied in Microsoft's Windows 2000,
6	A virtual distribution environment comprising	Windows XP products, and Server 2003
7	(a) a first host processing environment comprising	computer running Microsoft Windows 2000 or Windows XP.
8		
9	(1) a central processing unit;	CPU of computer
10	(2) main memory operatively connected to said central processing unit;	main memory of computer
11	(3) mass storage operatively connected to said central processing unit and said main memory;	hard disk or other mass storage contained in computer
12 13	(b) said mass storage storing tamper resistant software designed to be loaded into said	Windows File Protection process/service ("WFP") and System File Checker (SFC.exe)
14	main memory and executed by said central processing unit, said tamper resistant	features of winlogon.exe. Winlogon.exe is treated as a "critical" service by the Windows
15	software comprising:	operating system. Files supporting WFP (including winlogon.exe, sfc.exe, sfc.dll (2000 only), sfcfiles.dll (2000 only) and sfc_os.dll
16		(XP only)) are "protected" files and are signed using a signature verified by a hidden key. In
17	•	Windows 2000, WFP uses hidden functions within the sfc.dll library. Functions are imported by "ordinal" instead of "name."
18	(1) machine check programming which derives information from one or more	Winlogon either directly or using another dll (XP) or using SFC.dll (2000) determines if
19 20	aspects of said host processing environment,	changed file was protected, computes the hash of protected files and, if necessary, computes
21		the hash of the file in the dll cache before using it to replace a file overwritten by an incorrect version of the file.
22	(2) one or more storage locations storing said information;	hardware information is stored in the computer's memory
23	(3) integrity programming which	
24	(i) causes said machine check programming to derive said information,	Windows notifies Winlogon when there has been a system directory change or a change in the dll cache.
25		·
26	(ii) compares said information to information previously stored	Winlogon either directly or using another dll (XP) or using SFC.dll (2000) compares
27	in said one or more storage locations, and	computed hash with hash in the hash database created from the Catalog file(s), and, if there is
28		a difference, compares the hash of the file in the dll cache to the hash database created from
	•	

Exhibit B

1

2	(iii) generates an indication	the Catalog file(s) before using it to replace an overwritten file. An event is written to the Event Viewer if
3	based on the result of said companison; and	hashes do not agree.
4 5	(4) programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said indication;	Depending on the circumstances, WFP displays several messages to the user, including prompting the user to contact the system administrator, and to insert a CD-ROM.
6 7	(i) said one or more actions including displaying a message to the user.	See above. Messages also constitute viewable Event Property pop-ups.
8	×	
9		
10		
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
16	•	, · ·
17		•
18		
19	·	
20		· •
21	•	
22		
23		•
24		·
25		
26		
27		
28		

Exhibit B

4		
4	ELECTION DANGUAGE COMPANY	CONTRINGEMENTS AND THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERT
5	6.	Product Infringing: XBox
,	A process comprising the following steps:	The process constitutes assembly and use
6		of components making up an XBox game.
	accessing a first record containing	The first record consists of the second file
7	information directly or indirectly	table on an XBox DVD. This table
	identifying one or more elements of a first	identifies the .xbe file which includes the
.8	component assembly,	game information.
. 9		
9	at least one of said elements including at	The xbe file includes executable
10	least some executable programming,	programming.
10	, in the second of	l - S
11		
	at least one of said elements constituting a	The xbe file is a load module.
12	load module,	77 1 71 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
12	said load module including executable programming and a header;	The xbe file includes a header.
13	at least a portion of said header is a public	Most information the xbe header is not
14	portion which is characterized by a	obfuscated.
	relatively lower level of security	00140341021
15	protection; and	
_	at least a portion of said header is a private	The entry point address and the kernel
16	portion which is characterized, at least	image thunk address listed in the xbe
. 17	some of the time, by a level of security	header are obfuscated and therefore at a
17	protection which is relatively higher than said relatively lower level of security	higher level of security protection.
18	protection,	
	using said information to identify and	The second file table identifies the .xbe
19	locate said one or more elements;	file, including where that file is located.
	accessing said located one or more	The .xbe file is accessed by the XBox.
. 20	elements;	The the is decessed by the 715 cm.
21	securely assembling said one or more	
	elements to form at least a portion of said	At runtime, the .xbe file is assembled with
22	first component assembly;	certain services of the operating system to
1		form a component assembly. Security
23		associated with this assembling process
		includes verifying signatures associated with portions of the .xbe file, and replacing
24	·	obfuscated calls to operating system
25		services with actual addresses.
23		
26		The assembly may also include patch files
		downloaded from a remote server.
27		
	7	
28	executing at least some of said executable	Game play requires execution of the
ŀ	CACCULING ALTOUSE SOME OF SAID CACCUMOTE	: :

Exhibit B

2

1	programming; and	assembled programming.
2	checking said record for validity prior to performing said executing step.	The second file table is protected by a digital signature, and is not loaded/used unless the digital signature is verified against the file.
4		
5	7. A process as in claim 6 in which:	
6	said relatively lower level of security protection comprises storing said public header portion in an unencrypted state; and	The header is protected by the techniques protecting the xbe such as signing and security descriptors, but it is not encrypted except as noted below.
·	said relatively higher level of security	The entry point address and the kernel
8	protection comprises storing said private header portion in an encrypted state.	image thunk address listed in the xbe header are obfuscated. The Xbox SDK's
9	·	(XDK) image build uses a key value shared
10		with the retail XBox to perform two XOR operations against the addresses
11		·
12		·
13		
14		

Exhibit B

17.

STATES CEAIM EANGUAGE STATES	ZEZEZEGEALMIORINFRINGEMENTZEZE
8.	Infringing products: Microsoft CLR or CCL and .NET Framework SDK and products the include one or both of these.
A process comprising the following steps:	
(a) accessing a first record containing information directly or indirectly identifying	The first record is either an assembly manife or a whole assembly; the elements are other assemblies that are referenced as external in
one or more elements of a first component assembly,	the first record; the first component assemble is a .NET application domain.
(1) at least one of said elements including at least some executable programming.	Assembly contains executable programming
(2) at least one of said elements constituting a load module,	This is an external assembly referenced in t first record.
(i) said load module including executable programming and a header;	Assemblies include executable programmin and the assembly manifest and CLS type metadata constitute a header.
(ii) said header including an execution space identifier	This feature is provided for in the .NET architecture through numerous mechanisms,
identifying at least one aspect of an execution space required for	for example, by demands for ZoneID permissions.
use and/or execution of the load module associated with said header;	
(iii) said execution space identifier provides the capability	SecurityZone or other evidence provides the capability.
for distinguishing between execution spaces providing a	
higher level of security and execution spaces providing a lower level of security;	
(b) using said information to identify and	Manifest and type metadata information
locate said one or more elements;	section is used to identify and locate files, co elements, resource elements, individual clas
(c) accessing said located one or more	and methods. Step carried out by the CLR or CCLR loade
elements; (d) securely assembling said one or more	CLR or CCLR carries out this step, including
elements to form at least a portion of said first component assembly;	checking the integrity of the load module, checking the load module's permissions,
,,	placing the load module contents into an application domain, isolating it from malicion
	or badly behaved code, and from code that does not have the permission to call it.
(e) executing at least some of said executable programming; and	Step carried out by the CLR/CCLR and the CLR/CCLR host.

Exhibit B

1

	n	
1	(f) checking said record for validity prior to performing said executing step.	The CLR/CCLR checks the authenticity and the integrity of the first .NET assembly.
2	9. A process as in claim 8 in which said	The CLR/CCLR constitutes a secure
3	execution space providing a higher level of security comprises a secure processing	processing environment.
4 ·	environment. 13. A process as in claim 8 further comprising:	
5	(a) comparing said execution space identifier	In one example, the
6	against information identifying the execution space in which said executing step is to occur;	ZoneIdentityPermissionAttribute SecurityZone value demanded by control in the assembly
	and	manifest is compared against the SecurityZone
7		attribute value corresponding to the calling method
. 8	(b) taking an action if said execution space identifier requires an execution space with a	CLR/CCLR will throw an exception and transfer control to an exception handler in the
9	security level higher than that of the execution	calling routine, or it will shut down the
10	space in which said executing step is to occur.	application if there is no such exception handler, if the permissions do not include the
11	•	permissions required by the ZoneIdentityPermissionAttribute. The
12		ZoneIdentityPermissions are hierarchical, unless customized.
13	14. A process as in claim 13 in which said	CLR/CCLR may terminate the process or transfer control to an exception handler that
	action includes terminating said process prior to said executing step.	may itself terminate the process.
14		
15		
16		·
17		
18		·
19	·	
20		
21	·	
22	· *	
23		
24		
25		
26		
27		
28		
	Fyh	ibit B

3	FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 5,917,912	
4	ZEZ GUAIMUANGUAGE	GLAIM-OF INFRINGEMENT
5	8.	Products infringing include Windows Installer SDK, and products that include the Windows Installer technology.
7	A process comprising the following steps:	Scenario 1: use of Windows Installer packages (i.e., MSI files) to create Windows Installer-
8		enabled applications, such as Office 2000 and used of the WI service to install them.
·ĝ	· · · ·	Scenario 2: software distribution technologies that use the Windows Installer OS service for
10		installation, such as Internet Component Download and products like Office Web
11 12		Components. Either scenario can be used by SMS, IntelliMirror and third party tools like
13		InstallShield and WISE. NT or later operating systems (because they
14		use the subsystem identifier) using cabinet files, .CAB, (because they have a manifest and INF and/or OSD files), and
15		have been signed with a digital signature and will be authenticated by Authenticode or
16	·	WinVerifyTrust API and contain at least one PE (portable executables)
17		· •
18 19	(a) accessing a first record containing information directly or indirectly identifying one or more elements of a first component	Scenario 1: First record is the .MSI file that contains information on what goes in the assembly and how to install the assembly.
20 [.]	assembly,	Scenario 2: A. First record is the cabinet manifest
21		(indirect instructions)
22	·	B. Or, First record can be INF and/or OSD files (direct instructions)
23		,
24	(1) at least one of said elements including at least some executable	Both scenarios: The PE (portable executable) in the cabinet file is the executable
25	programming,	programming.
26	(2) at least one of said elements	Both scenarios: PE is a load module:
27	constituting a load module,	252552752.52.52.7500
28	(i) said load module including executable programming and a	Both scenarios: The PE has several headers.
	Exhi	bit B

Exhibit B

293482.02

1

1	header;	
3 . 4	(ii) said header including an execution space identifier identifying at least one aspect of an execution space required for	Both scenarios: SUBSYTEM is a field in the PE Optional Header that is an execution space
5	use and/or execution of the load module associated with said header;	
6 7	(iii) said execution space identifier provides the capability for distinguishing between	Both scenarios: SUBSYSTEM distinguishes between programs that can run in kernel mode and those that can run in user mode. This is a
8	execution spaces providing a higher level of security and	key security concept of process separation that was introduced with Windows NT.
9	execution spaces providing a lower level of security;	The Subsystem field in the PE header is used by the system to indicate whether the
10 11		executable will run within Ring 3 (user mode) or use Ring 0 (native or kernel mode). Anything running in Ring 3 is limited to its
12		own processing space. Executables running in Ring 0 can reach out to other spaces and have security measure built around them.
13 14	(b) using said information to identify and locate said one or more elements;	Scenario 1: the MSI file identifies and locates the elements
15	roduce said one of more elements,	Scenario 2:
16		.CAB manifest is used to identify Physical location OSD and/or INF is used to identify Logical
17 18	×	location
19	(c) accessing said located one or more elements;	Scenario 1: Using the MSI file
20		Scenario 2: Using INF and/or OSD in cabinet file
21		
22	(d) securely assembling said one or more elements to form at least a portion of said first	Both scenarios: Using the Window Installer OS service with various properties and flags on
24	component assembly;	the settings for higher protection.
25		Windows Installer has numerous flags that the developer can set to indicate how the assembly will be installed, in what privilege level, with
26	·	how much user interface, and how much ability the user has to watch or change what is
27		occurring. These controls have been strengthened with each release of Windows Installer. Windows Installer 1.1 and later has
28		the ability to limit the users capabilities during the installation. In a Windows 2000
	Fyhit	nii Bi

environment and later, using the Group Policybased Change and Configuration Management, 2 the administrator has the most control 3 Fields that can be set by the developer or administrator to control what users can do include the following: Transformssecure can be set to a value of 1 5 to inform the installer that transforms are to be cached locally on the user's computer in a 6 location the user does not have write access. (Transforms create custom installations from a 7 basic generic installation, for example to make the Finance versions different from the 8 Marketing version or English versions different from Japanese versions.) 9 AllowLockdownBrowse and DisableBrowse can prevent users from browsing to the 10 sources. SourceList can be used to specify the only 11 allowable source to be used for the installation of a given component. 12 Environment can be used to specify whether the installation can be done while the user is 13 logged on or only when no user is logged on. Security Summary Property conveys whether 14 a package can be opened as read-only or with no restriction. 15 Privileged Property is used by developers of installer packages to make the installation 16 conditional upon system policy, the user being an administrator, or assignment by an 17 administrator. Restricted Public Properties can be set as 18 variables for an installation. "For managed installations, the package author may need to 19 limit which public properties are passed to the server side and can be changed by a user that is 20 not a system administrator. Some are commonly necessary to maintain a secure 21 environment when the installation requires the installer use elevated privileges. " 22 SecureCustomProperties can be created by the author of an installation package to add 23 controls beyond the default list. MsiSetInternalUI specifies the level of user 24 interface from none to full. A Sequence Table can be used to specify the 25 required order of execution for the installation process. There are three modes, one of which is 26 the Administrative Installation that is used by the network administrator to assign and install 27 applications. InstallServicesAction registers a service for 28 the system and it can only be used if the user is

	II	1
1		
1	·	an administrator or has elevated privileges with
2		permission to install services or that the application is part of a managed installation.
3		Disable Media system policy disables media
,		sources and disables browsing to media
4		sources. It can be used with <i>DisableBrowse</i> to secure installations version 1.1 that doesn't
5		have some of the other capabilities.
		AlwaysInstallElevated can be set per user or
6		per machine and is used to install managed applications with elevated privileges.
7		AllowLockdownBrowse,
_		AllowLockdownMedia and AllowLockdownPatch set these capabilities so
8	-	they can only be performed by an administrator
9		during an elevated installation. [See article "HowTo: Configure Windows
10		Installer for Maximum Security (Q247528).
		Windows XP Professional and .NET have the
11	·	additional capability to set Software Restriction
12		Policies and have these used by Windows
		Installer.
13	·	In addition, most of the software distribution
14	·	technologies that use Windows Installer also add a layer of their own controls. For example,
15		SMS 2.0 enables the administrators to control
		the installation is optional or required and whether the user can affect the installation
16		contents/features at all.
17	(e) executing at least some of said executable	Both scenarios: Part of executable is called
18	programming; and	during installation in order to do self- registration or perform custom actions. The
		overall executable is used at runtime.
19	·	
20	(f) checking said record for validity prior to	Scenario 1: Sign the overall package and the
21	performing said executing step.	cabinet files.
21	·	Scenario 2: The cabinet file is signed.
22		For IE with the default security level or higher,
23		the digital signature is verified by
		Authenticode or a similar utility before the
24		component is allowed to be assembled.
25		
26		
		1
27	·	
28		* 41
1	Exhi	bit B

•	FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 5,917,912	
5	35.	Products infringing include all products that host the Microsoft .NET Common Language Runtime or Compact Common Language Runtime.
6	A process comprising the following steps:	Ruitine.
7	(a) at a first processing environment receiving a first record from a second processing	Computer running the Microsoft CLR/CCLR receives, for example, a shared assembly
. 8	environment remote from said first processing environment;	header or a complete shared assembly from another computer, for example a server.
9	(1) said first record being received in a secure container;	The shared assembly is cryptographically hashed and signed.
10	(2) said first record containing identification information directly or	The first record is either an assembly manifest, or a whole assembly; the elements are other
11 12	indirectly identifying one or more elements of a first component assembly;	assemblies that are referenced as external in the first record; the first component assembly is a .NET application domain.
13	(i) at least one of said elements including at least some executable programming;	Assembly contains executable programming.
14	(ii) said component assembly allowing access to or use of	The specified information can include any kind of data file, stream, log, environment variables,
15 16	specified information; (3) said secure container also including a first of said elements;	The shared assembly includes at least some executable programming.
17	(b) accessing said first record	CLR/CCLR accesses the assembly or assembly header.
18 19	(c) using said identification information to identify and locate said one or more elements;	Manifest and type metadata information section is used to identify and locate files, code elements, resource elements, individual classes and methods.
20	(1) said locating step including locating a second of said elements at a third	Met by a multifile assembly, with files distributed across a network, or by the second
21	processing environment located remotely from said first processing environment and said second	element constituting another referenced assembly located elsewhere; the CLR/CCLR uses probing to locate and access the file.
22	processing environment;	
23	(d) accessing said located one or more elements;	Step carried out by the CLR/CCLR loader.
24	(1) said element accessing step including retrieving said second	Step carried out by the CLR/CCLR loader.
25	element from said third processing environment;	CAR (COLD
26 27	(e) securely assembling said one or more elements to form at least a portion of said first	CLR/CCLR carries out this step, including checking the integrity of the load module,
28	component assembly specified by said first record; and	checking the load module's permissions, placing the load module contents into an application domain, isolating it from malicious or badly behaved code, and from code that
		4

Exhibit B

2

programming	at least some of said executal	
(1) said 1	id executing step taking place irst processing environment.	e at CLR/CCLR is operating in the first processin environment specified above.
·		
	•	
		•
<u>-</u> ••-••		
	· ·	

293482.02

3	FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 5,920,861	
4		
5	34.	Product Infringing: Microsoft Operating Systems that support device driver signature technology
6	A descriptive data structure embodied on a	signature technology
7	computer-readable medium or other logic device including the following elements:	
8	a representation of the format of data contained in a first rights management data	The driver package's INF is a data structure. The INF contains multiple types
9.	structure	of sections, structured as hierarchy "branches," that the Windows operating
10		system or its Plug and Play and/or Set-up installation services "branch" through
11		based on the operating system information and device for which a driver is to be installed. The installation services use the
12 13		"branching" structure (format) to determine what files should be installed. The INF,
14	·	further provides disk location information and file directory path information for the
15		files identified as necessary as a result of the "branching" process.
16		The driver package is a "rights
17	·	management" data structure based on the fact that it is governed and based on the fact that it processes governed information.
18	•	Rights Management as Governed Item
19		A driver manufacturer can include rules
20		governing the driver's installation and/or use in the driver's INF file. For example:
21		Security entries specify an access control
22		list for the driver. Driver developers can specify rules that
23		determine behavior of the driver package based on the user's operating system
24		version, including product type and suite and the device for which the driver is to be
25		installed Rules specifying logging
26		Local administrators can establish policy as
27		to what action or notification should occur in the event that a driver being installed is
28		not signed.
İ		

1

1 2 3 4 5		The operating system installation services have a ranking criteria it follows when multiple drivers are available for a newly detected device. The criterion is used to determine the driver best suited for ensuring compatibility with the operating system and ensuring functionality of the device.
6		Drivers have been certified to be
		compatible with specified operating system versions for their respective device classes.
7.		The catalog file protects the integrity of the driver.
8.	•	Microsoft distributes the Driver Protection
9		List to prevent known bad deriver from being installed.
11		Processing Rights Managed Items
12	·	Certain drivers (SAP) have been explicitly certified to protect DRM content.
13	·	MSDN – DRM Overview
14	,	A DRM-compliant driver must prevent unauthorized copying while digital content
15 16		is being played. In addition, the driver must disable all digital outputs that can transmit the content over a standard interface (such
17		as S/PDIF) through which the decrypted content can be captured.
18	said representation including:	
19	element information contained within said first rights management data	The elements of a driver package include: A driver that is typically a dynamic-link
20	structure; and	library with the sys filename extension. An INF file containing information that the
21		system Setup components use to install support for the device.
22		A driver catalog file containing the digital signature.
23		One or more optional co-installers which are a Win32® DLL that assists in device
24	•	installation NT-based operating systems. Other files, such as a device installation
25		application, a device icon, and so forth.
26		XP DDK - INF Version Section
27		The LayoutFile entry specifies one or more
		additional system-supplied INF files that contain layout information on the source
28		media required for installing the software
1	·	

1		described in this INF. All system-supplied
2		INF files specify this entry.
3		The CatalogFile entry specifies a catalog (.cat) file to be included on the distribution
4	organization information regarding	media of a device/driver. Within an INF is a hierarchy with the top
5	the organization of said elements	being a list of manufacturers, and sub-lists
6	within said first rights management data structure; and	of models and at the bottom a list of install information by model.
7		For Windows XP and later versions of NT- based operating systems, entries in the
. 8		Manufacturer section can be decorated to specify operating system versions. The
9		specified versions indicate OS versions with which the specified INF Models
10		sections will be used. If no versions are specified, Setup uses the specified Models
11		section for all versions of all operating
12		systems.
13		INF's SourceDisksNames and SourceDisksFiles sections specify
13		organization information.
14		XP DDK Source Media for INFs The methods you should use to specify
15		source media for device files depend on whether your INFs ship separately from the
16		operating system or are included with the
17		operating system. INFs for drivers that are delivered
18		separately from the operating system specify where the files are located using
		SourceDisksNames and SourceDisksFiles sections.
19		If the files to support the device are
20	·	included with the operating system, the INF must specify a LayoutFile entry in the
21		Version section of the file. Such an entry specifies where the files reside on the
22		operating system media. An INF that
23	·	specifies a LayoutFile entry must not include SourceDisksNames and
		SourceDisksFiles sections.
24		XP DDK – INF SourceDisksNames Section
25		A SourceDisksNames section identifies the distribution disks or CD-ROM discs
26		that contain the source files to be
		transferred to the target machine during installation. Relevant values of an entry in
27		the INF include:
28		diskid Specifies a source disk. disk-description - Describes the contents
ŀ		i disk-description - Describes the contents

		•
1		and/or purpose of the disk identified by
2		diskid. tag-or-cab-file This optional value
3		specifies the name of a tag file or cabinet file
		supplied on the distribution disk, either in the installation root or in the subdirectory
4		specified by path, if any.
5	1.1	path This optional value specifies the
		path to the directory on the distribution disk containing source files. The path is
6		relative to the installation root and is
7	·	expressed as \(\dirname \) \(\lambda \) irname 2 and so forth.
8		flags For Windows XP and later, setting
		this to 0x10 forces Setup to use cab-or-tag- file as a cabinet file name, and to use tag-
. 9		file as a tag file name. Otherwise, flags is
10		for internal use only. tag-file For Windows XP and later, if
11	·	flags is set to 0x10, this optional value
11		specifies the name of a tag file supplied on
12		the distribution medium, either in the installation root or in the subdirectory
13		specified by path. The value should specify
1.4	·	the file name and extension without path information.
14		XP DDK INF SourceDisksFiles Section
15		A SourceDisksFiles section names the source files used during installation,
16		identifies the source disks (or CD-ROM
		discs) that contain those files, and provides the path to the subdirectories, if any, on the
17		distribution disks containing individual
18		files. Relevant values in an entry in the INF would include:
19		filename Specifies the name of the file on
	; ·	the source disk. diskid Specifies the integer identifying
20		the source disk that contains the file. This
21		value and the initial path to the subdir(ectory), if any, containing the
22		named file must be defined in a
		SourceDisksNames section of the same INF.
23		subdir This optional value specifies the
24		subdirectory (relative to the SourceDisksNames path specification, if
25		any) on the source disk where the named
	information relating to metadata, said	file resides.
26	metadata including:	
27	metadata rules used at least in part to govern at least one aspect of use and/or	The driver manufacture can specify rules in the INF that govern the installation and/or
28	display of content stored within a rights	use of the driver. For example, security
	management data structure,	entries specify an access control list for the
- 1		!1

driver. Driver developers can specify rules in an INF file that determines behavior of the driver package based on the user's operating system version, including product type and suite. Also, rules related to logging can be specified as mentioned in next claim element.

For Example – Access Control List Rules

XP DDK - Tightening File-Open
Security in a Device INF File
For Microsoft Windows 2000 and later,
Microsoft tightened file-open security in
the class installer INFs for certain device
classes, including CDROM, DiskDrive,
FDC, FloppyDisk, HDC, and
SCSIAdapter.

If you are unsure whether the class installer for your device has tightened security on file opens, you should tighten security by using the device's INF file to assign a value to the DeviceCharacteristics value name in the registry. Do this within an addregistry-section, which is specified using the INF AddReg directive.

XP-DDK -- INF AddReg Directive

An INF can also contain one or more optional add-registry-section.security sections, each specifying a security descriptor that will be applied to all registry values described within a named add-registry-section.

A Security entry specifies a security descriptor for the device. The security-descriptor-string is a string with tokens to indicate the DACL (D:) security component. A class-installer INF can specify a security descriptor for a device class. A device INF can specify a security descriptor for an individual device, overriding the security for the class. If the class and/or device INF specifies a security-descriptor-string, the PnP Manager propagates the descriptor to all the device objects for a device, including the FDO, filter DOs, and the PDO.

For Example – Operating System Versioning

Operating-System Versioning for Drivers

	1	
1		under Windows XP
2		Setup selects the [Models] section to use based on the following rules:
· 4		If the INF contains [Models] sections for
5		several major or minor operating system version numbers, Setup uses the section with the highest version numbers that are
6		not higher than the operating system version on which the installation is taking
7		place.
8		If the INF [Models] sections that match the operating system version also include
. 9	·	product type decorations, product suite decorations, or both, then Setup selects the section that most closely matches the
10		running operating system.
11	said metadata rules including at least one rule specifying that information relating to at least one use or display of	The AddService directive can set up event- logging services for drivers. INF AddService Directive
12	said content be recorded and/or	An AddService directive is used to control
13	reported.	how (and when) the services of particular Windows 2000 or later device's drivers are loaded, any dependencies on other
14	·	underlying legacy drivers or services, and so forth. Optionally, this directive sets up
15 16		event-logging services by the devices/drivers as well.
17	·	Relevant sections of the directive's entry include:
18		event-log-install-section -Optionally references an INF-writer-defined section in
19		which event-logging services for this device (or devices) are set up. EventLogType Optionally specifies one
20	*	of System, Security, or Application. If omitted, this defaults to System, which is
21		almost always the appropriate value for the installation of device drivers. For example,
22,		an INF would specify Security only if the to-be-installed driver provides its own
23	·	security support. EventName Optionally specifies a name
24		to use for the event log. If omitted, this defaults to the given ServiceName.
25	·	
26	35. A descriptive data structure as in claim	
27	34, in which: said first rights management data structure	The driver package is secured through a
28	comprises a first secure container.	catalog file that is signed by Microsoft's Windows Hardware Quality Lab and

2		contains the hash of each file of the driver's package. The INF identifies the catalog file used to sign the driver package.
. 4	36. A descriptive data structure as in claim 35, in which:	
· 4 5	said first secure container comprises:	The first secure container is the driver package secured by a catalog file.
6	said content; and	The content is the driver and related files within the signed driver package.
7	rules at least in part governing at least . one use of said content.	The rules are within the INF, which is part of the signed driver package.
8	37. A descriptive data structure as in claim 36, wherein the descriptive data structure is stored in said first secure container.	The INF is stored within the signed driver package.
10	44. A descriptive data structure as in claim	
11	34, further including: a representation of the format of data	The manufacture and models sections in
12	contained in a second rights management data structure,	the INF Version section are provided for the possibility of a single INF representing the format for multiple drivers.
13		Operating system version "decorating"
14	·	relating the architecture, major and minor operating systems versions, product and
15 16	·	suit information all relate to the target environment and is used to identify the files necessary for the target environment.
17		An INF file, such as in the case of
18		operating system targeting, can be used for more than one driver package since it can contain more than one catalog file.
19		Further an INF can address the drives
20	said second rights management data	necessary for a multi-functional device. The files of the second data structure would
21 22	structure differing in at least one respect from said first rights management data structure.	vary from the files on the first data structure.
. [
23	45. A descriptive data structure as in claim 44, in which:	DIE : C 1
25	said information regarding elements contained within said first rights	INF specify where the driver files are located using the SourceDiskNames and SourceDiskFiles sections.
26	management data structure includes information relating to the location of at least one such element.	SOURCEDISM HES SECTIONS.
27	46. A descriptive data structure as in claim	
28	44, further including: a first target data block including	Operating system version "decorating"
	information relating to a first target	relating the architecture, major and minor
	F.	Exhibit B

1 2	environment in which the descriptive data structure may be used.	operating systems versions, product and suit information all relate to the first target environment.
3		J. SHANDING.
	47. A descriptive data structure as in claim 46, further including:	
5	a second target data block including information relating to a second target environment in which the descriptive data	Operating system version decorating will cover multiple operating systems.
6	structure may be used,	
7	said second target environment differing in at least one respect from said first target environment.	This is the reason for version decorating.
8		
9	48. A descriptive data structure as in claim 46, further including:	
10	a source message field containing information at least in part identifying the	The provider entry in the version section of the INF identifies the provider of the INF file. Also, the INF contains a manufacture
11	source for the descriptive data structure.	section.
12		
13	·	
14		
15		
16	·	
17		
18		
19	·	
20		
21		
22		2
23		
24		
25		
	•	·
26		
27		
28		ri .
٠		

. 4	影響	CENTRAL CONTRACTOR CON	STATE CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT STATES
· 1	58.		Product Infringing: Microsoft Reader SDK and Microsoft Digital Asset Server.
6		nethod of creating a first secure ntainer, said method including the	Method is carried out by Microsoft's Digital Asset Server and Microsoft's
O	fol	lowing steps;	.Litgen tools
7	(a)	accessing a descriptive data structure, said descriptive data structure	opf file describing the file structure of a protected e-book including metadata,
8		including or addressing	manifest, and "spine" information
9		(1) organization information at least in part describing a required or desired organization of a content	Organization information regarding organization of the ebook and the inscription as specified in the manifest and
10		section of said first secure container, and	spine information in the .opf file
11		(2) metadata information at least in part specifying at least one step	Metadata constitutes rules specifying the degree of security to use and/or XrML
12		required or desired in creation of said first secure container;	rules
13	(b)	using said descriptive data structure to organize said first secure container	e-book packaging carried out by Microsoft Litgen tool
14	(0)	using said metadata information to at	Step performed by Digital Asset Server;
15	(c)	least in part determine specific information required to be included in	example of specific information is owner/purchaser information required in
16		said first secure container contents; and	the inscription process
17	(d)	generating or identifying at least one rule designed to control at least one	Analyzing the metadata and finally packaging the e-book using a particular
18		aspect of access to or use of at least a portion of said first secure container	security level specified through the metadata
19	01	contents.	
20	71. (a)	A method as in claim 58, in which: said specific information required to	Owner purchaser information required in
21	•	be included includes information at least in part identifying at least one	the inscription process; XrML rule requiring display of copyright notice
22		owner or creator of at least a portion of said first secure container contents.	

Exhibit B

293482.02

. 25

-4	FOR U.S. PA	TENT NO. 5,920,861
5	58.	Product Infringing: All products that host the Microsoft Common Language Runtime or Compact Common Language Runtime.
. 6	A method of creating a first secure	Method is practiced by a user using the
7	container, said method including the following steps;	Common Language Runtime (CLR) or Compact Common Language Runtime
8		(CCLR) to create a dynamic shared assembly or .NET Framework SDK to
9	(a) accessing a descriptive data structure,	.NET framework Assembly class and/or
10	(a) accessing a descriptive data structure, said descriptive data structure including or addressing	AssemblyInfo file
11	(1) organization information at least in part describing a required or	This information is specified in the classes named above and in the AssemblyInfo file.
12	desired organization of a content section of said first secure	-
13	container, and (2) metadata information at least in	This information is addressed in the classes
14	part specifying at least one step required or desired in creation of	and the AssemblyInfo file, e.g., for a shared assembly metadata will be specified that
15	said first secure container;	the assembly is to be signed using specified key
16	(b) using said descriptive data structure to	This step is carried out by applications and tools using the classes and assembly info
17	organize said first secure container contents;	file, including CLR (or CCLR) and .NET Framework SDK
18	(c) using said metadata information to at least in part determine specific	This step is carried out by applications and tools using the assembly info file and
19	information required to be included in said first secure container contents;	classes that specify the metadata required in the target assembly
20	and (d) generating or identifying at least one	User may specify rules, as specified in the
21	rule designed to control at least one aspect of access to or use of at least a	NET Framework SDK, to be placed in the assembly manifest including such rules
22	portion of said first secure container contents.	requiring that all code be managed (CLR or CCLR compliant), "Code Access Security"
23		permissions be supplied for use of code supplied in the assembly, etc
24	64. A method as in claim 58, in which:	Con he a compar DC or workstation marries
25	(a) said creation of said first secure container occurs at a first data processing arrangement located at a	Can be a server, PC or workstation running CLR (or CCLR) to create a dynamic shared assembly or .NET Framework SDK to
26	first site;	create a shared assembly)
27	(b) said first data processing arrangement including a communications port; and	Included in virtually any computer
	(c) said method further includes:	
28	(1) prior to said step of accessing said	Download of the assemblyinfo file and/or a file containing a class calling the
	descriptive data structure, said	inc containing a class carring the

Exhibit B

1

2

		•
i	first data processing arrangement	DefineDynamicAssembly methods or download of SDK containing
2	receiving said descriptive data structure from a second data processing arrangement located at	assemblybuilder class from a second site
3	a second site,	
· 4	(d) said receipt occurring through said first data processing arrangement	Communications port is normally used for downloading
5	communications port. 67. A method as in claim 64, further	
6	comprising: at said first processing site, receiving said	Download of the AssemblyInfo file and/or
7	metadata through said communications port.	a file containing a class calling the DefineDynamicAssembly methods or
8.		download of SDK containing assemblybuilder class from a second site
. 9	68. A method as in claim 67, in which, (a) said metadata is received separately	Method practiced when metadata names are
10	from said descriptive data structure.	addressed by the assembly class and a template for the AssemblyInfo file, and
11		values corresponding to those names are received through a user interface such as
12		provided by Microsoft Visual Studio or are provided from a separate file
13	71. A method as in claim 58, in which:	The Assembly class definition includes
14	(a) said specific information required to be included includes information at	attributes for company name and trademark
15	least in part identifying at least one owner or creator of at least a portion of	information, and these may be required attributes specified in the AssemblyInfo file
16	said first secure container contents. 72. A method as in claim 58, in which:	
17	(a) said specific information required to be included includes a copyright	The Assembly class definition includes an attribute for copyright field that may be required by the AssemblyInfo file
18	notice.	required by the Assembly into the
19	·	
20		
21	_	
22		
23		
24		
25		
	•	•
26		
27		
28		

NAME OF THE PERSON OF THE PERS	THE COUNTY OF THE PARTY OF THE
CLAIM LANGUAGE 46 37	CLAIMOPINERINGEMENTS :
58.	Product Infringing: Microsoft .NET Framework, Visual Studio .NET, and tools that include the Assembly Generator tool AL.exe.
A method of creating a first secure container, said method including the following steps;	The Assembly Generation tool generates a portable execution file with an assembly manifest from one or more files that are either Microsoft intermediate language (MSIL) modules or resource files. When using the tool's signing option, the assembly becomes a secure container.
(a) accessing a descriptive data structure, said descriptive data structure including or addressing	The descriptive data structure is the text file used as input by the Assembly Generation tool.
(1) organization information at least in part describing a required or desired organization of a content section of said first secure container, and	The DDS specifies the link and or embed directives to indicate which source files should be included in the assembly, how the included resource will be tagged, and if the resource will be private. Private resources are not visible to other assemblies. These tags are used to organize the assembly into named sections. Private attributes are used to organize the assembly into both public and private sections. (Public sections are the default.)
(2) metadata information at least in part specifying at least one step required or desired in creation of said first secure container;	The text file can contain "options" relating to how the assembly should be built and additional information that should be included.
	Main – Specifies the method to use as an entry point when converting a module to an executable file. Algid – Specifies an algorithm to hash all files.
	Comp – Specifies string for the Company field. Conf – Specifies string for Configuration field Copy – Specifies string for Copyright field. Culture – Specifies the culture string to
	associate with the assembly. Delay - Variation of this option specifies whether the assembly will be

Exhibit E

1				.·
2				fully or partially signed and whether the public key is placed in the assembly.
3				Description - Specifies the description field.
				Evidence - Embeds file in the assembly
4			원 사람들은 생활을 받는데 되었다.	with the resource name Security.Evidence.
5				Fileversion - Specifies the file version of the assembly.
6			·	Flags – Specifies flags for such things
7				as the assembly is side-by-side compatible, assembly cannot execute
	1			with other versions if either they are
8	•			executing in the same application domain, process or computer.
٠ 9		ŀ		Keyf - Specifies a file that contains a
10	-			key or key pair to sign an assembly. Keyn - Specifies the container that holds
				a key pair.
11				Product - Specifies string for Product field.
12				Producty – Specifies string for Product Version.
13.				Template - Specifies the assembly fro
14				which to inherit all assembly metadata. Title - Specifies string for Title field.
				Trade – Specifics string for Trademark
15			<u></u>	field. V-Specifies version information.
16		(b)		The following directives are used to specify
17			organize said first secure container contents	which files are to be compiled into the assembly, how they will be tagged, and
			Concilia	whether or not they will be visible to other
18	1			assemblies, AKA private:
19			,	Embed[name, private] - copies the content of the file into the assembly and
20		- 1		applies an optional name tag, and
21			·	optional private attribute. Link[name, private] - file becomes part
			·	of the assembly via a link and applies an
22	.			optional name tag, and optional private attribute.
23		(c)		The following are some of the "options"
24			least in part determine specific information required to be included in	address what information should be included in the secure container:
25			said first secure container contents;	Main - Specifies the method to use as
			and	an entry point when converting a
26				module to an executable file. Comp - Specifies string for the
27				Company field.
28				Conf – Specifies string for Configuration field
20				Copy - Specifies string for Copyright
				•

		field. Culture – Specifies the culture string to associate with the assembly. Description – Specifies the description field. Evidence – Embeds file in the assembly with the resource name Security. Evidence. Fileversion – Specifies the file version of the assembly. Flags – Specifies flags for such things as the assembly is side-by-side compatible, assembly cannot execute with other versions if either they are executing in the same application domain, process or computer. Keyf – Specifies a file that contains a key or key pair to sign an assembly. Keyn – Specifies the container that holds a key pair. Product – Specifies string for Product field. Productv – Specifies string for Product Version.
		Template – Specifies the assembly fro which to inherit all assembly metadata. Title – Specifies string for Title field. Trade – Specifics string for Trademark field. V – Specifies version information.
(d)	generating or identifying at least one rule designed to control at least one aspect of access to or use of at least a portion of said first secure container contents.	User may specify rules, as specified in the .NET Framework SDK, to be placed in the assembly manifest including such rules requiring that all code be managed (CLR compliant), "Code Access Security" permissions be supplied for use of code supplied in the assembly, etc.
71.	A method as in claim 58, in which:	
(a)	said specific information required to be included includes information at least in part identifying at least one owner or creator of at least a portion of said first secure container contents.	The following "options" specifies owner and creator information: Comp - Specifies string for the Company field. Copy - Specifies string for Copyright field. Trade - Specifics string for Trademark field.
72.	A method as in claim 58, in which:	
(a)	said specific information required to be included includes a copyright notice.	The copy "option" specifies the string for the for the Copyright field.

.4

	FOR U.S. TATE	110.5,702,071
. 3	SECULIA MEANGUAGE SECULIAR	GLATMOEINFRINGEMENT
4 5	1.	Products infringing: All products that include the Common Language Runtime or Compact Common Language Runtime or Common Language Infrastructure.
6	A method for using at least one resource processed in a secure operating environment at	Resource may constitute a Microsoft Windows process or hardware element; secure operating
7	a first appliance, said method comprising:	environment is Microsoft Common Language Runtime ("CLR") environment, Common
. 8		Language Infrastructure ("CLI") or Compact CLR ("CCLR"); first appliance is computer
9		running CLR, CLI or Compact CLR. Two infringing scenarios are set forth herein: (1)
10		For CLR, an administrator, using the .NET framework caspol.exe tool remotely configures
11	·	security policy in a .NET configuration file for a machine, enterprise, user, or application and
12	· .	that security policy interacts with rules or evidence declared in a shared assembly
13		provided by another entity ("1st scenario"); and (2) for CLR, CLI and CCLR two assemblies
14		are delivered to an appliance; the first assembly has a rule that demands permissions
15		from a caller in the second assembly, and the second assembly includes a control that asserts
16		such permissions or provides evidence that convinces the runtime that it has such
17		permissions. ("2 nd scenario"). In each scenario Microsoft .NET "Code Access Security"
18		framework or "Role Based Security" framework is used.
19	(a) securely receiving a first entity's control at	1 st scenario: first entity is the administrator,
20	said first appliance, said first entity being located remotely from said operating	and the policy that constitutes this entity's control is securely received at the first
21	environment and said first appliance;	appliance through a session established between the administrator's computer and the
22		first appliance, requiring security credentials such as the administrator's login and password
23		or other secure session means. 2 nd scenario: first entity is creator or distributor
24	- marked to a control of the control	of the first assembly, assembly manifest
25		includes a control demanding or refusing or otherwise asserting a security action on
26		permissions from a caller; first assembly is integrity-checked.
27	(b) securely receiving a second entity's control at said first appliance, said second entity being	Second entity's control is contained in shared assembly manifest (and therefore integrity
28	located remotely from said operating environment and said first appliance, said	protected) that provides evidence for obtaining permissions, or asserts permissions; assembly
	second entity being different from said first	creator/distributor is located remotely and is
}		

Exhibit B

1

· 1	entity; and	not the administrator (1 st scenario) or creator/distributor of the first container (2 nd scenario);
3 4 5 6 7 8 9	(c) securely processing a data item at said first appliance, using at least one resource, including securely applying, at said first appliance through use of said at least one resource said first entity's control and said second entity's control to govern use of said data item. 51. A method as in claim 1 wherein at least said secure processing step is performed at an end user electronic appliance.	Secure processing is carried out by CLR, CLI or CCLR, Data item constitutes an executable code element, an interface controlled by such an executable, a data collection or stream (such as media file or stream or text file) or an environment variable. CLR, CLI or CCLR securely processes the rules, which will in both scenarios govern access to methods and data from the first assembly. The resource named in the claim is, e.g., a Windows process that is established by the runtime or hardware element on the computer. Consumer computer or appliance running Microsoft CLR, CLI or CCLR).
11 12 13	58. A method as in claim 1 wherein the step of securely receiving a first entity's control comprises securely receiving said first entity's control from a remote location over a telecommunications link, and the step of	1 st scenario 1: link is LAN or WAN; 2 nd scenario: link is any telecommunications link, including the internet.
14 15	securely receiving said second entity's control comprises securely receiving said second entity's control from the same or different remote location over the same or different telecommunications link.	
16 17 18	65. A method as in claim 1 wherein the processing step includes processing said first and second controls within the same secure processing environment.	Secure processing environment is CLR, CLI or CCLR running on user's computer or appliance.
19 20 21	71. A method as in claim 1 further including the step of securely combining said first entity's control and said second entity's control to provide a combined control arrangement.	In scenario 2, arrangement consists of the stack frame, and the corresponding array of permission grants for assemblies on the stack, and the permission demanded by the first assembly. Secure combining performed by the CLR, CLI or CCLR.
22	76. A method as in claim 1 wherein said two securely receiving steps are independently	Steps are performed at different times in both scenarios.
2324	performed at different times. 84. A method as in claim 1 wherein at least one of the first entity's control and the second	In both scenarios the second entity supplies an assembly with a demand procedure executed
25	entity's control comprises at least one executable component and at least one data	by the CLR, CLI or CCLR. The data component is a specific attribute value referenced by the assembly.
26 27	89. A method as in claim 1 wherein said first appliance includes a protected processing environment, and wherein:	Microsoft Common Language Runtime (CLR), Common Language Infrastructure (CLI), or Compact Common Language Runtime (CCLR)
28	(a) said method further comprises a step of receiving, at said first appliance, said data item	Typically occurs in both scenarios.

	separately and at a different time from said	
	separately and at a different time from said receiving said first entity's control; and (b) said securely processing step is performed at least in part in said protected processing	Protected processing environment is the CLR CLI or CCLR.
	environment	CEI of CCEIC
╟		
	:	
		:
		• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
	•	
	·	
	·	•
		·
		• • •
	· .	
		•

2	FOR U.S. PATE	NT NO. 5,982,891
3		
	22.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and
'4 .		included applications, and Server 2003,
5		including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using
ر	· ·	Passport
6	A method of securely controlling use by a third	A user (third party) accesses an IRM-protected
-	party of at least one protected operation with	data item governed by IRM controls under two
7	respect to a data item comprising:	or more RMS servers. For example, the data
	,	item may be a IRM-protected document.
8	·	The IDM centrals may be accepted with the
9.		The IRM controls may be associated with the data item directly or via a IRM-protected
9		container holding the IRM-protected data item,
10		such as an IRM-protected email with the IRM-
		protected document attached.
11	(a) supplying at least a first control from a first	The user acquires a first use license from a first
	party to said third party;	RMS server (first party) enabling access to, the
12	*	IRM-protected data item under the IRM rules associated with the first RMS server. For
13	•	example: (1) the first use license from the first
		RMS server permits the user to access a IRM-
14		protected document contained within or
		attached to an IRM-protected email; or (2) the
15		first use license from the first RMS server
16	·	applies a first set of IRM rules to an IRM- protected document.
10	(b) supplying, to said third party, at least a	The user acquires a second use license from a
17	second control from a second party different	second RMS server (second party) enabling
	from said first party;	access to the IRM-protected data item under
18	•	the IRM rules associated with the second RMS
10		server. For example: (1) in addition to the
19		user being given access to an IRM-protected email based on a first use license, a second
20		RMS server provides a second use license
		enabling access to the IRM-protected
21		document attached thereto; or (2) the second
		use license from the second RMS server
22		applies a second set of IRM rules to the IRM-
23	(c) securely combining at said third party's	protected document. The first and second use licenses are combined
	location, said first and second controls to form	to form a control arrangement that governs
24	a control arrangement;	access to the IRM-protected data item.
	,	
25	(d) securely requiring use of said control	The combined first and second use licenses
26	arrangement in order to perform at least one	govern access to the IRM-protected data item.
26	protected operation using said data item; and	The year performs a protected operation (a.c.
27	(e) securely performing said at least one	The user performs a protected operation (e.g., read, print, edit) on the IRM-protected data
	protected operation on behalf of said third party with respect to said data item by at least	item. The combined first and second use
28	in part employing said control arrangement	licenses are employed to permit the protected
	Fb.o.)B o o a	operation.
		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

Exhibit B

	ti	1
	·	
1	23. A method as in claim 22 wherein said data	The data item is encrypted and protected by IRM.
2	item is protected. 39. A method as in claim 22 further including	The first and/or second use license are securely
3	securely and persistently associating at least one of: (a) said first control, (b) said second	and persistently associated with the IRM- protected data item.
4	control, and (c) said control arrangement, with said data item.	
5	53. A method as in claim 22 wherein at least two of the recited steps are performed at an end	Steps performed at a user's computer or appliance.
6	user electronic appliance. 60. A method as in claim 22 wherein step (a)	The first and second use licenses are received
7	comprises supplying said first control from at least one remote location over a	over a telecommunications link such as a networking or modem/serial interface.
8.	telecommunications link, and step (b) comprises supplying said second control from	
9	the same or different remote location over the same or different telecommunications link	
10	67. A method as in claim 22 wherein at least	Steps are performed at user's computer or appliance.
11	step (c) is performed within the same secure processing environment at said third party's location.	арриансе.
12	91. A method as in claim 22 wherein:	TI C
13.	(a) said method further comprises supplying said data item to said third party separately and	The first use license (first control) is received at the time that the user accesses the data item,
14	at a different time from supplying of said first control to said third party; and	which occurs separately and at a different time from receipt of the IRM-protected data item itself.
15	(b) said securely performing step comprises	The protected operations require decryption of
16	performing said protected operation at least in part in a protected processing environment.	the protected content, which is done inside the RM lockbox. The RM lockbox is protected by
17		RM lockbox. The RM lockbox is protected by mechanisms such as obfuscation, anti-
17 18		RM lockbox. The RM lockbox is protected by mechanisms such as obfuscation, anti-
17		RM lockbox. The RM lockbox is protected by mechanisms such as obfuscation, anti-
17 18 19		RM lockbox. The RM lockbox is protected by mechanisms such as obfuscation, anti-
17 18 19 20		RM lockbox. The RM lockbox is protected by mechanisms such as obfuscation, anti-
17 18 19 20 21		RM lockbox. The RM lockbox is protected by mechanisms such as obfuscation, anti-
17 18 19 20 21 22		RM lockbox. The RM lockbox is protected by mechanisms such as obfuscation, anti-
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24		RM lockbox. The RM lockbox is protected by mechanisms such as obfuscation, anti-
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25		RM lockbox. The RM lockbox is protected by mechanisms such as obfuscation, anti-
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26		RM lockbox. The RM lockbox is protected by mechanisms such as obfuscation, anti-
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27		RM lockbox. The RM lockbox is protected by mechanisms such as obfuscation, anti-
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26		RM lockbox. The RM lockbox is protected by mechanisms such as obfuscation, anti-
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27		RM lockbox. The RM lockbox is protected by mechanisms such as obfuscation, anti-

	1010.00.17112.1110.03,702,071	
3	26.	Products infringing: Visual Studio.NET,
4		.NET Framework SDK, and all products that include the Common Language
5		Runtime or Common Language Runtime or Common Language
6		Infrastructure.
J	A secure method for combining data	
7	items into a composite data item comprising:	
8	(a) securely providing, from a first location to a second location, a first data item	A first signed and licensed .NET component, .NET assembly, managed
9	having at least a first control associated therewith;	control and/or Web control (component) is the first data item. The first .NET
10		component developer (first location) provides the application assembly
11		developer (second location) the first component. The first control is the set of
12		declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute (alternately
13	(h) convolve providing from a third	referred to as license controls).
14	(b) securely providing, from a third location to said second location, a second	A second signed and licensed component is the second data item. The second
15	data item having at least a second control associated therewith;	component developer (third location) provides the application assembly
16		developer (second location) the second component. The second control is the set of declarative statements comprising the
17	() C	LicenseProviderAttribute.
18	(c) forming, at said second location, a composite of said first and second data items:	The application assembly developer will include at least the two components into its assembly.
19	(d) securely combining. at said second location, said first and second controls to	At the second location, the application assembly developer uses the .NET runtime
20	form a control arrangement; and	that includes the LicenseManager.
21		Whenever a component is instantiated (here, an instance of the first licensed
22		component), the license manager accesses the proper validation mechanism for the
23		component. The license controls (first control) for the runtime license (derived
24	. .	from the design time license) are bound
25		into the header of the .NET application assembly, along with the second control for the second component.
26		Visual Studio.NET securely handles the
27		creation of runtime license controls.
28		Runtime licenses are embedded into (and bound to) the executing application assembly. The license control attribute
		assembly. The incense control attribute

1 2 3 4 5		included in the first component is customized in the second location to express and require the runtime license. In a more advanced scenario, the License Complier tool can be used to create a ".licenses file" containing licenses for multiple components, including runtime licenses for components and classes created by the license provider. This .licenses file is embedded into the assembly.
7	·	The third control set comprises the runtime license controls for the first and second components (that had been bound to the
9		assembly), the declarative controls provided by the application assembly developer, and any runtime licenses for
10	·	other components included by the
11		developer in application assembly. The controls are typically integrated into the header of the .NET application assembly
12	(e) performing at least one operation on	Calling the first licensed component. The proper execution of the application
13	said composite of said first and second data items based at least in part on said control arrangement.	will require that the assembly have run time licenses for the two components.
14		
15 16	27. A method as in claim 26 wherein said combining step includes preserving each of said first and second controls in said composite set.	The set of declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute of both the first and second components are included in the application assembly.
17		
18 19	28. A method as in claim 26 wherein said performing step comprises governing the operation on said composite of said first and second data items in accordance with said first control and said second control.	The application will require the first and second controls to operate properly when it calls the first and second data items, respectively.
20		
21	29. A method as in claim 26 wherein said providing step includes ensuring the integrity of said association between said	Signing the component that has embedded within it the license control ensures the integrity of the association of the control
22	first controls and said first data item is maintained during at least one of	and data item.
23	transmission, storage and processing of said first data item.	
24	31. A method as in claim 26 wherein said	The component includes the license control
25	providing step comprises codelivering said first data item and said first control.	and therefore they are codelivered.
26	40. A method as in claim 26 further	Each component includes the license
27	including the step of securely ensuring that at least one of (a) said first control, (b) said	control. Signing the component that has embedded within it the license control
28	second control, and (c) said control arrangement, is persistently associated with	ensures the persistence of the association of the control and data item.
	F	Exhibit B

1	at least one of said first and second data	
2	items.	<u> </u>
.4	54. A method as in claim 26 wherein at least one of steps (c), (d) and (e) is performed at an end user electronic appliance.	At least step (e) is typically performed at an end-user electronic appliance.
5	61. A method as in claim 26 wherein step	Microsoft maintains Web sites where a
6	(a) comprises providing said first data item from at least one remote location over a	developer can get components over the Web. These sites include references
7	telecommunications link, and step (b) comprises providing said second data item	whereby a developer may obtain components through their Web connection.
8	from the same or different remote location	One such site is Internet Explorer Web
9	over the same or different telecommunications link.	Control Gallery at ie.components.microsoft.com/webcontrols
9		
10 11	68. A method as in claim 26 wherein step (d) is performed within the same secure processing environment at said second	Typically, step (d) will be performed within the same secure processing environment.
	location.	L
12 13	79. A method as in claim 26 wherein steps (a) and (b) are performed at different times.	The application assembly developer will typically acquire components at different
14		times.
15	86. A method as in claim 26 wherein at least one of the first and second controls comprises at least one executable	The component must include an executable and can include a data items as a EULA, readme file or help file.
16	component and at least one data component.	reading the of help the.
17	component.	
18		
19		
20		. · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
21		
22	·	
23		
24		
25		
26		
27	·	
28		

3		
	L LESS CHAIMTANGUAGES SESSE	EST GEALM!ORINERINGEMENTS
4	35	Infringing products include: Windows
_	33	Media Player, Individualized DRM Clients
5		and the Secure Audio Path (SAP)
6		technology.
0	A method for using at least one resource	
7	processed by a secure operating	
1	environment, said method comprising:	
8	securely receiving a first load module	The Individualized DRM Client (first load
·	provided by a first entity external to said	module) is a signed security upgrade DLL.
9	operating environment	It is also bound to the hardware ID of the machine on which it runs. It is therefore
		securely delivered and integrity protected:
10	securely receiving a second load module	A SAP certified driver is also signed and
1i	provided by a second entity external to said	carries with it a certificate that indicates its
**	operating environment, said second entity	compliance with SAP criteria. If it is
12	being different from said first entity; and	delivered to a PC it is secure in the sense
		that it is integrity protected. This driver
13	*	would not come from the same entity as the Individualization DLL.
14	securely processing, using at least one	If a WM audio file targeted to the
14	resource, a data item associated with said	Individualized DRM client carries with it a
15	first and second load modules, including	requirement that SAP be supported to
	securely applying said first and second load	render the WMF contents, the content is
16	modules to manage use of said data item.	processed for playing through a soundcard
		using the WMP and by applying the DRM client - which decrypts the content and
17		negotiates with the DRM kernel processing
18		of the content through a Secure Audio Path
10		that includes the SAP-certified audio
19		driver.
		1 704
20	56. A method as in claim 35 wherein at	All steps occur at the user's PC that supports the WMP and DRM client and
٠, ا	least two of the recited steps are performed	SAP.
21	at an end user electronic appliance.	SAI.
22	63. A method as in claim 35 wherein said	The Driver and DRM client are received
	first load module receiving step comprises	from distinct locations and may be
23	securely receiving said first load module	delivered securely over the Internet. They
	from at least one remote location over at	are delivered securely in that each is
24	least one telecommunications link, and said	integrity protected.
	second load module receiving step	
25	comprises securely receiving said second	
26	load module from the same or different remote location over the same or different	
20	telecommunications link.	
27	totocommunications made	
-	70. A method as in claim 35 wherein said	Both load modules are executed on the PC
28	securely processing step comprises	within the WMP/DRM Client/SAP
	securely executing said first and second	environment.
		<u> </u>

....Exhibit B

			_
1	**************************************	RESIDERATION OF THE RINGEMENTS AND ADDRESS OF THE PROPERTY OF	ŀ
2	load modules within the same secure processing environment.		
3			
٦	74. A method as in claim 35 further	Since both the DRM client and the driver	
.4	including securely combining said first and	are DLLs in the same audio rendering	
	second load modules to provide a combined executable.	chain, they exist as an execution	
5	comonica executable.	environment.	-
6	81. A method as in claim 35 wherein said	The driver and Individualization DLL need not be received at the same time.	-
7	securely receiving steps are performed independently at different times.	not be received at the same time.	_
8		The Windows Media Player together with	_
9	94. A method as in claim 35 wherein said secure operating environment includes a	the Individualized DRM Client and Secure Audio Path comprise a protected	
10	protected processing environment, and wherein:	environment for processing protected media. The protected Windows Media	
11	said method further comprises receiving a	Files are received after the load modules have been received and installed (licenses	
**	data item within said secure operating environment;	cannot be acquired until load modules are	
12		in place). The processing of the Windows	
13	said first load module receiving step is	Media File occurs in the protected environment.	
"	performed separately and at a time different from receiving said data item; and	environment.	
14	Hom receiving said dam nom, and		
15	said securely processing step is performed		
	at least in part in said protected processing environment.		_
16			

Examples of SAP-certified drivers include - as indicated at http://www.microsoft.com/Windows/windowsmedia/WM7/DRM/FAQ.asp#Security7

- All VIA controllers with AC-97 codecs
- All ALI controllers with AC-97 codec
- Intel ICH controllers with AC-97 codecs
- Creative Labs SoundBlaster16/AWE32/AWE64/Vibra
- Yamaha OPL3

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

27

- Yamaha DS-1
 - Cirrus Logic (Crystal) CS4280
- Cirrus Logic (Crystal) CS4614 / CS4624
- 26 ESS Maestro 2E
 - USB Audio
 - Cirrus Logic (Crystal) CS4281

	1
1	1
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	11
26	
27	

•	All SiS controllers with AC-97 codecs
•	Ensoniq ES1370
•	NeoMagic NM6
•	Ensoniq ES1371/73 and CT5880
•	SoundBlaster Live!
•	Aureal 8810
•	Aureal 8820
•	Aureal 8830
•	Conexant Riptide
•	ESS Maestro
•	ESS ISA parts
•	NeoMagic NM5

3	FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 5,982,891	
•	·	
4 5	36.	Product Infringing: Any product using Common Language Runtime (CLR), Common Language Infrastructure (CLI), or Compact
6		Common Language Runtime (CCLR)
7	A secure operating environment system for managing at least one resource comprising:	Microsoft CLR, CLI or CCLR (operating environment system), managing any of the resources on a typical computer, including
. 8		memory, files system, communications ports, storage devices, and higher level resources that may use any of these or combinations of them.
9	(a) a communications arrangement	Communications port and Microsoft Internet Protocol stack that may optionally use Secure
11		Socket Layer protocol or IPSEC packet security protocol, supplied with Microsoft Windows.
12	(1) that securely receives a first control of a first entity external to said operating environment, and	Rule or evidence contained in the manifest of a shared assembly, distributed by a first entity that can be used by the CLR, CLI or CCLR to
13 14	operating environment, and	determine permissions that may be needed to cause operations on a data item or resource
15	·	is tamper-protected and may be received using secure SSL or IPSEC protocol.
16 17	(2) securely receives a second control of a second entity external to said operating environment, said second	Rule specified in the manifest of a second shared (Tamper protected) assembly, that demands permissions of callers of its methods.
18	entity being different from said first entity; and	CLR, CLI or CCLR, connected to (e.g.)
19	(b) a protected processing environment, operatively connected to said communications arrangement, that:	communications port
20	(1) [] securely processes, using at least one resource, a data item logically associated with said first and second	CLR, CLI or CCLR uses type safety mechanisms, access controls, integrity detection, and separation of domains. Data
21 22	controls, and	item may be any data item that is managed by the second assembly, which may be a member
23	·	of such assembly, and whose state or value may be accessible through an interface to other assemblies, and which is referenced by the first
- 24	(2) ∏ securely applies said first and	assembly. CLR, CLI or CCLR processes the demand for
25	second controls to manage said resource for controlling use of said data	permissions from the second assembly, collects the evidence or processes the rule from the first
26	item.	assembly, and determines whether the first assembly has the permissions to use the
27		resource to operate on the data item controlled by the second assembly.
28	57. A system as in claim 36 wherein said protected processing environment is part of an	Computer or electronic appliance running CLR, CLI or CCLR
ł		

Exhibit B 43

1

	II	1
1	end user electronic appliance.	:
2	64. A system as in claim 36 wherein said communications arrangement receives said	Shared assemblies are designed to be received remotely, e.g., over the internet.
3	first and second controls from at least one remote location over at least one	remotery, e.g., over the internet.
4	telecommunications link. 75. A system as in claim 36 wherein said	Arrangement consists of the stack frame and
5	protected processing environment combines said first and second controls to provide a	and the corresponding array of permission grants for assemblies on the stack, and the
6	combined control arrangement.	permission demanded by the second assembly.
7	82. A system as in claim 36 wherein said communications arrangement independently	Assemblies, including controls, are designed for independent delivery.
8	receives said first and second controls at different times	
9	88. A system as in claim 36 wherein at least one of the first control and second controls	The second entity supplies an assembly with a demand procedure (executed by the CLR, CLI
10	comprises at least one executable component and at least one data component.	or CCLR) that includes reference to a specific attribute value (the data component), and the protected processing environment executes the
12		executable component (demand) in a manner that is at least in part responsive to the data
13		component (execution is in response to the security action supplied in the data item).
14 15		
16		·
17		· · ·
18		
19		
20		
21	·	
22		
23		<i>x</i> -
24		
25		•
26		•
27		
28		

4	SECTION OF THE PROPERTY OF THE	SANCE OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PARTY OF THE PA
	E SE CLAIM FANGUAGE COM	CHAIM OF INFRINGEMENT CONTROL
5	36.	Infringing Product: My Services
6	A secure operating environment system for managing at least one resource	Secure operating environment is the secure server for any .NET My Services service
7	comprising: a communications arrangement that	(e.g. My Calendar, My Inbox) Secure server receives communications
8	securely receives	formatted using the SOAP-SEC, the security extension to SOAP that is used by
9		My Service servers to receive controls.
10		
11	a first control	The first control is a roleTemplate
12	a first conduct	associated with the service. The roleTemplate identifies specific actions
13		(e.g. read, replace) that can be performed against a certain scope (resource or set of
14		resources).
15	of a first entity external to said operating	The first entity is the administrator of the
16	environment,	server database, or other entity with authority over its content that sets up the
17		roleTemplates and scopes. That entity is independent from and located remotely
18		from the secure server.
19	and securely receives a second control	A role element specified by a specific end user, which is securely received by the secure server using the SOAP-SEC
20		protocol.
21		
22	of a second entity external to said operating environment, said second entity	The end user is located remotely from the secure server.
23	being different from said first entity;	
24	and a protected processing environment, operatively connected to said	The protected processing environment is the .NET security service (authorization
25	communications arrangement, that:	system) operating within the server. The server uses the SOAP-SEC
26		communication protocol to receive controls.
27	(a) securely processes, using at least one resource, a data item logically associated	"Securely processes" is performing the requested operation on secure server
28	with said first and second controls, and	running .NÉT. The system will perform the requested operation ensuring that the user
		has no access to information outside the
į	1	11

Exhibit B 45

293482.02

1

2

		·
1		scope computed.
2		The resource is the server software and/or hardware used to process the two controls and user data.
.4		
5		The first control is the roleTemplate for the service. The second control is the role element for an individual user.
6	·	The data item is the end user's stored
7		content (e.g. calendar, email inbox, etc.).
8	(b) securely applies said first and second	The secure server determines the result
9	controls to manage said resource for controlling use of said data item.	scope (visible node set) for the operation that is computed from the role element and
10		the roleTemplate. That result scope is used to manage the data item.
11		·
12	64. A system as in claim 36 wherein said	The remote location is the site where the
13	communications arrangement receives said first and second controls from at least one	user's or administrator's application is running.
14	remote location over at least one telecommunications link.	The telecommunication link can be the
15		Internet, intranet, VPN or other similar channels.
16	75. A system as in claim 36 wherein said	The role scope incorporating the role
17	protected processing environment combines said first and second controls to provide a combined control arrangement.	element and the role Template.
18		Administrator and user controls will
19 20	82. A system as in claim 36 wherein said communications arrangement independently receives said first and	ordinarily be received at different times.
21	second controls at different times.	
22	95. A secure operating environment system as in claim 36 wherein said	This is the normal case for .NET My Services. The user's content is normally
	communications arrangement also receives a data item separately and at a different	stored and updated independently of the setting of scope elements, role elements and
23	time from at least one of said first control and said second control.	roleTemplates.
24	and said second condor.	<u> </u>
25		·
26		•
27		
	11	Qi

· 4.	BE SEE SEE SEE SEE SEE SEE SEE SEE SEE S	EAST CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENTS.
5		Product Infringing: Windows CE for Automotive
6	1. A security method comprising:	WCEfA is Microsoft Windows CE for Automotive, sometimes also known by its former name, AutoPC 2.0.
7 8		With WCEfA an OEM can assign their device to a class that only accepts certain kinds of software. The device can be set to accept 1) any software with the correct
9		processor/version 2) only certified software or 3) only software from the OEM or Microsoft. These Security (or
10		Trust) levels also control to which kernel APIs and middlewere APIs the software has access.
11	·	Background: "Microsoft Software Install Manager (SIM), a
12		component of WCEfA, allows you to control what can be installed on your device platform. You can define
13	,	your platform as being <u>open</u> , <u>closed</u> or <u>restricted</u> to new installations, and SIM will enforce these designations." (D,pg.1)
14		
15		"Anything can be installed on an open platform, as long as the applications are compiled for the appropriate processor. At the other extreme, no third-party software
16 17	·	can be installed on a closed platform. Only certified applications can be installed on a restricted platform."
		(D, pg.1)
18 19		"By restricting installations to compliant applications, the risk of installing and using incompatible or harmful software is greatly reduced, while still keeping the
20		device open for robust, quality applications that enhance the user experience." (F, pg. 1)
21		WCEfA also has a Security Layer whose purpose is to
22		"Create an abstraction layer of security surrounding ISV applications to limit and/or deny access to key Windows
23		CE kernel API calls and WCEfA middleware APIs." I, pg. 1)
24	(a) digitally signing a first load module with a	A first load module is a WCEfA software component in
25	first digital signature designating the first load module for use by a first device class;	a signed .PE file. The first device class is a device that only allows software designated as "restricted" (or
26		higher) to be installed. "Restricted" software is software that has been certified. With restricted software, the
27		device also implements a Security Layer functionality that limits the kernel and WCEfA API calls that the software can make.
28		
	Evil	រស់ ប្រ៊ុ

1

2

1	11	"SIM Level: 1 = Restricted
2		Description: Only properly certified CEI (WCEfA device installation) files can be installed on the device.
3	\$ [†]	Remote execution is restricted to executables with master key.
4		Key: Logo certified CEI file required. CEI files or EXEs
		with master keys permitted." (F, pg.1)
5		"The kernel loader calls it each time a module is loaded by Windows CE. It returns one of the following values
6		that determine the module's access to kernel resources:
7		Value
8		Meaning
9		OEM_CERTIFY_TRUST (2)
10	11	The module is trusted by the OEM to perform any operation.
		OEM CERTIFY RUN(1)
11		The module is trusted by the OEM to run but is
12		restricted from making certain function calls.
13		OEM_CERTIFY_FALSE (0) The module is not allowed to run.
14		"(H, pg. 1)
15		Digitally signing: "Before the kernel loads a file, it uses
16		the OEMCertifyModule function to verify that the file
17		contains the proper signature." (N, pg.1)
		"Signfile.exe: This tool signs an executable with a supplied private key. You can use the following
18		command parameters with this tools AttribString, specifies an optional attribute string to be included in the
19		signature. For example, you could add a string to
20		indicate the trust level of the application." (O. Pg. 1)
21		In the MSDN article <u>Verifying the Signature</u> , the sample code segment states
22		"//the file has a valid signature //.we expect the trust level to be returned as signed
23		data
	N .	//case 'R': dwTrustLevel = OEM_CERTIFY_RUN" (N, pg.2)
24	- a -	
25		"The WCEfA Security Layer isolates installed
26		applications from making unrestricted kernel and WCEfA API calls. This allows the OEM to assign one of
27		three levels of security to applications and drivers installed in RAM when they are loaded into the system.
28		The three levels are Trusted, Restricted, and
	1	BlockedOn the systems level, the WCEfA Security

1		layer fits between ISV applications and isolates these software modules from having free access to all WinCE kernel calls and WCEfA middleware APIs." (I, pg. 1)
3		The developer submits their application for certification.
4		If it passes, then the .cei file (a form of cab file) receives a certification key from the certifier. The signed PE is within this .cei file.
5		
6	(b) digitally signing a second load module with a second digital signature different from the	A second load module is a WCEfA software component is a signed PE file. The second device class with a
7	first digital signature, the second digital signature designating the second load module	different tamper resistance or security level is a device that is "Closed", that is, it will not allow third party to
8	for use by a second device class having at least one of tamper resistance and security level	software to be installed. A closed device only allows trusted software to run. The Security Layer setting of
9	different from the at least one of tamper resistance and security level of the first device	"Trusted" allows the Microsoft and OEM software full access to kernel and middleware APIs.
10	class;	In the MSDN article Verifying the Signature, the sample code segment states
11		"//the file has a valid signature // we expect the trust level to be returned as signed
12		data //case 'T': dwTrustLevel = OEM_CERTIFY_TRUST"
13	·	(N, pg.2)
14 15		"Signfile.exe: This tool signs an executable with a supplied private key. You can use the following
16		command parameters with this tools AttribString, specifies an optional attribute string to be included in the signature. For example, you could add a string to
17		indicate the trust level of the application. (O. Pg. 1)
18		"SIM Level: 2 = Closed Description: Platform is limited to software supplied
19		directly by OEM or Microsoft. Third-party applications cannot be installed
20		Key: Master key required for any install or remote execution." (F, pg.1)
21.		Related to the Security Layer, the Trusted level "is most
22		likely reserved for MS and OEM applications and drivers." (I, pg. 1)
23		Whereas the .cei files for certified software have a certification key (sometimes call MS Logo key), the .cei
24		files from Microsoft or the OEM have a master key attached. "Master key required for any install or remote
25	-	execution." (F, p.gl)
26	(c) distributing the first load module for use by	First load module is the certified software from a third party that will be run as part of the "Restricted" first
27	at least one device in the first device class; and	device closs.
28		"Once your application is complete, send the .cei file to

2		the organization that is performing validation or certification for the OEM. They would validate it, then either reject or return a .cei that has been stamped with a certification key. You would then reproduce this .cei file
3		on CD-ROM or a compact flash card and distribute." (D,
4		p.g 5)
5 6		"APCLoad compares the device SIM level against the certification key, and either allows the installation to proceed or prohibits it based on the outcome of this comparison." (D, pg. 2)
7		
8	·	"Security:. To achieve a high level of reliability, WCEfA is carefully designed to:
		- Control the installation of certified and tested software and drivers.
. 9		- Limit the access of system services by installed module.
10		- Monitor the proper execution of software"
11		(G, pg. 1)
12	(d) distributing the second load module for use by at least one device in the second device	The second load module is the certified software from the OEM or Microsoft that will be run as part of the
13	class.	"Closed" second device class.
14		"You may need to change ROM components after your device ships, either to fix a problem, or to provide
15		enhanced functionality. For this purpose, the OEM is given a CElBuild that adds a master key to a .cei file.
16		CEI files stamped with this master key can be installed on an open, closed or a restricted platform." (D, pg. 3)
17		"Trusted: The application is registered as a completely
18		trusted module and allowed full access to the kernel
19	-	APIs and WCEfA APIs. This mode is mostly likely reserved for MS and OEM applications and drivers.
		Note that applications and drivers included in ROM are automatically given trusted status." (I, pg.1)
20		automatically given a actor states. (1, pg.1)
. 21	References: [D] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/lib	
22	[F] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/libi [G] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/lib	
23	[H] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp?url=/library/default.asp.url=/library/default.asp.url=/library/default.asp.url=/library/default.asp.url=/library/default.asp.url=/library/default.asp.url=/library/default.asp.url=/library/default.asp.url=/library/default.asp.url=/library/default.asp.url=/library/default.asp.url=/library/default.asp.url=/library/default.asp.url=/library/default.asp.url=/library/default.asp.url=/library/default.asp.url=/library/default.asp.url=/library/default.asp.url=/library/default.asp.url=/library/default.asp.url=/library/default.asp.url=/library/default.asp.url=/library/default.asp.url=/library/default.asp.url=/library/default.asp.url=/library/default.asp.url=/library/default.asp.url=/library/default.asp.url=/library/default.asp.url=/library/default.asp.url=/library/default.asp.url=/library/default.asp.url=/library/default.asp.url=/library/default.asp.url=/library/default.	rary/en-us/apcguide/htm/securityrev_7.asp
24	[N] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/lib [O] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/lib	rary/en-us/wcedsn40/htm/cgconVerifyingSignature.asp
25		
26		• •
27		
28		

3	,	
4	5.	Product infringing: Windows Hardware
5		Quality Lab certification services, and operating system products that support
6	A software verifying method comprising:	driver signature technology. Microsoft encourages manufacturers to
.7	A software verifying method comprising.	have their device drivers tested and signed. For example, only signed drivers will ship
8		"in-the-box." Also, Microsoft's driver ranking prefers signed drivers to unsigned
9		drivers.
10		Microsoft Web Page - Can't Find a Test Category for Your Driver?
11		WHQL's long-term objective is to be able to digitally sign all drivers. Although we do
12		not currently have test programs for certain driver types, such as specialized device
13		drivers and software filter drivers, WHQL is investigating a long term solution to
14		expand the categories of drivers tested under Windows 2000 and ultimately all
15		Windows operating systems. We are already formulating a test program for anti-
16	·	virus file system filters, and plan to address other file system filter drivers as soon as
17	(a) testing a load module	the initial program is in place. The driver will be tested for each version of
18		the operating system it supports and against the device class specification that apply to
19	·	the device's class.
20		The driver package is a load module. A driver package contains one or more of the
21	,	following files: A device setup information file (INF file)
22		A driver catalog (.cat) file One or more optional co-installers
23		Microsoft operates the Window Hardware
24		Quality Lab, which tests drivers submitted by driver manufactures.
25		The manufacturer can test their own driver
26		using the Microsoft testing kit and submit the test results to WHQL when requesting a
27		signature. Additionally, Microsoft or a testing facility working with Microsoft can
28	1	perform the testing. The manufacturer-written INF file, which
	having at least one specification associated	

_	÷	
1 2	therewith,	is part of the driver package, is a specification. Microsoft Windows drivers
3		must have an INF file in order to be installed.
	the specification describing one or more functions performed by the load module;	The INF Version section specifies its device class. One use of the device class is
4	Tunctions performed by the load module,	to identify the specific Windows compatibility specification that relate to the
5	,	device class. These specifications will vary by device class in part because the function
6		of each device can vary among class. The INF incorporates by reference the
7		Microsoft supplied device class-specific
8	·	specification by identifying its class in the INF.
9		The INF can include operating system
10		"decorating" to specify the operating system architecture, major and minor version, product and suite the driver is
11		intended for and can further use this decorating to specify what operating
12		systems for which it is not intended. Because the functionality of each of the
13		operating systems may vary the driver must be tested for each applicable operating
14	·	system.
15		Qualification Service Policy Guide – Hardware Category Policies
16		You must select the correct hardware
17		category for your device. If you select the wrong hardware category for your device,
18		your submission will fail. For example, if you have a storage/hard drive device, but
19	· .	you select storage/tape drive as your
20		hardware category, your submission will fail.
21		Windows XP HCT 10.0 Q & A – Windows
22		XP Logos
23		Q: Which "Designed for Windows XP" logos are available for my product?
24.		A: Devices and systems qualify for a "Designed for Windows" logo after passing
25		testing with the appropriate WHQL test kit on all operating systems specified by the
26		logo. "Designed for Windows" Logos for Device and System Programs lists which logos are
27	(b) verifying that the load module satisfies	available for each type of product. The Microsoft WindowsXP Hardware
28	the specification; and	Compatibility Test (HCT) kit version 10.0 includes the tests, test documentation, and
		1 merades are resultent documentation, and

submission processes the participate in the Micro Program for Hardware XP Professional operat qualify to use the "Desis logs for hardware, productsting with the Microsk kit. The HCT kits are o hardware type. As mentioned above, the test their own driver us testing kit and submit the WHQL when requestin Additionally, Microsof working with Microsof testing. (c) issuing at least one digital certificate attesting to the results of the verifying step. (c) issuing at least one digital certificate attesting to the results of the verifying step. (d) issuing at least one digital certificate attesting, WHQL general file containing a hash of and other relevant inforthen digitally signs the Digital Signature crypt and sends it to the vend does not change the drivers to let users known compatible with Microsoft windows 2000, and W driver's digital signature driver was tested with compatibility and has resting.	
qualify to use the "Desi logo for hardware, products testing with the Microsokit. The HCT kits are on hardware type. As mentioned above, the test their own driver use testing kit and submit the WHOL when requesting. Additionally, Microsof working with Microsof testing. (c) issuing at least one digital certificate attesting to the results of the verifying step. (c) issuing at least one digital certificate attesting to the results of the verifying step. (d) issuing at least one digital certificate attesting to the results of the verifying step. When a driver package testing, WHQL generatifile containing a hash of and other relevant information then digitally signs the Digital Signature crypt and sends it to the vendoes not change the driften to the verifying step. Microsoft uses digital signature drivers to let users known compatible with Micro Windows 2000, and Windriver's digital signature driver was tested with compatibility and has results in the verifying step.	soft Windows Logo for the Windows
testing with the Microskit. The HCT kits are ohardware type. As mentioned above, the test their own driver us testing kit and submit the WHQL when requestin Additionally, Microsof working with Microsof testing. (c) issuing at least one digital certificate attesting to the results of the verifying step. (c) issuing at least one digital certificate attesting to the results of the verifying step. (c) issuing at least one digital certificate attesting, WHQL general file containing a hash of and other relevant inforthen digitally signs the Digital Signature crypt and sends it to the vene does not change the dri INF file submitted for the digitally signature does not change the dri INF file submitted for the digital signature was tested with compatibility and has resulting the drivers to let users known compatible with Micro Windows 2000, and W driver's digital signature driver was tested with compatibility and has resulting the drivers to let users known compatibility and has resulting the drivers to let users known compatibility and has resulting the drivers to let users known compatibility and has resulting the drivers to let users known compatibility and has resulting the drivers to let users known compatibility and has resulting the drivers to let users known compatibility and has resulting the drivers to let users known compatibility and has resulting the drivers to let users known compatibility and has resulting the drivers to let users known compatibility and has resulting the drivers to let users known compatibility and has resulting the drivers to let users known compatibility and has resulting the drivers to let users known compatibility and has resulting the drivers to let users known compatibility and has resulting the drivers to let users known compatible with Microsof testing.	gned for Windows."
kit. The HCT kits are o hardware type. As mentioned above, the test their own driver us testing kit and submit the WHQL when requesting at least one digital certificate attesting to the results of the verifying step. (c) issuing at least one digital certificate attesting to the results of the verifying step. (c) issuing at least one digital certificate attesting to the results of the verifying step. When a driver package testing, WHQL generat file containing a hash of and other relevant information then digitally signs the Digital Signature crypt and sends it to the venifores one thange the dri INF file submitted for the digital signature drivers to let users known compatible with Microsoft uses digital and drivers to let users known compatible with Microsoft uses digital signature driver was tested with compatibility and has referred to the veniform of the digital signature driver was tested with compatibility and has referred to the veniform of the digital signature driver was tested with compatibility and has referred to the veniform of the digital signature driver was tested with compatibility and has referred to the veniform of the digital signature driver was tested with compatibility and has referred to the veniform of the digital signature driver was tested with compatibility and has referred to the veniform of the veniform of the digital signature driver was tested with compatibility and has referred to the veniform of the veniform o	
As mentioned above, the test their own driver us testing kit and submit the WHQL when requesting with Microsoft working with Microsoft testing. (c) issuing at least one digital certificate attesting to the results of the verifying step. (c) issuing at least one digital certificate attesting to the results of the verifying step. (c) issuing at least one digital certificate attesting to the results of the verifying step. Men a driver package testing, WHQL generatifile containing a hash of and other relevant inforthen digitally signs the Digital Signature crypte and sends it to the venifoses not change the dri INF file submitted for the verifying step. Microsoft uses digital sinvers to let users known compatible with Microsoft uses digital sinvers to let users known compatible with Microsoft uses digital signature driver was tested with compatibility and has resulted to the verifying step. Microsoft uses digital signature driver was tested with compatibility and has resulted for the verifying step. Microsoft uses digital signature driver was tested with compatibility and has resulted for the verifying step. Men a driver package testing, WHQL generatifile containing a hash of any other leaves to the verifying step. Microsoft uses digital signature drivers to let users known compatible with Microsoft uses digital signature driver was tested with compatibility and has resulted for the verifying step. Men a driver package testing, WHQL generatifile containing a hash of any other leaves to any other leaves to any other leaves the desting. Microsoft uses digital signature drivers to let users known compatible with Microsoft uses digital signature drivers to let users known compatible with Microsoft uses digital signature drivers to let users known compatible with Microsoft uses digital signature drivers to let users known compatible with Microsoft uses digital signature drivers to let users known compatible with Microsoft uses digital signature drivers to let users known compatible with Microsoft users digita	
As mentioned above, test their own driver us testing kit and submit it WHQL when requestin Additionally, Microsof working with Microsof testing. (c) issuing at least one digital certificate attesting to the results of the verifying step. (c) issuing at least one digital certificate attesting to the results of the verifying step. (d) issuing at least one digital certificate attesting. WHQL generates file containing a hash of and other relevant inforthen digitally signs the Digital Signature crypt and sends it to the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for the digital signature driver's digital signature driver's digital signature driver's digital signature driver was tested with compatibility and has resulted to the vend does not change the driver's digital signature driver's digital signature driver was tested with compatibility and has resulted to the vend does not change the driver's digital signature driver was tested with compatibility and has resulted to the vend does not change the driver's digital signature driver's digital signature driver was tested with compatibility and has resulted to the vend does not change the driver's digital signature driver's driver's driver's driver's driver's driver	
testing kit and submit to WHQL when requesting. (c) issuing at least one digital certificate attesting to the results of the verifying step. (c) issuing at least one digital certificate attesting to the results of the verifying step. (c) issuing at least one digital certificate attesting. When a driver package set sting, WHQL generative containing a hash of and other relevant inforthen digitally signs the Digital Signature crypt and sends it to the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for the drivers to let users known compatible with Micro Windows 2000, and the results of the verifying step. Microsoft uses digital a drivers to let users known compatible with Micro Windows 2000, and Windows 2000, and Windows 2000, and the results of the verifying step.	
Additionally, Microsof working with Microsof testing. (c) issuing at least one digital certificate attesting to the results of the verifying step. (c) issuing at least one digital certificate attesting to the results of the verifying step. (c) issuing at least one digital certificate attesting to the results of the verifying step. (d) When a driver package testing, WHQL generate file containing a hash of and other relevant information then digitally signs the Digital Signature cryptical and sends it to the vene does not change the dri INF file submitted for the does not change the dri INF file submitted for the does not change the dri INF file submitted for the does not change the driver's digital signature driver's digital signature driver was tested with compatibility and has resting.	ne test results to
working with Microsoft testing. (c) issuing at least one digital certificate attesting to the results of the verifying step. (c) issuing at least one digital certificate attesting to the results of the verifying step. (c) issuing at least one digital certificate attesting to the results of the verifying step. When a driver package file containing a hash of and other relevant inforthen digitally signs the Digital Signature crypt and sends it to the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for the digital signature crypt and sends it to the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for the digital signature crypt and sends it to the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for the digital signature crypt and sends it to the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for the digital signature crypt and sends it to the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for the digital signature crypt and sends it to the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for the digital signature crypt and sends it to the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for the digital signature crypt and sends it to the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for the digital signature crypt and sends it to the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for the digital signature crypt and sends it to the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for the digital signature crypt and sends it to the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for the digital signature crypt and sends it to the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for the digital signature crypt and sends it to the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for the digital signature crypt and sends it to the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for the digital signature crypt and sends it to the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for the digital signature crypt and sends it to the vend does not change the drivers of the drivers and the drivers of the drivers of the driv	
(c) issuing at least one digital certificate attesting to the results of the verifying step. When a driver package testing, WHQL generated the dotter relevant information to the digitally signs the Digital Signature crypt and sends it to the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for the digital signature. Microsoft uses digital signature was to let users known compatible with Micro Windows 2000, and windows was tested with compatibility and has resting.	
attesting to the results of the verifying step. 11	
and other relevant inforthen digitally signs the Digital Signature crypt and sends it to the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for the vend drivers to let users known compatible with Micro Windows 2000, and W	es a separate CAT I the driver binaries
Digital Signature crypts and sends it to the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for to Microsoft uses digital signature crypts and sends it to the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for to Microsoft uses digital signature crypts and sends it to the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for to Microsoft uses digital signature crypts and sends it to the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for to Microsoft uses digital signature crypts and sends it to the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for to Microsoft uses digital signature crypts and sends it to the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for to Microsoft uses digital signature crypts and sends it to the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for to Microsoft uses digital signature crypts and sends it to the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for to Microsoft uses digital signature crypts and sends it to the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for to the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for to the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for to the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for the vend does not change the dri INF file submitted for the vend does not change the drivers to let users know compatible with Microsoft uses digital signature the vend does not change the drivers to let users know compatible with Microsoft uses digital signature the vend does not change the drivers to let users know compatible with Microsoft uses digital signature the vend does not change the	mation. WHQL
does not change the dri INF file submitted for to Microsoft uses digital stativers to let users knot compatible with Micro Windows 2000, and Windows 2000, and Windows 2000, and Windows 2000, and Windows was tested with compatibility and has retesting. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26	ographic technology
Microsoft uses digital significant drivers to let users known compatible with Micro Windows 2000, and	ver binaries or the
drivers to let users known compatible with Micro Windows 2000, and Windows 2000, and Windows 2000, and Windows driver's digital signature driver was tested with compatibility and has retesting.	esting.
compatible with Micro Windows 2000, and W driver's digital signature driver was tested with compatibility and has retesting.	ignatures for device
driver's digital signature driver was tested with compatibility and has retesting. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26	soft Windows XP,
18 darver was tested with compatibility and has resting. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26	e indicates that the
testing. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26	
20 21 22 23 24 25 26	
21 22 23 24 25 26	
22 23 24 25 26	
23 24 25 26	
24 25 26	
24 25 26	
25 26	
26	
27	
0	
28	•

ا ہے		
3	CLAIMLANGUAGE	CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT
4	14.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and
5		included applications, and Server 2003, including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using
6		Passport
7	A first protected processing environment comprising:	A personal computer running Windows XP, Windows 2000, or Windows 2003
8	a first tamper resistant barrier having a first security level, and	The tamper resistant barrier is the Office 2003 IRM client environment and includes the
9		signed digital certificate identifying the user.
10		If the certificate is tampered with, or if certain, sensitive IRM processes or modules are debugged or tampered with, the system will
11		cease to operate.
12		The first security level is the "Security Level" which has been selected for a particular Office
.13.		Application, e.g., Word.
14	at least one arrangement within the first tamper resistant barrier that prevents the first	The arrangement that prevents a load module from running in one PPE and not in another is
15	protected processing environment from executing the same load module accessed by a	the type and characteristics of a particular Load Module (VBA program within a document or
	second protected processing environment	add-in); i.e., signed, script author, code
16	having a second tamper resistant barrier with a	capabilities, etc., and the "Security Level"
16	having a second tamper resistant barrier with a second security level different from the first security level.	capabilities, etc., and the "Security Level" settings.
	having a second tamper resistant barrier with a second security level different from the first	capabilities, etc., and the "Security Level"
17	having a second tamper resistant barrier with a second security level different from the first	capabilities, etc., and the "Security Level"
17 18	having a second tamper resistant barrier with a second security level different from the first	capabilities, etc., and the "Security Level"
17 18 19	having a second tamper resistant barrier with a second security level different from the first	capabilities, etc., and the "Security Level"
17 18 19 20	having a second tamper resistant barrier with a second security level different from the first	capabilities, etc., and the "Security Level"
17 18 19 20 21	having a second tamper resistant barrier with a second security level different from the first	capabilities, etc., and the "Security Level"
17 18 19 20 21 22	having a second tamper resistant barrier with a second security level different from the first	capabilities, etc., and the "Security Level"
17 18 19 20 21 22 23	having a second tamper resistant barrier with a second security level different from the first	capabilities, etc., and the "Security Level"
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	having a second tamper resistant barrier with a second security level different from the first	capabilities, etc., and the "Security Level"
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26	having a second tamper resistant barrier with a second security level different from the first	capabilities, etc., and the "Security Level"
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	having a second tamper resistant barrier with a second security level different from the first	capabilities, etc., and the "Security Level"

Exhibit B

1

_	FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 6,157,721	
3	CLAIM LANGUAGE	CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT
4	18.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and
5		included applications, and Server 2003, including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using
6		Passport
7	A method for protecting a first computing arrangement surrounded by a first tamper resistant barrier having a first security level,	The first computing arrangement with a tamper resistant barrier is the Office 2003 IRM client environment and includes the signed digital certificate identifying the user.
9	the method including:	If the certificate is tampered with, or if certain,
10		sensitive IRM processes or modules are debugged or tampered with, the system will
11	·	cease to operate.
12		The computing arrangement is being protected from; for example, viruses and malicious code.
13		The first security level is the "Security Level" which has been selected for a particular Office
14	die Ale Gertaerenties amongste	Application, e.g., Word.
15	preventing the first computing arrangement from using the same software module	The arrangement that prevents a load module
16	accessible by a second computing arrangement having a second tamper resistant barrier with a	from running in one computing arrangement and not in another is the type and
17	second security level different from the first security level.	characteristics of a particular software module (VBA program within a document or add-in);
18		i.e., signed, script author, code capabilities, etc., and the "Security Level" settings.
19		
20	·	·· ·
21	•	•
22		
23		
24		
25	·	
26		•
27		•
28		

...Exhibit B

. .

293482.02

2	FOR U.S. PATE	NT NO. 6,157,721
3	CLAIM LANGUAGE	CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT
5	34.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and included applications, and Server 2003, including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using
6		Passport
7	A protected processing environment comprising:	A personal computer running Windows XP, Windows 2000, or Windows 2003
8	a first tamper resistant barrier having a first security level,	The first tamper resistant barrier is the Office 2003 IRM client environment and includes the
9		signed digital certificate identifying the user. If the certificate is tampered with, or if certain, sensitive IRM processes or modules are
10		debugged or tampered with, the system will cease to operate.
11		The first security level is the "Security Level"
12		which has been selected for a particular Office Application, e.g., Word.
13	a first secure execution space, and	The secure execution space is process space allocated by the operating system for the
15		Microsoft Office host application to run. This host application (e.g., Word) executes the VBA code within this process space.
16	.	This execution space (application) is secure
17		because the IRM environment takes steps to insure that it is "trusted", the application is signed, and the document which includes the
18	·	VBA code is protected by IRM policy and then encrypted and signed.
19	at least one arrangement within the first	The arrangement that prevents a load module
20	tamper resistant barrier that prevents the first secure execution space from executing the	from running in one computing arrangement and not in another is the type and
21	same executable accessed by a second secure execution space having a second tamper	characteristics of a particular software module (VBA program within a document or add-in);
22	resistant barrier with a second security level different from the first security level.	i.e. signed, script author, code capabilities,
23		etc., and the "Security Level" settings.
24	·	·
25	·	
26	·	
27		

Exhibit B

293482.02

28

1

FOR U.S. P	ATENT NO. 6,157,721
SECONGLATMICANGUAGES 2012	EXECUTION OF INFRINGEMENTS
34.	Product Infringing: Microsoft Common Language Runtime and ASP.NET
A protected processing environment comprising:	Microsoft Common Language Runtime and ASP.NET
a first tamper resistant barrier having a first security level,	TAMPER RESISTANT BARRIER The first tamper resistant barrier is the application
	domain in the CLR. The runtime hashes the contents of each file loaded into the application domain and compares it with the hash value in the
•	manifest. If two hashes don't match, the assemble fails to load.[1]
	Also "Code running in one application cannot directly access code or resources from another
	directly access code or resources from another application. The common language runtime enforces this isolation by preventing direct calls
	between objects in different application domains. Objects that pass between domains are either copied or accessed by proxy."[2]
	SECURITY LEVELS
	The security levels of the application domain if
•	different by setting the trust level assigned to an outside application using the "trust" element in the web.config for the ASP.NET application.
	Syntax- <trust <="" level="Full/High/Low/None" td=""></trust>
	originUrl="url"/> Example-
•	<pre>crust level="High" originUrl=http://www.SomeOtherCompany.com/defa</pre>
	t.aspx >
	[7]
a first secure execution space, and	The application domain is the execution space for particular application.
at least one arrangement within the first amper resistant barrier that prevents the first secure execution space from	The second secure execution space is another application domain that has a different trust level an outside application.
executing the same executable accessed by a second secure execution space	If second app domain gives Full trust to the outside
naving a second tamper resistant barrier	application; whereas the first one doesn't, the first
with a second security level different from he first security level.	app domain won't be able to execute the applicati that requires full trust permission.
•	References:

Exhibit B

293482.02

1

	www.microsoft.com/germany/ms/msdnbiblio/tnetrk/doc/assembly.doc [2] msdn.Microsoft.com/library/en-us/cpguide/html/cpconapplicationdomainsoverview.asp?frameue [7] LaMacchia,etc, .NET Framework Security Addision-Wesley, 2002
·	
	·
·	
	·
·	
	•

	 	Seerge South Corner of the Cor
4	EXAMPANGUAGE SEE SEE	SECULOR DESIGNATION OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PRO
_	34.	Product Infringing: Products containing Microsoft Common Language Runtime or
5		Compact Common Language Runtime and
		products implementing the Common Language
6		Infrastructure specification.
7	A protected processing environment	Microsoft Common Language Runtime and
	comprising:	.NET Framework SDK:
8	a first tamper resistant barrier having a first	TAMPER RESISTANT BARRIER
	security level,	The first tamper resistant barrier is the
9	· · ·	application domain in the CLR. The runtime
10		hashes the contents of each file loaded into the application domain and compares it with the
10		hash value in the manifest. If two hashes don't
11		match, the assembly fails to load. [1]
12		Also "Code running in one application cannot
,,		directly access code or resources from another
13		application. The common language runtime enforces this isolation by preventing direct
14		calls between objects in different application
•	·	domains. Objects that pass between domains
15		are either copied or accessed by proxy."[2]
		arcuprev i evel a
16	·	SECURITY LEVELS
17		Application domains have different security
		levels by setting security policy of the
18		application domain programmatically. [3]
		"It has different security based on code-based
19		security model of .NET. Administrators and hosts use code-access security to decide what
20		code can do, based on characteristics of the
20		code itself, regardless of what user is executing
21		the code. The code characteristics are called
		evidence and can include the Web site or zone
22	•	from which the code was downloaded, or the
23		digital signature of the vendor who published the code."
23		
24		"When the security manager needs to
		determine the set of permissions that an
25		assembly is granted by security policy, it starts
<u>, </u>		with the enterprise policy level. Supplying the
26		assembly evidence to this policy level will result in the set of permissions granted from
27		that policy level. The security manager
-'		typically continues to collect the permission
28		sets of the policy levels below the enterprise
H		policy [including the app domain] in the same
Ш	•	

Exhibit B

1

2

1 2 3 4		fashion. These permission sets are then intersected to generate the policy system permission set for the assembly. All levels must allow a specific permission before it can make it into the granted permission set for the assembly."
5		Example of granted permission sets from a
6		policy — Condition: All code, Permission Set: Nothing
7		Condition: Zone: Internet, Permission Set: Internet Condition: URL:
8	•	www.monash.edu.au, Permission Set: MonashPSet
. 9		Condition: Strong Name: m-Commerce, Permission Set: m-
_		CommercePSet [4]
10 11		Another difference in security levels can be whether the verification process is turned off or on, "Managed code must be passed through a
12		verification process before it can be run (unless the administrator has granted
13		permission to skip the verification). The verification process determines whether the
14		code can attempt to access invalid memory addresses or perform some other action that
15	·	could cause the process in which it is running
16		to fail to operate properly. Code that passes the verification test is said to be type-safe. The
17		ability to verify code as type-safe enables the common language runtime to provide as great a level of isolation as the process boundary, at
18	·	a much lower performance cost." [5]
19	Y	·
	a first secure execution space, and	The application domain is the execution space for a particular application.
20	at least one arrangement within the first tamper resistant barrier that prevents the first secure	The second secure execution space is another application domain that has a different security
21	execution space from executing the same	policy than the first.
22	executable accessed by a second secure execution space having a second tamper	If second app domain's security policy doesn't
23	resistant barrier with a second security level different from the first security level.	give any permission to code from internet zone, but first app domain does, then the code
24		would run in first app domain and not in second.[6]
25		References: [1]
26		www.microsoft.com/germany/ms/msdnbibl
27		io/dotnetrk/doc/assembly.doc [2] msdn.Microsoft.com/library/en-
28		us/cpguide/html/ cpconapplicationdomainsoverview.asp?fra
20		me=true
.]		

									[3] LaMacchia, etc, .NET Framework Security, Addision-Wesley, 2002, p.113 [4] Watkins, Demien, "An Overview of Security in the .NET Framework", from MSDN Library, January 2002 [5] same as [2] [6] msdn.Microsoft.com/library/en- us/cpguide/html/ cpconapplicationdomainlevelsecuritypol .asp?frame=true									
		,				.—— .		L .∙	· .							:	· .	
												:				•		:
								:										•
							٠	<i>:</i> ·	•				-	•	7			
						:				•								
			•	•							•							
																٠		:
											٠							
													•					

~	POR U.S. TATE	111 1101 0,101,111
3	CLAIMLANGUAGE	CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT
.4	38.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and
5		included applications, and Server 2003, including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using
6 [.]	AA. d Co	Passport The first computing arrangement surrounded by
7	A method for protecting a first computing arrangement surrounded by a first tamper resistant barrier having a first security level,	a tamper resistant barrier is the Office 2003 IRM client environment and includes the
8	the method including:	signed digital certificate identifying the user. If the certificate is tampered with, or if certain,
9		sensitive IRM processes or modules are debugged or tampered with, the system will
10		cease to operate.
11 12		The first security level is the "Security Level" which has been selected for a particular Office Application, e.g., Word.
13	preventing the first computing arrangement from using the same software module accessed	The computing arrangement that prevents a
14	by a second computing arrangement having a second tamper resistant barrier with a second	software module from running in one computing arrangement and not in another is
15	security level different from the first security level.	the type and characteristics of the particular software module (VBA program within a
16		document or add-in); i.e., signed, script author, code capabilities, etc., and the "Security Level"
	u ·	
17		settings.
17 18		settings.
	·	settings.
18	3	settings.
18 19	3	settings.
18 19 20	3	settings.
18 19 20 21		settings.
18 19 20 21 22		settings.
18 19 20 21 22 23		settings.
18 19 20 21 22 23 24		settings.
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25		settings.
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26		settings.

,		
4	E CLAIMILANGUAGE	ZEE GLAIM OF INFRINGEMENTAL BASE
5	2.	Product Infringing: Windows Media Rights Manager and Windows Media Player
_	A system including:	
6	(a) a first apparatus including,	Consumer's computer, as shown in WMRM SDK
.7	(1) user controls,	Consumer's computer, as shown in WMRM SDK
8	(2) a communications port,	Consumer's computer, as shown in WMRM SDK
9	(3) a processor,	Consumer's computer, as shown in WMRM SDK
10	(4) a memory storing:	Consumer's computer, as shown in WMRM SDK
11	(i) a first secure container containing a governed item, the first secure	Secure container (packaged Windows Media file), received by consumer's computer from
12	container governed item being at least in part encrypted; the first	"Content provider" (WMRM SDK, Step 3), which contains encrypted governed item
13	secure container having been received from a second apparatus;	("Encrypted content")
14	(ii) a first secure container rule at least in part governing an aspect of	Rights portion of signed license, received by consumer's computer from "License issuer"
15	access to or use of said first secure container governed item, the first	(WMRM SDK, Step 9)
16	secure container rule [sic], the first secure container rule having been	
17	received from a third apparatus different from said second	
18	apparatus; and (5) hardware or software used for	Windows Media Player and Windows Media
19	receiving and opening secure containers, said secure containers each	Rights Manager
20	including the capacity to contain a governed item, a secure container rule	·
21	being associated with each of said secure containers;	
22	(6) a protected processing environment at least in part protecting information	1 st and 2nd rules consist of any two valid rules as specified in the Window Media Rights
23	contained in said protected processing environment from tampering by a user	Manager SDK; protected processing environment includes Windows Media Rights
24	of said first apparatus, said protected processing environment including	Manager and Windows processes for protecting operation of Windows Media Rights
25	hardware or software used for applying said first secure container	Manager. Licenses can be used to convey multiple rules.
26	rule and a second secure container rule in combination to at least in part	
27	govern at least one aspect of access to or use of a governed item contained in	
28	a secure container; and	·
j	(7) hardware or software used for	Any hardware or software employed in

Exhibit B

1

2

transmission of secure containers to other apparatuses or for the receipt of secure containers from other apparatuses.							transmitting Windows Media files, including for example consumer's computer's communication port and Windows Media Player (WMRM SDK, Step 3)							
ı			: .			٠.								
					. :	•					•			
				•	-:			•	•		•	• :	٠	
						• •								
				•			•		•		•			
•							• •	• •					٠	
						•	•	•	•			•		
		•				. :		•						
	•	•					•							
					5	•					•	٠		
			•							•				
								•						
					•							•		
			•											
										•				
			-		•									
						٠.	•							
		٠												
	•													
				•										
		•						٠						
						•	•							
					•				•			٠		
		•										-		
												_		
												•		
							. ::	•						
		•		••		•		•			. *			

Exhibit B 64

293482.02

INTERTRUST TECHNOLOGIES CORP. v. MICROSOFT CORP. INTERTRUST INFRINGEMENT CHART

2	INTERTRUST INFR FOR U.S. PATE	INGEMENT CHART NT NO. 6,185,683
3		CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT
	CLAIM LANGUAGE	CLAIMOLINI AINOLINEN
5	2.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and included applications, and Server 2003, including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using Passport
Ĭ	A system including:	
7	a first apparatus including,	A device with user controls, a communications port, a processor and memory. For example,
8	user controls,	the user controls may be a keyboard and mouse, the communications port may be a NIC
9	a communications port,	card with an Ethernet port, the processor may be a CPU, and the memory may be a hard-drive
10	a processor,	or RAM.
11	a memory storing:	
12	a first secure container containing a governed item, the first secure container governed item	An encrypted IRM-governed email received from a remote computer. The encrypted IRM-
13	being at least in part encrypted; the first secure container having been received from a second	governed email contains an encrypted IRM- governed email message.
14	apparatus;	
15	a first secure container rule at least in part governing an aspect of access to or use of said	The first secure container rule is received from the RMS server in the form of a use license.
16	first secure container governed item, the first secure container rule, the first secure container	This use license contains rules generated by the
17	rule having been received from a third apparatus different from said second	RMS server specifically for the user (or user's group)
18	apparatus; and hardware or software used for receiving and	The RM-enabled device contains hardware or
19	opening secure containers,	software for receiving and opening secure emails.
20	said secure containers each including the capacity to contain a governed item, a secure	The secure email has the capacity to contain an
21	container rule being associated with each of said secure containers;	IRM-governed email message, with a rule being associated with each email.
22		The rules associated with the secure emails are
23		rules that come as part of the original email as well as rules that come back from the RMS.
24	a protected processing environment at least in part protecting information contained in said	Protected information on the RM-enabled device is protected by the use of at least
25	protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said first apparatus,	cryptographic techniques.
26	•	m , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
27	said protected processing environment including hardware or software used for	The rule governing the email works together with an additional rule to determine what
_	applying said first secure container rule and a	access to or use (if any) are allowed with respect to the IRM-governed email message.
28	second secure container rule in combination to at least in part govern at least one aspect of	For example, the additional rule may be

a ir	access to or use of a governed item contained in a secure container; and							received together with the rule in the use license.									
s	hardware or software used for transmission of secure containers to other apparatuses or for the receipt of secure containers from other apparatuses.								The device includes hardware or software used for transmitting or receiving secure emails. For example, RM-enabled OUTLOOK is designed to transmit and receive encrypted IRM-governed emails to/from other devices.								
						,	-		•	 -			•		,		
	•							•									•
			•					•	•						•	. •	
								-				•		•		•	
		•				•		•									
						•		٠.						•			
										•						•	
				•			•										
							•	-									
															•	•	
													•				
				•													
										•-	•				٠		
													•				
			• .														
			•				•										
						-					-					•	
								-									
-						•		٠	į	· .		:					

3		
4	GLAIM LANGUAGE	CLAIMOF INERINGEMENT.
5	2.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and included applications, and Server 2003,
6		including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using Passport
7	A system including:	
8	a first apparatus including,	A device with user controls, a communications port, a processor, and memory. For example,
9	user controls,	the user controls may be a keyboard and mouse, the communications port may be a NIC
10	a communications port,	card with an Ethernet port, the processor may be a CPU, and the memory may be a hard-drive
11	a processor,	or RAM.
12	a memory storing: a first secure container containing a governed	The first secure container is an encrypted IRM-
.13	item, the first secure container governed item being at least in part encrypted; the first secure	protected document.
14	container having been received from a second apparatus;	This encrypted IRM-governed document is, for example, received from a remote computer, as an attachment to an IRM-governed email or
15 16		downloaded from a document server or web site.
	a first secure container rule at least in part	The first secure container rule is received from
17	governing an aspect of access to or use of said first secure container governed item, the first	the RMS server in the form of a use license.
18	secure container rule, the first secure container	This use license contains rules generated by the
19	rule having been received from a third apparatus different from said second apparatus; and	RMS server specifically for the user (or user's group).
20	hardware or software used for receiving and opening secure containers,	The RM-enabled device contains hardware or software for receiving and opening secure
22	said secure containers each including the	documents.
	capacity to contain a governed item, a secure container rule being associated with each of	The secure documents have the capacity to contain IRM-governed content, with a rule
23	said secure containers;	being associated with each secure document.
24		The rules associated with said secure
25	·	documents are the rules that come as part of the originally received document as well as rules that come back from the RMS server.
26	a protected processing environment at least in	Protected information on the RM-enabled
27	part protecting information contained in said protected processing environment from	device is protected by the use of at least cryptographic technique.
28	tampering by a user of said first apparatus,	The rule governing the document works
		The fale governing the document works

2 3 4	said protected processing environment including hardware or software used for applying said first secure container rule and a second secure container rule in combination to at least in part govern at least one aspect of access to or use of a governed item contained in a secure container; and	together with an additional rule to determine what access to or use (if any) are allowed with respect to the IRM-governed document. For example, the additional rule may be associated with an email to which the document was attached, or received together with the rule in the use license.								
6 7 8	hardware or software used for transmission of secure containers to other apparatuses or for the receipt of secure containers from other apparatuses.	The device includes hardware or software used for transmitting or receiving secure documents. For example, RM-enabled OUTLOOK is designed to transmit and receive to/from other devices emails with IRM-governed documents attached thereto.								
. 9										
10	<i>,</i>									
11										
12										
13		·								
14	•									
15										
16	·	· .								
17										
18										
19										
20	·	٠.								
21										
22		·								
23	*									
24	•									
25										
26										
27										
28										
28										

3		
4	CLAIM LANGUAGE	CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT
5	3.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and included applications, and Server 2003, including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using Passport
-	A system including:	
7 8	a first apparatus including,	A device with user controls, a communications port, a processor and memory. For example,
9	user controls,	the user controls may be a keyboard and mouse, the communications port may be a NIC
	a communications port,	card with an Ethernet port, the processor may be a CPU, and the memory may be a hard-drive
10 11	a processor,	or RAM.
11	a memory storing:	·
12	a first secure container containing a governed item, the first secure container governed item being at least in part encrypted;	The first secure container containing a governed item is an IRM protected email.
13	being at least in part encrypted;	Both the email and attachment are IRM
14		protected, each having their own rules, each being encrypted.
15	a first secure container rule at least in part governing an aspect of access to or use of said	The rule governing the email (a first secure container rule) governs said first secure
16	first secure container governed item; and	container governed item.
17		
18	a second secure container containing a digital certificate;	The second secure container is the IRM protected attachment's derived license request
19		object. The license request object contains the
20		Publishing license and a signed digital certificate.
21		
22	hardware or software used for receiving and opening secure containers,	The RM (IRM) enabled computer has software for receiving and opening secure containers.
23	said secure containers each including the	The IRM secure containers have capacity to
24	capacity to contain a governed item, a secure container rule being associated with each of said secure containers;	contain a governed item, with a secure container rule being associated with each of said secure containers.
25	a protected processing environment at least in	Protected information on the RM-enabled
26	part protecting information contained in said protected processing environment from	computer is protected by the use of at least cryptographic techniques.
27	tampering by a user of said first apparatus,	
28	said protected processing environment including hardware or software used for	The rules governing the email itself (first
- 1		

Exhibit B

1

se at ac	plying said first secure container rule and a cond secure container rule in combination to least in part govern at least one aspect of cess to or use of a governed item contained a secure container; and	secure container rule) and the rules governing the attachment work together to determine whaccess to or use (if any) will be allowed with respect to the governed item.							
ha sec	rdware or software used for transmission of cure containers to other apparatuses or for e receipt of secure containers from other paratuses.	IRM-enabled applications, e.g., OUTLOOK are designed to transmit and receive RM secured containers to/from other computers							
	•								
	- 90	·							
	•								
	•.								
	·								
		•							
		÷.							

293482.02

INTERTRUST TECHNOLOGIES CORP. v. MICROSOFT CORP. INTERTRUST INFRINGEMENT CHART

2		INTERTRUST INFRINGEMENT CHART FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 6,185,683						
3	CLAIMLANGUAGE	CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT						
4	3.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and						
5		included applications, and Server 2003, including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using						
6		Passport Passport						
7	A system including: a first apparatus including,	A dovice with year and all						
8		A device with user controls, a communications port, a processor and memory. For example,						
. 9	user controls,	the user controls may be a keyboard and mouse, the communications port may be a NIC						
10	a communications port,	card with an Ethernet port, the processor may be a CPU, and the memory may be a hard-drive						
	a processor,	or RAM.						
11	a memory storing:	·						
12	a first secure container containing a governed item, the first secure container governed item	The first secure container containing a governed item is an IRM protected document.						
. 13	being at least in part encrypted;	which is an attachment within an IRM protected email message. The governed item is						
14		the document's content.						
15		Both the email message and attachment are encrypted and have associated usage rules due to IRM protection.						
16	a first secure container rule at least in part	A use license for the IRM protected document						
17	governing an aspect of access to or use of said first secure container governed item; and	specifies rules governing access to or use of said first secure container governed item.						
18	a second secure container containing a digital certificate;	The second secure container is the IRM protected email message.						
19								
20		The IRM protected attachment includes a publishing license and an owner certificate, both of which are signed XrML digital						
21		certificates.						
22		The attachment (including embedded certificates) is contained within the IRM						
23		protected email message (said second secure container).						
24	hardware or software used for receiving and opening secure containers,	The RM (IRM) enabled computer has software						
25		for receiving and opening secure containers.						
. 26	said secure containers each including the capacity to contain a governed item, a secure	The IRM secure containers have capacity to contain a governed item, with a secure						
27	container rule being associated with each of said secure containers:	container rule being associated with each of said secure containers.						
28	a protected processing environment at least in part protecting information contained in said protected processing environment from	Protected information on the RM-enabled computer is protected by the use of at least cryptographic techniques.						

Exhibit B 1

293482.02

		*
1		
1	tampering by a user of said first apparatus,	
2	said protected processing environment	
3	including hardware or software used for applying said first secure container rule and a	The rules governing the attachment (first secure container rule) and the rules governing the
4	second secure container rule in combination to at least in part govern at least one aspect of	email message (second secure container rule) work together to determine what access to or
5	access to or use of a governed item contained	use (if any) will be allowed with respect to the
_	in a secure container; and hardware or software used for transmission of	governed item. RM-enabled applications, e.g., OUTLOOK, are
6	secure containers to other apparatuses or for	designed to transmit and receive RM secured
7	the receipt of secure containers from other apparatuses.	containers to/from other computers.
. 8		
	4. A system as in claim 3,	All parts of the attachment (including
9	said memory storing a rule associated with said second secure container, said rule	All parts of the attachment (including embedded signed XrML licenses/certificates)
10	associated with said second secure container at	are protected by the enclosing email message and governed by the associated email rules
11	least in part governing at least one aspect of access to or use of said digital certificate.	(second secure container rule).
12		\$#\$
13		
14		
15		
16		
17	·	
18	·	
19		•
20		
21		
22		
23		
	·	
24		
25		
26		
27		
28		
ļ		

2	FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 6,185,683		
3	CLAIM LANGUAGE	CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT	
5	5.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and included applications, and Server 2003, including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using	
6		Passport Passport	
7	A system including: a first apparatus including,	A device with user controls, a communications	
8	user controls,	port, a processor and memory. For example, the user controls may be a keyboard and mouse, the communications port may be a NIC	
9	a communications port,	card with an Ethernet port, the processor may be a CPU, and the memory may be a hard-drive	
11	a processor,	or RAM.	
12	a memory storing: a first secure container containing a governed item, the first secure container governed item	first secure container containing a governed item is an IRM protected email.	
13 14	being at least in part encrypted;	Both the email and attachment are IRM protected, each having their own rules, each	
		being encrypted.	
15 16	a first secure container rule at least in part governing an aspect of access to or use of said first secure container governed item; and	The rule governing the email (a first secure container rule) governs said first secure container governed item.	
17			
18	a second secure container containing a digital signature, the second secure container being different from said first secure container;	The second secure container is the IRM protected attachment's derived license request object.	
19 20		The license request object contains the Publishing license and a signed digital	
21		certificate.	
22	hardware or software used for receiving and opening secure containers, said secure containers each including the capacity to	The RM (IRM) enabled computer has software for receiving and opening secure containers.	
23	containers each including the capacity to contain a governed item, a secure container rule being associated with each of said secure	The IRM secure containers have capacity to contain a governed item, with a secure	
24	containers;	container rule being associated with each of said secure containers.	
25	a protected processing environment at least in part protecting information contained in said	Protected information on the RM-enabled computer is protected by the use of at least	
26	protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said first apparatus,	cryptographic techniques.	
27 28	said protected processing environment including hardware or software used for applying said first secure container rule and a	The rules governing the email itself (first secure container rule) and the rules governing	

Exhibit I

293482.02

at least in part	container rule in combination to govern at least one aspect of c of a governed item contained	the attachment will work together to determin what access to or use (if any) will be allowed with respect to the governed item.
hardware or so secure contains	ftware used for transmission of irs to other apparatuses or for ecure containers from other	RM-enabled applications, e.g., OUTLOOK, a designed to transmit and receive RM secured containers to/from other computers.
apparatuses.		
		. •
	• ,	
		:
	•	•
-		
	•	
		•
		•
·		
1		

3		
.4	CLAIM LANGUAGE	GLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT
5	5.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and included applications, and Server 2003, including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using
6	·	Passport
7	A system including:	
8	a first apparatus including,	A device with user controls, a communications port, a processor and memory. For example,
9	user controls,	the user controls may be a keyboard and mouse, the communications port may be a NIC
10	a communications port,	card with an Ethernet port, the processor may be a CPU, and the memory may be a hard-drive
11	a processor,	or RAM.
12	a memory storing:	E-t course container containing a governed
13	a first secure container containing a governed item, the first secure container governed item being at least in part encrypted;	first secure container containing a governed item is an IRM protected email.
14	·	Both the email and attachment are IRM protected, each having their own rules, each
15	a first secure container rule at least in part	being encrypted. The rule governing the email (a first secure
16	governing an aspect of access to or use of said first secure container governed item; and	container rule) governs said first secure container governed item.
17		
18	a second secure container containing a digital signature, the second secure container being	The second secure container is the IRM email attachment.
19	different from said first secure container;	This attachment and its publishing license are
20	·	signed.
21	hardware or software used for receiving and opening secure containers, said secure	The RM (IRM) enabled computer has software for receiving and opening secure containers.
22	containers each including the capacity to	The IRM secure containers have capacity to
23	contain a governed item, a secure container rule being associated with each of said secure containers;	contain a governed item, with a secure container rule being associated with each of
24		said secure containers.
25	a protected processing environment at least in- part protecting information contained in said	Protected information on the RM-enabled computer is protected by the use of at least
26	protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said first apparatus,	cryptographic techniques.
27	said protected processing environment	
28	including hardware or software used for anniving said first secure container rule and a	The rules governing the email itself (first secure container rule) and the rules governing
		. 11.

Exhibit B 75

1

2	second secure container rule in combination to at least in part govern at least one aspect of access to or use of a governed item contained in a secure container; and		the attachment work together to determine what access to or use (if any) will be allowed with respect to the governed item.	
3	hardware or software used for tran	smission of	RM-enabled applications, e.g., OUTLOOK, are designed to transmit and receive RM secured	
4.	secure containers to other apparatu the receipt of secure containers fro	om other	containers to/from other computers.	
5	apparatuses.			
6	,		·	
7				
8				
9	•			
10	. :		· · ·	
11			:	
12				
13		. •		
14				
15			•	
16	·		;	
17				
18	·		•	
19			•	
20				
21				
22				
23				
24				
25	·		·	
26			. •	
27				
28				

3	·	
4	CLAIM LANGUAGE	CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT
5	5.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and included applications, and Server 2003,
6		including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using Passport
7	A system including:	
8	a first apparatus including,	A device with user controls, a communications port, a processor and memory. For example,
9	user controls,	the user controls may be a keyboard and mouse, the communications port may be a NIC
10	a communications port,	card with an Ethernet port, the processor may be a CPU, and the memory may be a hard-drive
11	a processor,	or RAM.
12	a memory storing: a first secure container containing a governed	The first secure container containing a
13	item, the first secure container governed item being at least in part encrypted;	governed item is an IRM protected document, which is an attachment within an IRM
14		protected email message. The governed item is the document's content.
15		Both the amail masses as and attachment and
16		Both the email message and attachment are encrypted and have associated usage rules due to IRM protection.
17 18	a first secure container rule at least in part governing an aspect of access to or use of said first secure container governed item; and	A use license for the IRM protected document specifies rules governing access to or use of said first secure container governed item.
10	a second secure container containing a digital	The second secure container is the IRM
19	signature, the second secure container being different from said first secure container;	protected email message.
20		The IRM protected attachment includes a
21		publishing license and an owner certificate, both of which are signed XrML digital certificates.
22		The attachment (including embedded
23	·	certificates) is contained within the IRM protected email message (said second secure
24	hardware or coffware used for section and	container).
25	hardware or software used for receiving and opening secure containers, said secure containers each including the capacity to	The RM (IRM) enabled computer has software for receiving and opening secure containers.
26	contain a governed item, a secure container rule being associated with each of said secure	The IRM secure containers have capacity to contain a governed item, with a secure
27	containers;	container rule being associated with each of said secure containers.
28	a protected processing environment at least in nart protecting information contained in said	Protected information on the RM-enabled computer is protected by the use of at least
	salu in salu	in a surface is inviced by the use of at least

Exhibit B

293482.02

1

1 2	protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said first apparatus,	cryptographic techniques.
3	said protected processing environment including hardware or software used for	The rules governing the attachment (first secure
4 5	applying said first secure container rule and a second secure container rule in combination to at least in part govern at least one aspect of access to or use of a governed item contained	container rule) and the rules governing the email message (second secure container rule) work together to determine what access to or use (if any) will be allowed with respect to the
6	in a secure container; and	governed item.
7	hardware or software used for transmission of secure containers to other apparatuses or for the receipt of secure containers from other	RM-enabled applications, e.g., OUTLOOK, are designed to transmit and receive RM secured containers to/from other computers.
8	apparatuses. 6. A system as in claim 5,	
9	said memory storing a rule at least in part	All parts of the attachment (including
10	governing an aspect of access to or use of said digital signature.	embedded signed XrML licenses/certificates) are protected by the enclosing email message and governed by the associated email rules
11		(second secure container rule).
12		
13		
14	·	
15		
16		
17.		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		•
26		•
27		
28		
	. Ęxh	ubit B

3	1	
4	CLAIM EANGUAGE	CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT
5	28.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and included applications, and Server 2003,
6	·	including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using Passport
7	A system including:	
8	a first apparatus including;	A device with user controls, a communications port, a processor and memory. For example,
9	user controls,	the user controls may be a keyboard and mouse, the communications port may be a NIC
·10·	a communications port,	card with an Ethernet port, the processor may be a CPU, and the memory may be a hard-drive
11	a processor,	or RAM.
12	a memory containing a first rule,	The first rule governs use of an IRM protected document (e.g., an IRM rule permitting a document to be read by specified users or
13 14		barring access to IRM-governed information from specified users, applications, or other principals).
15	hardware or software used for receiving and opening secure containers,	The RM-enabled device contains hardware or software for receiving and opening secure containers.
16	said secure containers each including the	containers.
17	capacity to contain a governed item, a secure container rule being associated with each of said secure containers;	The secure email has the capacity to contain an IRM-governed email message, with a rule
18	a protected processing environment at least in	being associated with each email. Protected information on the RM-enabled
19	part protecting information contained in said protected processing environment from	device is protected by the use of at least cryptographic techniques.
20	tampering by a user of said first apparatus,	The secure container rule is an IRM rule
21	said protected processing environment including hardware or software used for	governing access to the IRM protected document (e.g., a rule permitting editing by
22	applying said first rule and a secure container rule in combination to at least in part govern at	specified users).
23	least one aspect of access to or use of a governed item; and	The rule governing the email works together with an additional rule to determine what
24		access to or use (if any) are allowed with respect to the IRM-governed email message
25		(the document's content). For example, the additional rule may be received together with
26	·	the rule in the use license, may be associated with a publishing license, may be associated
27		with user certification, revocation lists, or
28		exclusion policies, or may be received from any other source.
	hardware or software used for transmission of	The device includes hardware or software used
l,		

Exhibit B 79

293482.02

2 3	secure containers to other apparatuses or for the receipt of secure containers from other apparatuses; and	for transmitting or receiving secure containers. For example, RM-enabled OUTLOOK is designed to transmit and receive encrypted IRM-governed emails to/from other devices:
	a second apparatus including:	
4	user controls,	A device with user controls, a communications port, a processor and memory. For example,
5	a communications port,	the user controls may be a keyboard and mouse, the communications port may be a NIC
6	a processor,	card with an Ethernet port, the processor may be a CPU, and the memory may be a hard-drive
7	a memory containing a second rule,	or RAM.
8		The second rule governs use of an IRM protected document (e.g., an IRM rule
9		permitting a document to be read by specified users or barring access to IRM-governed
· 10 ·		information from specified users, applications, or other principals).
11	hardware or software used for receiving and opening secure containers,	The RM-enabled device contains hardware or software for receiving and opening secure
12	said secure containers each including the	containers.
13	capacity to contain a governed item, a secure container rule being associated with each of	The secure email has the capacity to contain an IRM-governed email item, with a rule being
14	said secure containers;	associated with each secure containers.
15	a protected processing environment at least in part protecting information contained in said protected processing environment from	Protected information on the RM-enabled device is protected by the use of at least cryptographic technique.
16	tampering by a user of said apparatus,	The secure container rule is an IRM rule
17 18	said protected processing environment including hardware or software used for applying said second rule and a secure	governing access to the IRM protected document (e.g., a rule permitting editing by specified users).
19	container rule in combination to at least in part	The rule governing the email works together
20	govern at least one aspect of access to or use of a governed item;	with an additional rule to determine what access to or use (if any) are allowed with respect to the IRM-governed item (the
21-		document's content). For example, the additional rule may be received together with
22		the rule in the use license, may be associated with a publishing license, may be associated
23		with user certification, revocation lists, or exclusion policies, or may be received from
24	·	any other source.
25	hardware or software used for transmission of secure containers to other apparatuses or for	The device includes hardware or software used for transmitting or receiving secure containers.
26	the receipt of secure containers from other apparatuses; and	For example, RM-enabled OUTLOOK is designed to transmit and receive encrypted IRM-governed emails to/from other devices.
27	an electronic intermediary, said intermediary	The RMS Server (Microsoft hosted or
28	including a user rights authority clearinghouse.	otherwise) constructs a 'use license' specific to a piece content and targets it to a specific user.

29. A system as in claim 28, said user rights authority clearinghouse operatively connected to make rights available to users.		The RMS server sends use licenses to users through a communications port, e.g., Ethemet, serial, satellite, "the internet" These use licenses include rights.		
			The clearing functionality of operatively connected to the	the RMS is RMS server.
				•
] .	·		•	
		·		•
-		•		
			٠	
		٠	•	
		•	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	
		•		
	•		·	
			•	
				•
			· ·	
		·		

293482.02

Exhibit B

28.		Product Infringing: Windows Media Rights Manager and Windows Media Player
A system including:		Managor and Windows Modia Player
(a) a fi	rst apparatus including;	Consumer's computer, as shown in WMRM SDK
(1)	user controls,	Consumer's computer, as shown in WMRM SDK
(2)	a communications port,	Consumer's computer, as shown in WMRM SDK
(3)	a processor,	Consumer's computer, as shown in WMRM SDK
(4)	a memory containing a first rule,	Memory is in the consumer's computer, first rule is a right received as part of a signed license (WMRM SDK, Step 9)
(5)	hardware or software used for receiving and opening secure	Consumer's computer receives Windows Media file (secure container) via
	containers, said secure containers each including the capacity to contain	communications port (WMRM SDK, Step 3) and applies secure container rule or rules via
	a governed item, a secure container rule being associated with each of said secure containers;	Windows Media Player and Windows Media Rights Manager.
(6)		Processing environment includes Windows Media Rights Manager and Windows
	contained in said protected processing environment from tampering by a	processes for protecting operation of Windows Media Rights Manager
	user of said first apparatus, said protected processing environment	
	including hardware or software used for applying said first rule and a	
	secure container rule in combination to at least in part govern at least one	
	aspect of access to or use of a governed item; and	
(7)	hardware or software used for transmission of secure containers to	Hardware or software employed in transmitting Windows Media files, including for example
	other apparatuses or for the receipt of secure containers from other	consumer's computer's communication port and Windows Media Player (WMRM SDK,
(h) 2 sec	apparatuses; and cond apparatus including:	Step 3)
	user controls,	2nd consumer's computer 2nd consumer's computer
	a communications port,	2nd consumer's computer
	a processor,	2nd consumer's computer
	a memory containing a second rule,	Memory is in the 2nd consumer's computer, first rule is a Right received as part of a signed license (WMRM SDK, Step 9)
` '	hardware or software used for receiving and opening secure	2nd consumer's computer receives Windows Media file (secure container) via
	containers, said secure containers each including the capacity to contain	communications port (WMRM SDK, Step 3) and applies secure container rule or rules via

Exhibit B

1

2

1	a governed item, a secure container rule being associated with each of said secure containers;	Windows Media Player and Windows Media Rights Manager.
3	(6) a protected processing environment at least in part protecting information	Processing environment includes Windows Media Rights Manager and Windows
4	contained in said protected processing environment from tampering by a	processes for protecting operation of Windows Media Rights Manager; processing
5	user of said apparatus, said protected processing environment including	environment applies multiple rules in combination
6	hardware or software used for applying said second rule and a secure container rule in combination	
7	to at least in part govern at least one aspect of access to or use of a	
8	governed item; (7) hardware or software used for	Hardware or software employed in transmitting
9 10	transmission of secure containers to other apparatuses or for the receipt of	Windows Media files, including for example 2 nd consumer's computer's communication
11	secure containers from other apparatuses; and	port and Windows Media Piayer (WMRM SDK, Step 3)
12	(c) an electronic intermediary, said intermediary including a user rights authority clearinghouse.	License Issuer
13	29. A system as in claim 28, said user rights authority clearinghouse	License Issuer, operatively connected to
14	operatively connected to make rights available to users.	consumer's computer (WMRM SDK, Step 9)
15		
16 17		
18		
19	·	
20		
21		
22		
23	·	
24	. '	
25 26		
27	·	
28		
	·	
	Exh	ibit B
1		٠

3	<u> </u>	
. 4	CLAIM LANGUAGE	CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT
5	56.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and included applications, and Server 2003, including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using Passport
	A method of securely delivering an item,	
7	including the following steps:	
8	performing an authentication step;	The RM-enabled application, e.g., Word, OUTLOOK, PowerPoint, etc., must be
9		authenticated before it is allowed access to or use of the content.
10	associating a digital signature with said item;	The RM protected content is signed.
11	incorporating said item into a first secure electronic container, said item being at least in part encrypted while in said container,	RM-protected content is packaged with rules and encrypted.
12		·
13	said incorporation occurring in an apparatus containing a first protected processing environment, said protected processing	Protected information on the RM enabled
14	environment at least in part protecting information contained in said protected	computer is protected by the use of at least cryptographic techniques.
15	processing environment from tampering by a user of said apparatus;	
16	in said protected processing environment, associating a first rule with said first secure	The IRM-protected document (said item) has an associated rule or rules.
17	electronic container, said first rule at least in part governing at least one aspect of access to	·
18	or use of said item;	
19	authenticating an intended recipient of said item;	A recipient of IRM-protected content must be authenticated before being allowed access to or use of the content.
20 21	transmitting said first secure electronic container and said first rule to said intended recipient; and	The document is sent via IRM-protected email as an attachment.
22	using a second protected processing environment, providing said intended recipient	The email is received at another IRM-enabled computer.
23	access to at least a portion of said item,	
24	said access being governed at least in part by said first rule and by a second rule present at	The first said rule is the rule(s) associated with
25	said intended recipient's site.	the attached document, and the second rule is the rule(s) received that govern the email itself.
26		•

Exhibit B 84

27

28

4		
4 5 6 7	126.	Product Infringing: Windows Hardware Quality Labs Authentication services, Windows operating Systems (such as Windows XP) that support the driver signing features, and any product using Driver Signing feature
8	A method of providing trusted intermediary services including the following steps:	
9	at a first apparatus, receiving an item from a second apparatus;	Microsoft's Window Hardware Quality Labs (WHQL) (first apparatus) receiving driver package (item) from independent
· 10		hardware vendor (IHV) or any driver developer (second apparatus).
11	associating authentication information with said item;	The signature information of a security catalog file (see next element of claim)
12 13		names Microsoft as the publisher. WHQL's signature is intended to signify that a driver has complied with Microsoft's
14		Windows compatibility and/or Secure Audio Path (SAP) specifications.
15	incorporating said item into a secure digital container;	The hashes of the files making up the driver package are included in the signed security catalog file for the driver package.
16		The catalog file makes the driver package a secure digital container.
17 18	associating a first rule with said secure digital container, said first rule at least in part governing at least one aspect of access	Driver developers specify rules in an INF file that govern the installation and/or use of the driver. For example, as specified in
19	to or use of said item;	the INF, the installation events will vary based on the user's operating system
20	·	version, which includes architecture, product type and suite. The INF logging rules and can further specify security rules
21		that are evaluated when the driver is used.
22		White Paper – Operating-System Versioning for Drivers under Windows XP
23		Setup selects the [Models] section to use based on the following rules:
25		If the INF contains [Models] sections for
26	·	several major or minor operating system version numbers, Setup uses the section with the highest version numbers that are
27 28		not higher than the operating system version on which the installation is taking place.
		,

Exhibit B

293482.02

1

2

,		.•
1 2 3 4		If the INF [Models] sections that match the operating system version also include product type decorations, product suite decorations, or both, then Setup selects the section that most closely matches the running operating system.
_		Suppose, for example, Setup is running on
5 6 7		Windows XP Professional (which is operating system version 5.1), and it finds the following entry in a [Manufacturer] section:
8.		%FooCorp%=FooMfg, NT, NT.5, NT.5.5, NT0x80
9		In this case, Setup will look for a [Models]
10 11	·	section named [FooMfg.NT.5]. Setup will also use the [FooMfg.NT.5] section if it is running on a Datacenter version of
12		Windows .NET Server, because a specific major/minor version takes precedence over the product type and suite mask.
13		
14		For example, to create an INF that is intended for use only on Windows XP, the INF file could contain the following:
15		[Manufacturer]
16		"Foo Corp." = FooMfg, NT.5.1, NT.5.2
17		[FooMfg.NT.5.1] "Foo Device" = FooDev, *FOO1234
18		Note the omission of the undecorated [FooMfg] section, as well as the omission
19		of the [FooMfg.NT.5.2] section. This INF
		file would appear to be "empty" on any operating system other than Windows XP.
20	•	
21		Access Control List Rules
22		XP DDK - Tightening File-Open Security in a Device INF File
23		For Microsoft Windows 2000 and later,
	,	Microsoft tightened file-open security in the class installer INFs for certain device
24		classes, including CDROM, DiskDrive,
25		FDC, FloppyDisk, HDC, and SCSIAdapter.
26	0.70A	If you are unsure whether the class installer
27		for your device has tightened security on file opens, you should tighten security by
		using the device's INF file to assign a value
28	·	to the DeviceCharacteristics value name in the registry. Do this within an add-

	<u> </u>	
I		registry-section, which is specified using
2	transmitting said secure digital container	the INF AddReg directive. Microsoft, IHV, driver developer or any
3	and said first rule to a third apparatus, said third apparatus including a protected	other party distributing signed driver packages transmitting the driver package to
4 .	processing environment at least in part protecting information stored in said	user (third apparatus). Since the driver package includes the INF file, it will
5	protected processing environment from	include the first rule. The protected
6	tampering by a user of said third apparatus;	processing environment (PPE) is Windows operating system with its pertinent services such as Windows File Protection, signature
7	i .	and cryptographic functions, Plug and Play and Set-up and their related default and
8	' .	modifiable policies. The PPE checks for signatures on driver packages and detects
. 9 .		situations when the driver package's signature does not match the driver
10		package.
11		Additionally, the Digital Rights Manager (DRM) components (kernel and client) will
12	-	contribute to making the third apparatus a PPE when the SAP functionality is
13		invoked. [That is, when SAP is required, an additional signature is checked to verify
14		that the driver is SAP compliant and that it hasn't been tampered with.]
15	said third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule;	The end-user receiving the driver package.
16	said third apparatus checking said authentication information; and	A step in the Plug and Play/Setup driver installation process checks signature at
17		installation. Additionally, the DRM component will check the DRM signature
18		when invoking DRM functionality.
19		White Paper – Driver Signing for Windows
20		During driver installation, Windows compares the hashes contained in the
21		driver's CAT file with the computed hash of the driver binaries to determine whether
22		the binaries have changed since the CAT file was created. If a driver fails the
23	,	signature check or there is no CAT file, what happens next depends on the driver
24		signing policy in effect on the user's system:
25	• • •	If the policy is set to Ignore, the driver
26		installs silently, with no message to the user.
27		If the policy is set to Warn, a message
28		warns the user the driver is unsigned, which means that it has not passed WHOL

1 testing and might cause problems. The Warn dialog box gives an administrative 2 user the option to override the warning and install an unsigned driver anyway. 3 If the policy is set to Block, the system displays a message that informs the user that the driver cannot be installed because 5 it is not digitally signed. The action would be installing and/or using said third apparatus performing at least one action on said item, said at least one action the driver. For example, installation being governed, at least in part, by said policies govern the actions (ignore, warn or 7 block) taken based on whether a driver is first rule and by a second rule resident at said third apparatus prior to said receipt of signed or not and these policies (rule) are said secure digital container and said first resident on the third apparatus. Another rule is the "ranking" of available drivers rule, said action governance occurring at 9 least in part in said protected processing when selecting a driver to install. This ranking process includes whether a driver environment. 10 is signed or not. Another rule is the security access rules that the class installer 11 that will be used to install the device has. 12 In the case of DRM, the content will have associated rules governing its use in a SAP-13 complaint environment. These rules (the content license) can be resident at the third 14 apparatus particularly in the case when a user is installing a new (SAP-compliant) 15 device that will render previously acquired content or in the case that acquired content 16 cannot be rendered until the user installs required drivers. 17 For example, when installing: 18 The XP driver ranking process and the 19 modifiable default related to signature state of the driver act as the second rule. 20 The driver will be installed only if the first 21 and second rules validate. 22 Operating-System Versioning for Drivers under Windows XP 23 Default System Policy for Unsigned 24 Drivers 25 If the user installs an unsigned driver for a designated device class from disk or from 26 another web site, Windows XP/Windows 2000 displays a warning that the driver is 27 unsigned, thus helping to preserve the integrity of the released system. However, 28 by default, Windows XP/Windows 2000

	1	
	2 3	does not block installation of unsigned drivers, so vendors can get urgent hot-fixes to customers while waiting for WHQL to test the fix.
	5	In Windows XP, the default driver signing policy can be changed through the Hardware tab of the System applet on the Control Panel. A user can change the policy to be more restrictive, but not less restrictive on a per-user basis (that is, a user can change Warn to Block, but not to
8		Ignore). An administrator can change the policy to be either more restrictive or less
9		restrictive for all users on the system by checking "Apply the setting as system default."
10		Driver Ranking
11		Under Windows XP, the driver ranking
12		strategy has been modified as follows:
13		If an INF file is unsigned, and if neither the [Models] section nor the [DDInstall]
14 15		section is decorated with an NT-specific extension, the INF file is considered "suspect" and its rank is shifted into a
16		higher range (that is, worse) than all hardware and compatible rank matches of
17		INF files for which one (or both) of those criteria are met.
18		The new ranking ranges will now be:
19		0 - 0xFFF (DRIVER_HARDWAREID_RANK):
20		"trusted" hardware-ID match 0x1000 - 0x3FFF: "trusted" compatible-
21		ID match 0x8000 - 0x8FFF: "untrusted" hardware-
22		ID match 0x9000 - 0xBFFF: "untrusted"
23		compatible-ID match 0xC000 - 0xCFFF: "untrusted"
24		undecorated hardware-ID match (possibly a Windows 9x-only driver)
25		0xD000 - 0xFFFF: "untrusted"
26		undecorated compatible-ID match (possibly a Windows 9x-only driver)
27	122 A	
28	127. A method as in claim 126, in which said authentication information at least in	The authentication information will identify Microsoft, operator of the first
	part identifies said first apparatus and/or a	apparatus.

293482.02

	FOR U.S. PA	TENT NO. 6,185,683
3 4	126.	Products Infringing: Microsoft Software that includes the Authenticode feature,
5		NET Framework SDK, Visual Studio, Microsoft technology that supports a digital
6		signature function (such as ActiveX), Windows Installer technology.
7	A method of providing trusted intermediary services including the following steps:	Infringement is based on use Microsoft ActiveX control, Cabinet file, Microsoft
8		Windows Installer, Authenticode and Software Restriction Policy technologies.
9		For example, a software publisher distributing a signed application that has
10		licensed ActiveX controls embedded within it would practice this method.
11	at a first apparatus, receiving an item from a second apparatus;	The item is unsigned software such as an ActiveX control or any software packaged in a sekinet file or Microsoft Installer
12		in a cabinet file or Microsoft Installer (.msi) file. Within the development environment, multiple software developers
13		(working on a second apparatus) will send their unsigned software to a secure location
14		(first apparatus) containing the entity's private signing key. An example entity
15		would be a software publisher.
16 17		Source: Deploying ActiveX Controls on the Web with the Internet Component Download
18		The holder of the digital certificate
19		Keeping your digital certificate safe is very important. Some firms (including
20		Microsoft) do not keep their signature file on site. The signature is kept with the
21		Certificate Authority and files are sent there for signing.
22	associating authentication information with.	Signing the software associates the
23	said item;	software publisher's identify with the software.
24	÷	Source: Packaging ActiveX Controls
25		Signing Cabinet Files A .cab file can be digitally signed like an
26		ActiveX control. A digital signature provides accountability for software
27		developers: The signature associates a software vendor's name with a given file. A
28		signature is applied to a .cab file (or control) using the Microsoft Authenticode®
Į.		

Exhibit l

,		
1 2 3		technology. The .cab tool set assists software developers in applying digital signatures to .cab files by allowing a developer to allocate space in the .cab file for the signature.
5	incorporating said item into a secure digital container;	Signing software either directly or within a package (cabinet or .msi file) secures it in a digital container.
6		Alternately, the signed ActiveX control could be placed into a signed cabinet file.
7	associating a first rule with said secure digital container, said first rule at least in	The first rule would be the licensing support code within the ActiveX control
8	part governing at least one aspect of access to or use of said item;	and/or conditional syntax statements when the software is within a signed .msi file.
9		When the software is within a signed cabinet file, the first rule can be a rule
10 11		contained in the software, as is the case when an ActiveX control is packaged in a signed cabinet file.
12		First rule, in the case of ActiveX:
13		When an application with a licensed
14		ActiveX control is started, an instance of the control usually needs to be created. The application accomplishes this by
15		making a call to CreateInstanceLic and passing the license key embedded in the application as a parameter in the call. The
16 17		ActiveX control performs a string comparison between the embedded license
18		key and its own copy of the license key. If the keys match, an instance of the control is created and the application can execute
19		normally.
20		Source: Using ActiveX Controls to Automate Your Web Pages Run-time licensing
21		Most ActiveX Controls should support design-time licensing and run-time
22 23		licensing. (The exception is the control that is distributed free of charge.) Design-time
24		licensing ensures that a developer is building his or her application or Web page
25		with a legally purchased control; run-time licensing ensures that a user is running an
26		application or displaying a Web page that contains a legally purchased control.
27		Design-time licensing is verified by control containers such as Visual Basic, Microsoft
28		Access, or Microsoft Visual InterDev®. Before these containers allow a developer
ļ	·	to place a control on a form or Web page,

23 White Paper – Using Software Restrict Policies in Windows XP and Windows NET Server to Protect Against Unauthorized Software Software Restriction Polices is a police	
containers verify that a control is licer by calling certain functions in the con If the license is verified, the developer add it. Run-time licensing is also an issue for these containers (which are sometime bundled as part of the final application containers again call functions in the control to validate the license that was embedded at design time. The third apparatus is a user computer an application server. The protected processing environment at least in part protecting information stored in said protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said third apparatus; and pertinent operating IE services su Windows File Protection and security signature and cryptographic functions related to code signing and related pole The PPE checks for signatures on soft or the software packages and detects situations when the signature does not validate as an indication that tampering and third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus checking said authentication information; and said third apparatus performing at least one action on said item, said at least one action would be installation and/or of the distributed software. The secon rule can be sof	
If the license is verified, the developer add it. Run-time licensing is also an issue for these containers (which are sometime bundled as part of the final application containers again call functions in the control to validate the license that was embedded at design time. Transmitting said secure digital container and said first rule to a third apparatus, said third apparatus including a protected processing environment at least in part protecting information stored in said protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said third apparatus; side third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus checking said authentication information; and said third apparatus performing at least one action on said item, said at least one action on the machine, which can be robustless of the public sev of the p	sed
Run-time licensing is also an issue for these containers (which are sometime bundled as part of the final application containers again call functions in the control to validate the license that was embedded at design time. Transmitting said secure digital container and said first rule to a third apparatus, said third apparatus including a protected processing environment at least in part protecting information stored in said protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said third apparatus; sind third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus checking said authentication information; and said third apparatus performing at least one action on said item, said at least one action being governed, at least in part, by said first rule and by a second rule resident at said third apparatus performing at least one action on said item, said at least one action of said secure digital container and said first rule, said action governed, at least in part, by said first rule and by a second rule resident at said third apparatus prior to said receipt of said secure digital container and said first rule, said action governed, at least in part, by said first rule, said action governed at least in part, by said first rule, said action governed at least in part, by said first rule, said action governed at least in part with the item. The action would be installation and/or runtime benefit to publisher. The action would be installation and/or truntime invertifying that signature was creating to the private key that corresponds to the publisher. The action would be installation and/or truntime invertifying that signature and caption of the distributed software. The second invoked at installation and/or runtime invertifying tha	
transmitting said secure digital container and said first rule to a third apparatus, said third apparatus including a protected processing environment at least in part protecting information stored in said protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said third apparatus; said third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus checking said authentication information; and said third apparatus performing at least one action on said item, said at least one action being governed, at least in part, by said first rule and by a second rule resident at said third apparatus pror to said receipt of said decure digital container and said first rule, said action governance occurring at least in part in said protected processing environment. the protection and secure digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus checking said authentication information; and said third apparatus performing at least one action on said item, said at least one action being governed, at least in part, by said first rule and by a second rule resident at said third apparatus pror to said receipt of said secure digital container and said first rule, said action governance occurring at least in part in said protected processing environments. Software Restriction Polices is a policies in Windows XP and Window NET Server to Protect Against Unauthorized Software Software Restriction Polices is a policies in Windows AP and window NET Server to Protect Against Unauthorized Software	•
transmitting said secure digital container and said first rule to a third apparatus, said third apparatus including a protected processing environment at least in part protecting information stored in said protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said third apparatus; related to code signing and related por The PPE checks for signatures on soft or the software packages and detects situations when the signature does not validate as an indication that tamperin may have occurred with the item. Having the third apparatus receiving said authentication information; and said third apparatus performing at least one action being governed, at least in part, by said first rule and by a second rule resident at said third apparatus prior to said receipt of said secure digital container and said first rule, said action governance occurring at least in part in said protected processing environment (PPE) is Win operating system, Internet Explorer (I and pertinent operating IE services su Windows File Protection and security signature and cryptographic functions related to code signing and related por The PPE checks for signatures on soft or the software packages and detects situations when the signature does not validate as an indication that tamperin may have occurred with the item. Having the third apparatus receiving secure digital container and said first trule; typical of networked computing environments. Examine the signature information indication of the distributed software. The secon rule can be software restriction policic resident on the machine, which can be invoked at installation and/or runtime in part in said protected processing environment (PPE) is Win operating system, Internet Explorer (I and pertinent operating IE services su Windows File Protection and security signature and cryptographic functions related to code signing and related por the software packages and detects situations when the signature does not validate as an indication that tamperin may have occurred with the item. H	
transmitting said secure digital container and said first rule to a third apparatus, said third apparatus including a protected processing environment at least in part protecting information stored in said protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said third apparatus; said third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus checking said authentication information; and said third apparatus performing at least one action on said item, said at least one action on said item, said at least one action on said item, said at least one action on said secure digital container and said first rule, said action governed, at least in part, by said first rule and by a second rule resident at said third apparatus prior to said receipt of said secure digital container and said first rule, said action governance occurring at least in part in said protected processing environment. The third apparatus is a user computer an application server. The protected processing environment (PPE) is Win operating system, Internet Explorer (I and pertinent operating 1E services su Windows File Protection and security signature and cryptographic functions related to code signing and related pol The PPE checks for signatures on soft or the software packages and detects situations when the signature does not validate as an indication that tamperin may have occurred with the item. Having the third apparatus receiving secure digital container and said first typical of networked computing environments. Examine the signature was creating to the private key that corresponds to the public key of the publisher. The action would be installation and/or runtime said third apparatus prior to said receipt of said secure digital container and said first rule; NET Framework Security – pg 259 and White Paper – Using Software Restriction Policies in Windows XP and Windows TP and Windows TP and Windows TP a	•
third apparatus including a protected processing environment at least in part protecting information stored in said protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said third apparatus; third apparatus including a protected processing environment at least in part protecting information stored in said protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said third apparatus; third apparatus including a protected processing environment (PPE) is Win operating system, Internet Explorer (and protection and security signature and cryptographic functions related to code signing and related pole. The PPE checks for signatures on soft or the software packages and detects situations when the signature does not validate as an indication that tamperinmay have occurred with the item. Having the third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus performing at least one action on said item, said at least one action of said secure digital container and said first rule, said action governed, at least in part, by said first rule and by a second rule resident at said third apparatus prior to said receipt of said secure digital container and said first rule, said action governed, at least in part, by said first rule and by a second rule resident at said third apparatus prior to said receipt of said secure digital container and said first rule, said action governed, at least in part, by said first rule and by a second rule resident at said third apparatus prior to said receipt of said secure digital container and said first rule, said third apparatus prior to said receipt of said secure digital container and said first rule and by a second rule resident at	or
protecting information stored in said protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said third apparatus; 10	
isignature and cryptographic functions related to code signing and related polar the PPE checks for signatures on soft or the software packages and detects situations when the signature does not validate as an indication that tampering may have occurred with the iterm. Is asid third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus checking said authentication information; and said third apparatus performing at least one action on said item, said at least one action on said item, said at least one action being governed, at least in part, by said first rule and by a second rule resident at said third apparatus prior to said receipt of said secure digital container and said first rule and by a second rule resident at said third apparatus prior to said receipt of said secure digital container and said first rule and by a second rule resident at said third apparatus prior to said receipt of said secure digital container and said first rule and by a second rule resident at said third apparatus prior to said receipt of said secure digital container and said first rule and by a second rule resident on the machine, which can be invoked at installation and/or runtime invok	
The PPE checks for signatures on soft or the software packages and detects situations when the signature does not validate as an indication that tamperin may have occurred with the item. 14 said third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; 15 said third apparatus checking said authentication information; and 16 said third apparatus checking said authentication information; and 17 said third apparatus performing at least one action on said item, said at least one action on said item, said at least one action being governed, at least in part, by said first rule and by a second rule resident at said third apparatus prior to said receipt of said secure digital container and said first rule and by a second rule resident at said third apparatus prior to said receipt of said secure digital container and said first rule and by a second rule resident at said third apparatus prior to said receipt of said secure digital container and said first rule and by a second rule resident at said third apparatus prior to said receipt of said secure digital container and said first rule and by a second rule resident at least in part in said protected processing environment. NET Framework Security – pg 259 and White Paper – Using Software Restrict Policies in Windows XP and Window NET Server to Protect Against Unauthorized Software Software Restriction Polices is a policies in windows in the private key that corresponds to the public key of the publisher. The action would be installation and/or runtime said third apparatus prior to said receipt of said secure digital container and said first rule; and the signature was creating undersifying that signature was creating unde	icies
said third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus checking said authentication information; and said third apparatus performing at least one action on said item, said at least one action being governed, at least in part, by said first rule and by a second rule resident at said third apparatus prior to said receipt of said secure digital container and said first rule, said action governance occurring at least in part in said protected processing environment. situations when the signature does not validate as an indication that tamperin may have occurred with the item. Having the third apparatus receiving secure digital container and said first typical of networked computing environments. Examine the signature information into verifying that signature was creating to the private key that corresponds to the public key of the publisher. The action would be installation and/or of the distributed software. The secon rule can be software restriction policies resident on the machine, which can be invoked at installation and/or runtime which can	
may have occurred with the item. Having the third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus checking said authentication information; and said third apparatus performing at least one action on said item, said at least one action on said item, said at least one action on said item, said at least one action being governed, at least in part, by said first rule and by a second rule resident at said secure digital container and said first rule, said action governance occurring at least in part in said protected processing environment. may have occurred with the item. Having the third apparatus receiving secure digital container and said first typical of networked computing environments. Examine the signature information in verifying that signature was creating to the provide key of the publisher. The action would be installation and/or rule can be software restriction policie resident on the machine, which can be invoked at installation and/or runtime inverifying that signature was creating to the provide key of the publisher. The action would be installation and/or rule can be software restriction policie invoked at installation and/or runtime inverifying that signature was creating to the provide key of the publisher. The action would be installation and/or rule can be software restriction policie invoked at installation and/or runtime inverifying that signature was creating to the publisher. The action would be installation and/or rule can be software. NET Framework Security - pg 259 and White Paper - Using Software Restriction Policies in Windows XP and Window NET Ser	
digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus checking said authentication information; and said third apparatus performing at least one action on said item, said at least one action being governed, at least in part, by said first rule and by a second rule resident at said third apparatus prior to said receipt of said secure digital container and said first rule, said action governance occurring at least in part in said protected processing environment. digital container and said first typical of networked computing typical of networked computing environments. Examine the signature was creating to the public key of the publisher. The action would be installation and/or full can be software restriction policies resident on the machine, which can be invoked at installation and/or runtime NET Framework Security – pg 259 and White Paper – Using Software Restriction Polices in Windows XP and Window NET Server to Protect Against Unauthorized Software Software Restriction Polices is a police	3
said third apparatus checking said authentication information; and said third apparatus performing at least one action on said item, said at least one action being governed, at least in part, by said first rule and by a second rule resident at said third apparatus prior to said receipt of said secure digital container and said first rule, said action governance occurring at least in part in said protected processing environment. Examine the signature was creating to the private key that corresponds to the public key of the publisher. The action would be installation and/or of the distributed software. The secon rule can be software restriction policie resident on the machine, which can be invoked at installation and/or runtime NET Framework Security – pg 259 and White Paper – Using Software Restriction Polices in Windows XP and Window NET Server to Protect Against Unauthorized Software Software Restriction Polices is a police	
authentication information; and authentication information; and said third apparatus performing at least one action on said item, said at least one action being governed, at least in part, by said first rule and by a second rule resident at said third apparatus prior to said receipt of said secure digital container and said first rule, said action governance occurring at least in part in said protected processing environment. The action would be installation and/of the distributed software. The secon rule can be software restriction policies resident on the machine, which can be invoked at installation and/or runtime NET Framework Security – pg 259 and White Paper – Using Software Restriction Policies in Windows XP and Windows NET Server to Protect Against Unauthorized Software Software Restriction Polices is a policies.	
the private key that corresponds to the public key of the publisher. The action would be installation and/or of the distributed software. The second rule and by a second rule resident at said third apparatus prior to said receipt of said secure digital container and said first rule, said action governance occurring at least in part in said protected processing environment. White Paper — Using Software Restrict Policies in Windows XP and Window NET Server to Protect Against Unauthorized Software Software Restriction Polices is a police.	
action on said item, said at least one action being governed, at least in part, by said first rule and by a second rule resident at said third apparatus prior to said receipt of said secure digital container and said first rule, said action governance occurring at least in part in said protected processing environment. 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 29 20 20 20 20 21 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 28 29 20 20 20 21 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 28 29 20 20 20 21 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 28 29 29 20 20 20 20 21 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 29 20 20 20 20 21 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 29 20 20 20 20 21 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 29 20 20 20 20 21 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 29 20 20 20 20 21 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 29 20 20 20 20 21 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 29 20 20 20 20 21 21 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 29 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20	,,,,e
first rule and by a second rule resident at said third apparatus prior to said receipt of said secure digital container and said first rule, said action governance occurring at least in part in said protected processing environment. 21 White Paper — Using Software Restrict Policies in Windows XP and Window NET Server to Protect Against Unauthorized Software 22 Software Restriction Polices is a police.	d
said third apparatus prior to said receipt of said secure digital container and said first rule, said action governance occurring at least in part in said protected processing environment. NET Framework Security – pg 259 and White Paper – Using Software Restrict Policies in Windows XP and Window NET Server to Protect Against Unauthorized Software Software Restriction Polices is a police.	S
rule, said action governance occurring at least in part in said protected processing environment. NET Framework Security – pg 259 and White Paper – Using Software Restrict Policies in Windows XP and Window NET Server to Protect Against Unauthorized Software Software Restriction Polices is a police.	-
23 White Paper – Using Software Restrict Policies in Windows XP and Windows NET Server to Protect Against Unauthorized Software Software Restriction Polices is a police.	
Policies in Windows XP and Window NET Server to Protect Against Unauthorized Software Software Restriction Polices is a police	
25 Unauthorized Software Software Restriction Polices is a police	
Software Restriction Polices is a police	
	y-
driven technology that allows administrators to set code-identity-base	ed
rules that determine whether an applic is allowed to execute. (.NET Framewo	
28 Security – pg 259)	:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8		For example, administrators can set rules for all Windows Installer packages coming from the Internet or Intranet zone. As part of the DLL load mechanisms, Software Restriction Policies is invoked and starts to check its most specific rules. Software Restriction Policies get invoked prior to an .exe being able to run. The four types of rules are – hash, certificate, path, and zone. Note: The hash and certificate rules relate directing to the signature information whereas, the path and zone rules do not.
10	127. A method as in claim 126, in which said authentication information at least in	The software publisher, user of first device, is identified in the authentication
11	part identifies said first apparatus and/or a user of said first apparatus.	information.
12	user of said first apparatus.	
13		
14		
15		
16		• •
17	. ,	
18		
19	·	•
20		·
21		
22		·
23		•
24		
25		
26		
27		
28		

4		
5	126.	Product infringing: Visual Studio .NET, .NET Framework SDK, Authenticode, Products that contain the .NET CLR, Compact CLR or CLI.
6	A method of providing trusted intermediary	· ·
7	services including the following steps: at a first apparatus, receiving an item from	First apparatus is a software build or
8	a second apparatus;	deployment services computer that has
. 9		access to signing key. The item may be a program, graphic, media object or other resource, from a developer computer, or
10	associating authentication information with	archive (second apparatus).
11	said item;	Associating a cryptographic hash with the file that will contain this item for the purpose of ensuring the authenticity of the
12	·	item, along with names and attributes that are desired to be associated with the item
13	i	for identification purposes.
14	incorporating said item into a secure digital container;	Producing signed, strongly named assembly that contains this assembly and associated attributes.
15	associating a first rule with said secure digital container, said first rule at least in	Including any security demands (such as members of the Microsoft .NET
16	part governing at least one aspect of access to or use of said item;	Framework SDK Public Class CodeAccessSecurityAttribute) as part of
1.7	transmitting said secure digital container	the assembly. The third apparatus is a user computer or
18	and said first rule to a third apparatus, said third apparatus including a protected	an application server. The third apparatus's protected processing
19	processing environment at least in part protecting information stored in said	environment is Windows NT and the .NET CLR, CLI and/or compact CLR.
20	protected processing environment from	Information is protected from tampering
21	tampering by a user of said third apparatus;	because user is not administrator, user runs code on server, a share on another
22		computer, or over a network. Further this information is protected by a number of
23	. ·	protection mechanisms that are included with the Windows NT and CLR, CLI and/or compact CLR distributions.
24	said third apparatus receiving said secure	Having the third apparatus receiving said
25	digital container and said first rule;	secure digital container and said first rule is typical of networked computing environments.
26	said third apparatus checking said	The .NET Framework, when the assembly
27	authentication information; and	is installed into the global assembly cache (GAC), verifies the strong name of
28		assemblies. This process includes verifying that signature was creating using
20		the private key that corresponds to the

Exhibit B

293482.02

2

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	said third apparatus performing at least one action on said item, said at least one action being governed, at least in part, by said first rule and by a second rule resident at said third apparatus prior to said receipt of said secure digital container and said first rule, said action governance occurring at least in part in said protected processing environment.	public key of the publisher. The action is executing code that is the item or using code that renders the item. Action is governed by security demands on code that calls the item or on code that calls code included in the .NET assembly that manages said item. The second rule is the machine, enterprise, user, and application configuration file resident rules. Typically these configuration files will be populated before the arrival of most new assemblies in a virtual distribution environment. This action governance occurs in the protected processing environment of the CLR, CLI and/or compact CLR.
10	127. A method as in claim 126, in which said authentication information at least in part identifies said first apparatus and/or a	The authentication information will identify the .NET Assembly Class company name and trademark attributes
11 12	user of said first apparatus.	that identify the apparatus or user of the first apparatus as being a member of an entity or a branded source (brand name).
	·	entry of a brailded source (braild harie).
.13	·	
15		
16		
17.		
18		
19		· · · · · ·
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25 26		
26		
28		
~"		

•	10K 0.5.1 A	12/11/11/01/01/03/003
3		
5	126.	Product infringing: Visual Studio .NET, .NET Framework SDK, Authenticode, Products that contain the .NET CLR, Compact CLR or CLI.
6	A method of providing trusted intermediary	pact objects objects
.7	services including the following steps: at a first apparatus, receiving an item from	The item is an unsigned .NET assembly,
8 9	a second apparatus;	which can include, but not be limited to, a Web control, multi-file assembly or component. Within the development
10		environment, multiple assembly builders (working on a second apparatus) will send
11		their unsigned assembly to a secure location (first apparatus) containing the
12	•	entity's private signing key. An example entity would be a software publisher.
13		NET Security Framework - pg 130-1
14		Describes this exact practice and further explains the "Delay Signing Assemblies"
15 16		feature of .NET that accommodates the fact that "many publishers will keep the private key in a secure location, possibly
17		embedded in specially designed cryptographic hardware."
18		"Delay signing is a technique used by developers whereby the public key is added
19		to the assembly name as before, granting the assembly its unique identity, but no
20		signature is computed. Thus, no private key access is necessary."
21	associating authentication information with said item;	Strong naming the assembly binds the entity's/publisher's name into the
22		assembly. The public portion of the key used to strongly name the assembly is
23	·	placed in the assembly manifest. Other assemblies or applications can contain
24		references to the strong names of strongly named assemblies such as in the case of
25		applications that contain references to a set of compliant .NET core libraries. Strong naming compliant .NET core libraries with
26		the European Computers Manufactures Association's (ECMA) key is a way to
27		allow any publisher to develop compliant
28		.NET core libraries that can be authenticated by other applications.
- 11		<u> </u>

Exhibit B

1		
2	·	.NET Security Framework - pg 124 "Strong naming is a process whereby an
3		assembly name can be further qualified by
		the identity of the publisher." .NET Security Framework – pg 133
4		The publisher must advertise its public key
5		or keys in an out-of-band fashion (such as
6	·	documentation shipped with the product or on the company Web site)
		.NET Security Framework - pg 130
7		The goal of the ECMA key is to allow a slightly more generalized strong name
8		binding than usual, namely allowing
•		binding to the publisher of the runtime in use, rather than to a fixed publisher.
9	incorporating said item into a secure digital	Signing the assembly places it in a secure
10	container;	container.
11		NET Framework Security – pg 527 Strong named assemblies cannot be
		modified in any manner without destroying
12		the strong name signature. Applied Microsoft .NET Framework
13		Programming – pg 89
1.4		Strongly Named Assemblies Are Tamper- Resistant
14		When the assembly is installed into the
15		GAC, the system hashes the contents of the
16		file containing the manifest and compares the hash value with the RSA digital
		signature value embedded within the PE
17		file (after unsigning it with the public key). If the values are identical, the file's
18		contents haven't been tampered with and
10		you know that you have the public key that corresponds to the publisher's private key.
19		In addition, the system hashes the contents
20		of the assembly's other files and compares the hash values with the hash values stored
21		in the manifest file's FileDef table. If any
		of the hash values don't match, at least one
22		of the assembly's files has been tampered with and the assembly will fail to install
23		into the GAC.
24	associating a first rule with said secure digital container, said first rule at least in	A .NET assembly includes imperative and declarative statements/rules that will
24	part governing at least one aspect of access	govern its access or use. For example,
25	to or use of said item;	role-based security or strong name
26		demands in the assembly can be the first rule.
Į	·	MCDN on Dolo Dood Const.
27		MSDN on Role-Based Security
28	4	Applications that implement role-based
		security grant rights based on the role
-	•	

associated with a principal object. The principal object represents the security context under which code is running. The Principal Permission object represents the identity and role that a particular principal, class must have to run. To implement the Principal Permission class imperatively, create a new instance of the class and initialize it with the name and role that you want users to have to access your code. MSDN on StrongNameIdentityPermission class defines the identity permission for strong names. StrongNameIdentityPermission uses this class to confirm that calling code is in a particular strong-named assembly. The third apparatus is a user computer or an application server. The software publisher transmitting the .NET assembly to an end-user with a CLR. The third apparatus's protected processing environment at least in part protecting information stored in said protected processing environment at least in part protecting information stored in said protected processing environment at least in part protecting information stored in said protected processing environment at least in symbol and the .NET assembly an environment is Windows NT and CLR, CLI and/or compact CLR. Information is protected by a number of protection mechanisms that are included with the Windows NT and CLR, CLI and/or compact CLR distributions. The end-user receiving the signed assembly cash (GAC), verifies the strong name of assemblies. This process includes verifying that signature was creating using the private key that corresponds to the publisher. Applied Microsoft NET Framework Programming – pg 89 Strongly Named Assemblies Are Tamper-Resistant As above. NET Framework Security – pg 128 The verification of any strong name assembly claiming a strong name but when needed by the .NET. Framework. Any assembly claiming a strong name but	1		
Principal/Permission object represents the identity and role that a particular principal class must have to run. To implement the Principal/Permission class imperatively, create a new instance of the class and initialize it with the name and role that you want users to have to access your code. MSDN on StrongNameIdentityPermission class defines the identity permission class defines the identity permissio	•	·	principal object represents the security
class must have to run. To implement the Principal/Permission class imperatively, create a new instance of the class and initialize it with the name and role that you want users to have to access your code. MSDN on StrongNameIdentityPermission class defines the identity permission class defines the have promised the intermised of the class and initialize it with the name and role that you want users to have to access your code. MSDN on StrongNameIdentityPermission class defines the particular strong name assembly to an end-user with a CLR. The third apparatus is a user computer or an application server. The software publisher transmitting the .NET assembly to an end-user with a CLR. The third apparatus is protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said third apparatus; and the .NET CLR, CLI and/or compact CLR distributions. The end-user with a CLR. The third apparatus is protected from tampering because user is not administrator, user runs code on server, a share on another computer, or over a network. Further this information is protected from tampering because user is not administrator, user runs code on server, a share on another computer, or over an envolve. Further this information is protected from tampering because user is not administrator, user runs code on server, a share on another computer, or over an envolve. Further this information is protect	3		PrincipalPermission object represents the
PrincipalPermission class imperatively, create a new instance of the class and initialize it with the name and role that you want users to have to access your code. MSDN on StrongNameIdentityPermission class defines the identity permission class defines the identity permission of strong names. StrongNameIdentityPermission uses this class to confirm that calling code is in a particular strong-named assembly to an end-user with a CLR. The third apparatus including a protected processing environment at least in part protecting information stored in said protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said third apparatus; Information is protected processing environment in the NET CLR, CLI and/or compact CLR. Information is protected from tampering because user is not administrator, user runs code on server, a share on another computer, or over a network. Further this information is protected by a number of protection mechanisms that are included with the Windows NT and CLR, CLI and/or compact CLR distributions. The end-user receiving the signed authentication information; and The NET Framework, when the assembly is installed into the global assembly cash (GAC), verifies the strong name of assemblies. This process includes verifying that signature was creating using the private key that corresponds to the public key of the publisher. Applied Microsoft NET Framework Programming — pg 89 Strongly Named Assemblies Are Tamper-Resistant As above. NET Framework Security — pg 128 The verification of any strong name assemblies is performed automatically when needed by the .NET Framework and assembly claiming a strong name but	4		class must have to run. To implement the
initialize it with the name and role that you want users to have to access your code. MSDN on StrongNameIdentityPermission class defines the identity permission class defines the identity permission for strong names. StrongNameIdentityPermission uses this class to confirm that calling code is in a particular strong-named assembly. The third apparatus is a user computer or an application server. The software publisher transmitting the .NET assembly to an end-user with a CLR. The third apparatus's protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said third apparatus; Information is protected from tampering because user is not administrator, user runs code on server, a share on another computer, or over a network. Further this information is protected by a number of protection mechanisms that are included with the Windows NT and CLR, CLI and/or compact CLR distributions. The end-user receiving the signed assembly. The end-user receiving the signed assembly. The NET Framework, when the assembly is installed into the global assembly cash (GAC), verifies the strong name of assemblies. This process includes verifying that signature was creating using the private key that corresponds to the public key of the publisher. Applied Microsoft. NET Framework Programming – pg 89 Strongly Named Assemblies Are Tamper-Resistant As above. NET Framework Security – pg 128 The verification of any strong name assembly claiming a strong name but			PrincipalPermission class imperatively,
MSDN on StrongNameIdentityPermission class defines the identity permission for strong names. StrongNameIdentityPermission on uses this class to confirm that calling code is in a particular strong-named assembly. Transmitting said secure digital container and said first rule to a third apparatus, said third apparatus including a protected processing environment at least in part protecting information stored in said protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said third apparatus; Information is protected from tampering because user is not administrator, user runs code on server, a share on another computer, or over a network. Further this information is protected by a number of protection mechanisms that are included with the Windows NT and CLR, CLI and/or compact CLR distributions. The end-user receiving the signed assembly. said third apparatus checking said authentication information; and MSDN on StrongNameIdentityPermission class defines the identity permission for strong names. StrongNameIdentityPermission for strong names. StrongNameIdentityPermission for strong names. StrongNameIdentityPermission defines the identity permission for strong names. StrongNameIdentityPermission defines the identity permission for strong names. StrongNameIdentityPermission defines the identity permission for strong name assembly example calmity a paratus is a user computer or an application server. The software publisher Intensification server. The software publisher Intensification server. The software publisher Intensification server. The software publisher transmitting the NET assembly to an application server. The software publisher transmitting the NET assembly to an end-user with a CLR. The third apparatus's protected by a number of protection mechanisms that are included with the Windows NT and CLR, CLI and/or compact CLR distributions. The end-user receiving the signed assembly cash (GAC), verifies the strong name of assembly. Said third apparatus checking said authentication information; and M			initialize it with the name and role that you
StrongNameIdentityPermission class defines the identity permission class defines the identity permission for strong names. StrongNameIdentityPermission uses this class to confirm that calling code is in a particular strong-named assembly. The third apparatus is a user computer or an application server. The software publisher transmitting the NET assembly to an end-user with a CLR. The third apparatus's protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said third apparatus; StrongNameIdentityPermission class defines the identity permission for strong names. StrongNameIdentityPermission on uses this class to confirm that calling code is in a particular strong-named assembly. The third apparatus is a user computer or an application server. The software publisher transmitting the NET assembly to an end-user with a CLR. The third apparatus's protected processing environment is Windows NT and the NET CLR. CLI and/or compact CLR. Information is protected from tampering because user is not administrator, user runs code on server, a share on another computer, or over a network. Further this information is protected by a number of protection mechanisms that are included with the Windows NT and CLR, CLI and/or compact CLR distributions. The end-user receiving the signed assembly cash (GAC), verifies the strong name of assembly is installed into the global assembly cash (GAC), verifies the strong name of assemblies. This process includes verifying that signature was creating using the private key that corresponds to the public key of the publisher. Applied Microsoft NET Framework Programming — pg 89 Strongly Named Assemblies Are Tamper-Resistant* As above. NET Framework Security — pg 128 The verification of any strong name assemblies is performed automatically when needed by the NET Framework. Any assembly claiming a strong name but	6		
defines the identity permission for strong names. StrongNameIdentityPermission on sames. StrongNameIdentityPermission on sames this class to confirm that calling code is in a particular strong-named assembly. The third apparatus is a user computer or an application server. The software publisher transmitting the .NET assembly to an end-user with a CLR. The third apparatus's protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said third apparatus; Said third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; said third appara	7		MSDN on StrongNameIdentityPermission
names. StrongNameldentityPermission uses this class to confirm that calling code is in a particular strong-named assembly. The third apparatus is a user computer or and said first rule to a third apparatus, said third apparatus including a protected processing environment at least in part protecting information stored in said protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said third apparatus: The third apparatus is a user computer or an application server. The software publisher transmitting the .NET assembly to an end-user with a CLR. The third apparatus's protected processing environment is Windows NT and the .NET CLR, CLI and/or compact CLR. Information is protected from tampering because user is not administrator, user runs code on server, a share on another computer, or over a network. Further this information is protected by a number of protection mechanisms that are included with the Windows NT and CLR, CLI and/or compact CLR distributions. The end-user receiving the signed assembly as installed into the global assembly cash (GAC), verifies the strong name of assemblies. This process includes verifying that signature was creating using the private key that corresponds to the public key of the publisher. Applied Microsoft .NET Framework Programming – pg 89 Strongly Named Assemblies Are Tamper-Resistant As above. NET Framework Security – pg 128 The verification of any strong name assemblies is performed automatically when needed by the .NET ramework. Any assembly claiming a strong name but	8		
is in a particular strong-named assembly. transmitting said secure digital container and said first rule to a third apparatus, said third apparatus including a protected processing environment at least in part protecting information stored in said protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said third apparatus; the description of the protection of the protection information stored in said protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said third apparatus; the description of the protection of the protection mechanisms that are included with the Windows NT and CLR, CLI and/or compact CLR distributions. The third apparatus is a user computer or an application server. The software publisher transmitting the .NET CLR. The third apparatus's protected processing environment is Windows NT and the .NET CLR, CLI and/or compact CLR. LInformation is protected from tampering because user is not administrator, user runs code on server, a share on another computer, or over a network. Further this information is protected by a number of protection mechanisms that are included with the Windows NT and CLR, CLI and/or compact CLR distributions. The end-user receiving the signed assembly cash (GAC), verifies the strong name of assemblies. This process includes verifying that signature was creating using the private key that corresponds to the public key of the publisher. Applied Microsoft .NET Framework Programming – pg 89 Strongly Named Assemblies Are Tamper-Resistant As above. NET Framework Security – pg 128 The verification of any strong name assemblies is performed automatically when needed by the .NET. Framework. Any assembly claiming a strong name but	9		names. StrongNameIdentityPermission
transmitting said secure digital container and said first rule to a third apparatus, said third apparatus including a protected processing environment at least in part protecting information stored in said protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said third apparatus; 12	10		is in a particular strong-named assembly.
and said first rule to a third apparatus, said third apparatus including a protected processing environment at least in part protecting information stored in said protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said third apparatus; 13	11	transmitting said secure digital container	The third apparatus is a user computer or
processing environment at least in part protecting information stored in said protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said third apparatus; 15 16 17 18 18 18 19 20 21 21 22 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 28 28 29 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 28 28 29 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 26 27 28 28 29 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 26 27 28 28 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 26 27 28 28 26 27 28 28 26 27 28 28 26 27 28 28 26 27 28 26 27 28 28 26 27 28 28 26 27 28 28 26 27 28 28 26 27 28 28 26 27 28 28 26 27 28 28 26 27 28 28 26 27 28 28 28 29 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 28 26 27 28 28 28 29 20 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 28 29 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 28 28 29 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 28 28 29 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 28 28 29 20 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 28 29 20 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 28 28 29 20 20 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 28 29 20 20 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 28 28 28 29 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20		and said first rule to a third apparatus, said third apparatus including a protected	an application server. The software
protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said third apparatus; Information is protected from tampering because user is not administrator, user runs code on server, a share on another computer, or over a network. Further this information is protected by a number of protection mechanisms that are included with the Windows NT and CLR, CLI and/or compact CLR distributions. Said third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus checking said authentication information; and The end-user receiving the signed assembly. The .NET Framework, when the assembly is installed into the global assembly cash (GAC), verifies the strong name of assemblies. This process includes verifying that signature was creating using the private key that corresponds to the public key of the publisher. Applied Microsoft .NET Framework Programming – pg 89 Strongly Named Assemblies Are Tamper-Resistant As above. NET Framework Security – pg 128 The verification of any strong name assemblies is performed automatically when needed by the .NET Framework. Any assembly claiming a strong name but		processing environment at least in part	to an end-user with a CLR. The third
Information is protected from tampering because user is not administrator, user runs code on server, a share on another computer, or over a network. Further this information is protected by a number of protection mechanisms that are included with the Windows NT. and CLR, CLI and/or compact CLR distributions. The end-user receiving the signed assembly. The .NET framework, when the assembly is installed into the global assembly cash (GAC), verifies the strong name of assemblies. This process includes verifying that signature was creating using the private key that corresponds to the public key of the publisher. Applied Microsoft .NET framework Programming – pg 89 Strongly Named Assemblies Are Tamper-Resistant As above. NET Framework Security – pg 128 The verification of any strong name assemblies is performed automatically when needed by the .NET framework. Any assembly claiming a strong name but		protected processing environment from	environment is Windows NT and the .NET
code on server, a share on another computer, or over a network. Further this information is protected by a number of protection mechanisms that are included with the Windows NT. and CLR, CLI and/or compact CLR distributions. Said third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus checking said authentication information; and The end-user receiving the signed assembly. The NET Framework, when the assembly is installed into the global assembly cash (GAC), verifies the strong name of assemblies. This process includes verifying that signature was creating using the private key that corresponds to the public key of the publisher. Applied Microsoft .NET Framework Programming – pg 89 Strongly Named Assemblies Are Tamper-Resistant As above. NET Framework Security – pg 128 The verification of any strong name assemblies is performed automatically when needed by the .NET Framework. Any assembly claiming a strong name but	14	tampering by a user of said third apparatus;	
computer, or over a network. Further this information is protected by a number of protection mechanisms that are included with the Windows NT and CLR, CLI and/or compact CLR distributions. said third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus checking said authentication information; and The end-user receiving the signed assembly. The .NET Framework, when the assembly is installed into the global assembly cash (GAC), verifies the strong name of assemblies. This process includes verifying that signature was creating using the private key that corresponds to the public key of the publisher. Applied Microsoft .NET Framework Programming – pg 89 Strongly Named Assemblies Are Tamper-Resistant As above. NET Framework Security – pg 128 The verification of any strong name assemblies is performed automatically when needed by the .NET Framework. Any assembly claiming a strong name but	15	·	because user is not administrator, user runs code on server, a share on another
protection mechanisms that are included with the Windows NT. and CLR, CLI and/or compact CLR distributions. Said third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus checking said authentication information; and The end-user receiving the signed assembly. The NET Framework, when the assembly is installed into the global assembly cash (GAC), verifies the strong name of assemblies. This process includes verifying that signature was creating using the private key that corresponds to the public key of the publisher. Applied Microsoft NET Framework Programming – pg 89 Strongly Named Assemblies Are Tamper-Resistant As above. NET Framework Security – pg 128 The verification of any strong name assemblies is performed automatically when needed by the .NET. Framework. Any assembly claiming a strong name but	16		computer, or over a network. Further this
said third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus checking said authentication information; and The end-user receiving the signed assembly. The NET Framework, when the assembly is installed into the global assembly cash (GAC), verifies the strong name of assemblies. This process includes verifying that signature was creating using the private key that corresponds to the public key of the publisher. Applied Microsoft .NET Framework Programming – pg 89 Strongly Named Assemblies Are Tamper-Resistant As above. NET Framework Security – pg 128 The verification of any strong name assemblies is performed automatically when needed by the .NET Framework. Any assembly claiming a strong name but	17		protection mechanisms that are included
digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus checking said authentication information; and The .NET Framework, when the assembly is installed into the global assembly cash (GAC), verifies the strong name of assemblies. This process includes verifying that signature was creating using the private key that corresponds to the public key of the publisher. Applied Microsoft .NET Framework Programming – pg 89 Strongly Named Assemblies Are Tamper-Resistant As above. NET Framework Security – pg 128 The verification of any strong name assemblies is performed automatically when needed by the .NET Framework. Any assembly claiming a strong name but	18		and/or compact CLR distributions.
said third apparatus checking said authentication information; and The .NET Framework, when the assembly is installed into the global assembly cash (GAC), verifies the strong name of assemblies. This process includes verifying that signature was creating using the private key that corresponds to the public key of the publisher. Applied Microsoft .NET Framework Programming – pg 89 Strongly Named Assemblies Are Tamper-Resistant As above. NET Framework Security – pg 128 The verification of any strong name assemblies is performed automatically when needed by the .NET Framework. Any assembly claiming a strong name but	19	digital container and said first rule;	
(GAC), verifies the strong name of assemblies. This process includes verifying that signature was creating using the private key that corresponds to the public key of the publisher. Applied Microsoft .NET Framework Programming – pg 89 Strongly Named Assemblies Are Tamper- Resistant As above. NET Framework Security – pg 128 The verification of any strong name assemblies is performed automatically when needed by the .NET Framework. Any assembly claiming a strong name but	20		
verifying that signature was creating using the private key that corresponds to the public key of the publisher. Applied Microsoft .NET Framework Programming – pg 89 Strongly Named Assemblies Are Tamper-Resistant As above. NET Framework Security – pg 128 The verification of any strong name assemblies is performed automatically when needed by the .NET Framework. Any assembly claiming a strong name but		, , ,	(GAC), verifies the strong name of
public key of the publisher. Applied Microsoft .NET Framework Programming – pg 89 Strongly Named Assemblies Are Tamper- Resistant As above. .NET Framework Security – pg 128 The verification of any strong name assemblies is performed automatically when needed by the .NET Framework. Any assembly claiming a strong name but			verifying that signature was creating using
Programming – pg 89 Strongly Named Assemblies Are Tamper- Resistant As above. NET Framework Security – pg 128 The verification of any strong name assemblies is performed automatically when needed by the .NET Framework. Any assembly claiming a strong name but	22		public key of the publisher.
25 Strongly Named Assemblies Are Tamper- Resistant As above. NET Framework Security – pg 128 The verification of any strong name assemblies is performed automatically when needed by the .NET Framework. Any assembly claiming a strong name but	23		Applied Microsoft .NET Framework Programming – pg 89
25 As above. 26 .NET Framework Security – pg 128 The verification of any strong name assemblies is performed automatically when needed by the .NET Framework. Any assembly claiming a strong name but	24		Strongly Named Assemblies Are Tamper-
The verification of any strong name assemblies is performed automatically when needed by the .NET Framework. Any assembly claiming a strong name but	25		
assemblies is performed automatically when needed by the .NET Framework. Any assembly claiming a strong name but	26	·	.NET Framework Security - pg 128
when needed by the .NET Framework. Any assembly claiming a strong name but	27		
Any assembly claiming a strong name but	28		when needed by the .NET Framework.

1		
2		failing verification will fail to install into the global assembly or download cache or will fail to load at runtime.
3	said third apparatus performing at least one	Within the CLR (protected processing
4	first rule and by a second rule resident at	environment), the execution of the program will depend upon whether the user is of the "role" required of the assembly or whether
5	said third apparatus prior to said receipt of said secure digital container and said first	the calling assembly is from a strong- named assembly specified in the "item"
6	rule, said action governance occurring at least in part in said protected processing	assembly (alternate first rules) and only if
7	environment.	assembly complies with the local code access security policy (second rule), as an
8		example of one of the types of rules that .NET Framework allows to be resident on the third apparatus
9.	127. A method as in claim 126, in which	
10	said authentication information at least in part identifies said first apparatus and/or a	The user of the first apparatus is the developer at the assembly developer. Strong naming binds the publisher's name to assembly.
11	user of said first apparatus.	
12	LaMacchia, Brian, etc, <u>NET Framework Sec</u>	curity, Addison-Wesley, 2002 unework Programming, Microsoft Press, 2002
13		unework Programming, Microsoft Press, 2002
14	·	
15		
16		
17	·	•
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25	·	
26		•
27		
28		

	3		
	CLAIMLANGUAGE	CEAIM OF INFRINGEMENT STATES	
	5	Infringing products include Windows Media Player and Windows Media Rights Manager SDK	
	A method comprising:	JOK	
((a) receiving a digital file including music;	Reference is made to the Windows Media	
7	7	Rights Manager SDK Programming Reference ("WMRM SDK"), attached hereto as Exhibit	
8	3	A. Media Player intringement analysis is set forth herein using the example of a music file	
9	•	downloaded and transferred to a portable audio player.	
10		Consumer receives a Windows Media file (WMRM SDK, Step 3)	
11	(b) storing said digital file in a first secure memory of a first device;	Windows Media file is stored in consumer's	
12	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	computer and all use of it is securely managed by the Secure Content Manager in Windows	
12	(c) storing information associated with said	<u> Media Player.</u>	
13	digital file in a secure database stored on said	License is stored in the License Store (WMRM	
	first device, said information including at least	SDK, Step 5); license includes Rights which may include AllowTransfertoNonSDMI,	
14	one budget control and at least one conv	Allow I ransfer to Allow Transfer to	
15	control, said at least one budget control including a budget specifying the number of	WM-D-DRM-Compliant devices or other types of devices), and TransferCount- the	
16	copies which can be made of said digital file:	number of times a piece of content may be	
	and said at least one copy control controlling the copies made of said digital file;	transferred to the device (a transfer budget).	
17	(d) determining whether said digital file may	Windows Media Rights Manager enforces the	
18	be copied and stored on a second device based on at least said copy control;	license restrictions	
19	(e) if said copy control allows at least a portion	Windows Media Rights Manager determines	
19	of said digital file to be copied and stored on a second device,	whether the Allow Transfer To Non SDMI or	
20	second device,	AllowTransferToSDMI rights are present.(Or, Allow Transfer to WM-D-DRM-Compliant	
21		devices or other types of devices.)	
21	(1)copying at least a portion of said digital file;	Transfer to the SDMI or non-SDMI portable.	
. 22	ine,	device (Allow Transfer to WM-D-DRM-Compliant devices or other types of devices), if	
23	(2)transferring at least a portion of said	allowed by Windows Media Rights Manager	
24	digital file to a second device	Portable device necessarily includes at least a memory and audio output	
	including a memory and an audio and/or video output;		
25	(3)storing said digital file in said memory	Music file is transferred to the portable device	
26	of said second device; and (4)including playing said music through	Portable device plays the music	
27	said audio output. 2. A method as in claim 1, further	- state device plays the music	
28	comprising:		
~	(a) at a time substantially contemporaneous with said transferring step, recording in said	Counter reflecting TransferCount is	
	- recording in said	decremented by Windows Media Rights	
	∽		
	Exhil 10	bit B	
"	10	/1	

293482.02

1

		·
1		
-	first device information indicating that said transfer has occurred.	Manager
2	3. A method as in claim 2, in which:	
3	(a) said information indicating that said transfer has occurred includes an encumbrance	Counter decrement reduces the allowable number of budgeted transfers
4	on said budget. 4. A method as in claim 3, in which:	
5	(a) said encumbrance operates to reduce the number of copies of said digital file authorized	Counter decrement reduces the allowable number of budgeted transfers
6	by said budget.	named of budgeted daysters
7		
8	·	
9		
10		
11		
12		
13		•
14		•
15		
16		•
17		·
18	•	
19		
20		• •
21		
22		
23		
24		•
25		
26	•	
- 11		
27		
28		

2	INTERTRUCT TECHNOLOGIES CORR MICROSOFT CORR		
	INTERTRUST TECHNOLOGIES CORP. v. MICROSOFT CORP. INTERTRUST INFRINGEMENT CHART		
3	FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 6,253,193		
4			
.4		Infringing products include Windows Media	
5		Player and Windows Media Rights Manager	
,		SDK	
6	11. A method comprising:	·	
·	(a) receiving a digital file;	Consumer receives a Windows Media file	
7		(WMRM SDK, Step 3)	
	(b) storing said digital file in a first secure	Windows Media file is stored in consumer's	
8	memory of a first device;	computer and all use of it is securely managed	
_	·	by the Secure Content Manager in Windows Media Player.	
9	(c) storing information associated with said	License information is stored in the License	
10	digital file in a secure database stored on said	Store (WMRM SDK, Step 10), license	
10	first device, said information including a first	information includes Rights. License Rights	
11	control;	may include AllowTransferToNonSDML	
• •	•	AllowTransferToSDMI (Allow Transfer to	
12		WM-D-DRM-Compliant devices or other	
		types of devices), TransferCount	
13	(d) determining whether said digital file may	WMRM determines whether transfer rights are	
	be copied and stored on a second device based	included in license (WMRM SDK, Step 5)	
14	on said first control, (1) said determining step including	Portable Device Service Provider Module	
15	identifying said second device and	identifies the portable device as either SDMI-	
13	determining whether said first control	compliant or non-SDMI-compliant (or WM-D-	
16	allows transfer of said copied file to	DRM Compliant or other types of supported	
	said second device, said determination	devices) and provides this information to	
17	based at least in part on the features	Windows Media Device Manager, which	
	present at the device to which said	allows the transfer based on whether the device	
18	copied file is to be transferred;	identification matches the License Right.	
	(e) if said first control allows at least a portion	If Windows Media Rights Manager determines	
19	of said digital file to be copied and stored on a	whether the AllowTransferToNonSDMI or	
20	second device,	AllowTransferToSDMI rights are present (or Allow Transfer to WM-D-DRM-Compliant	
20		devices or other types of devices), the	
21	·	following steps are performed:	
۲۱	(1) copying at least a portion of said	Transfer to the SDMI or non-SDMI (Allow	
22	digital file;	Transfer to WM-D-DRM-Compliant or other)	
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	portable device, if allowed by Windows Media	
23		Rights Manager	
	(2) transferring at least a portion of said	Portable device necessarily includes at least a	
24	digital file to a second device	memory and audio output	
	including a memory and an audio	ļ	
25	and/or video output;		
~	(3) storing said digital file in said memory	Music file is stored in the portable device	
26	of said second device; and	Destable desired	
27	(4) rendering said digital file through said	Portable device plays the music	
41	output.		
1			

293482.02

2		ES CORP. v. MICROSOFT CORP.	
3	INTERTRUST INFRINGEMENT CHART		
	FOR U.S. PATE	NT NO. 6,253,193	
5		Product infringing: Windows Media Player, Windows Media Player, Windows Media Rights Manager SDK	
6 15. A met	hod comprising:		
	ng a digital file;	Consumer receives a Windows Media file ((WMRM SDK, Step 3)	
(b) an author	entication step comprising:	·	
8 (1) acc asso use	cessing at least one identifier ociated with a first device or with a r of said first device; and	License includes identity of user's Windows Media Player. WM Players capable of playing protected content must be individualized. They contain a unique (Individualized) DRM	
)	,	client component to which protected WMA content licenses are bound. Content licenses are bound to this DRM individualization	
		module as the result of a challenge sent from the Client to the WMLM service. The	
		Individualized DRM Client (in the form of an encrypted Client ID) and capabilities of the	
		machine (e.g. support for Secure Audio Path (SAP), version of the WMRM SDK supported	
	ermining whether said identifier is	in the player. Music file cannot be used unless identifier	
	ociated with a device and/or user norized to store said digital file;	indicated in License matches user's Windows Media Player identifier (that is, the	
	•	Individualized DRM Client to which the license is bound must be the same one supported by the device).	
	said digital file in a first secure said first device, but only if said	Music file will not be processed through Windows Media Player, including protected	
device and/o	or user is so authorized, but not with said storing if said device	rendering buffers, unless the identifiers match. Protected WMA file can be stored on client	
and/or user i	s not authorized;	even if unauthorized but it cannot be decrypted and enter into the secure boundary (first secure	
(1)		memory) of the player unless appropriately licensed.	
digital file in	nformation associated with said a secure database stored on said said information including at least	License includes Rights and is stored in the License Store, Rights may include AllowTransferToNonSDMI,	
one control;	sale information including at least	AllowTransferToSDMI, (or Allow Transfer To WM-D-DRM-CompliantDevice or other	
		device) TransferCount	
be copied an	ning whether said digital file may and stored on a second device based ast one control;	Windows Media Rights Manager enforces the license restrictions	
(f) if said at	least one control allows at least a id digital file to be copied and	If appropriate rights are present, the following steps are performed:	
stored on a s	ving at least a portion of said	Transfer to the SDMI or non-SDMI (or WM-	
	The second position of paid		

293482.02

	11	1
1		
2	digital file;	D-DRM Compliant or other) portable device, if allowed by Windows Media Rights Manager
	(2) transferring at least a portion of said digital file to a second device	Portable device necessarily includes at least a memory and audio output
3	including a memory and an audio and/or video output;	, and dadie output
. 4 .	(3) storing said digital file in said memory	Music file is stored in the portable device
5	of said second device; and (4) rendering said digital file through said	Portable device plays the music
6	output. 16. A method as in claim 15, in which:	
7	said digital file is received in an encrypted form;	Protected Windows Media File is encrypted. WMP will not decrypt file until license is
8		processed. Licenses are bound to
9	and further comprising:	Individualization DLLs, which are bound to Hardware ID. Ind. DLL and Hardware ID
10	decrypting said digital file after said authentication step and before said step of	must be verified as the Ids to which the license is bound – this is the authentication process.
11	storing said digital file in said memory of said first device.	(Recall that this module was created based in part on receipt of the Client Hardware ID or
12		fingerprint and the license was create based in part on receipt of a challenge from the client
13		indicating the security properties (SAP-ready, SDK support, etc.) of the client).
14		
15		·
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		•
21	*	
22		
23		
24		
25		
26		
27		
28		
		4
	r.l.:	his pi

•	FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 6,253,193		
3	CLAIM LANGUAGE	CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT	
· 4 5	19.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and included applications, and Server 2003, including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using Passport	
_	A method comprising:		
7 . 8 . 9 . 10 . 11	receiving a digital file at a first device;	Receiving a digital file such as a Word Document, email, Excel spreadsheet, PowerPoint presentation, or other content at a recipient's device. Such content may be received via email, received on removable media, such as floppy disk, downloaded and viewable by Internet Explorer, e.g., a web page possibly containing graphics and/or audio data, etc.	
12 13	establishing communication between said first device and a clearinghouse located at a location remote from said first device;	If the digital file is subject to rights management, and the recipient tries to open the digital file in an IRM-enabled application, the	
14		IRM-enabled application contacts a remote RMS, i.e., clearinghouse for a use license.	
15	said first device obtaining authorization information including a key from said clearinghouse;	If the recipient is authorized to access or use the digital file, the RMS creates a license for the digital file. The RMS then seals a key	
16	g.c.,	inside the license so that only the recipient canaccess or use the digital file. Finally, the RMS sends the license back to the recipient.	
17 18	said first device using said authorization information to gain access to or make at least	The recipient's device then uses the key in the license to gain access or decrypt a portion of	
19	one use of said first digital file, including using said key to decrypt at least a portion of said first digital file; and	the digital file.	
20	receiving a first control from said clearinghouse at said first device;	The license received from the RMS at the recipient's device contains at least one control,	
21		such as restricting the ability to print, forward, or edit.	
22	storing said first digital file in a memory of said first device;	The digital file is stored in the memory of the said recipient's device, such as in RAM, on a	
23	using said first control to determine whether	hard drive, etc. The at least one control in the license limits	
24	said first digital file may be copied and stored on a second device;	copying the digital file.	
25		Such controls are set when the digital file was authored. For example, when the digital file is	
26		authored, the IRM-enabled application presented the author with a list of policy	
27		templates with different rights levels. The author selected an appropriate rights level	
28		which may for instance, allow other users in the system to open and read the document, but not	
		i	

Exhibit B

1

1		
2		to modify it, copy text from it, or forward it. These rights or controls are then associated with the digital file.
3 4 5		When an attempt is made to access the digital file, the RMS determines the recipient's rights based on the recipient's identity and the policies or controls associated with the digital file.
6	if said first control allows at least a portion of	If the control in the license allows copying the
7	said first digital file to be copied and stored on a second device,	digital file to a second device, then at least a portion of the digital file is copied,
8	copying at least a portion of said first digital file;	such as by transferring or forwarding the digital file in an email message;
9	transferring at least a portion of said first	A portion of the digital file is then transferred
. 10	digital file to a second device including a memory and an audio and/or video output;	to a second device, such as a personal computer or portable device. The second device includes
11		a memory and an audio and/or video output. The memory may be a hard-drive, RAM, CD,
12		DVD, or other storage. The audio and/or video output may be speakers and/or a video monitor.
13	storing said first digital file portion in said memory of said second device; and	The digital file is stored in the second device's memory.
14	rendering said first digital file portion through	The digital file is rendered through the output,
15	said output.	such as played through the speakers and/or displayed on the video monitor. For example, a
16		Word document is displayed on the screen of the video monitor.
17		
18	·	
19		
20		
21.		
22		
23		
24	7 1	
25	•	
26		
27		
28		
20		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
- 1		.;
	Exhil	

- 293482.02

	FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 6,253,193		
4 5		Infringing products include Windows Media Player, Windows Media Rights Manager SDK	
ر	19. A method comprising:		
6	(a) receiving a digital file at a first device;	WMRM SDK, Step 3.	
Ū	(b) establishing communication between said	WMRM SDK, Step 6.	
7	first device and a clearinghouse located at a location remote from said first device;		
8	(c) said first device obtaining authorization information including a key from said clearinghouse;	WMRM SDK, Step 9. [License contains the key]	
7	(d) said first device using said authorization	WMRM SDK, Step 11.	
10	information to gain access to or make at least one use of said first digital file,		
11	including using said key to decrypt at least a portion of said first digital file; and		
12	(e) receiving a first control from said clearinghouse at said first device;	WMRM SDK, Steps 8-9.	
13	(f) storing said first digital file in a memory of said first device;	WMRM SDK, Step 3.	
14	(g) using said first control to determine whether said first digital file may be	At least the following WMRMRights Object properties meet this limitation:	
15	copied and stored on a second device;	AllowTransferToNonSDMI,	
16	·	AllowTransferToSDMI (or AllowTransfer To WM-D-DRM-Compliant Device or other) and TransferCount	
17	(h) if said first control allows at least a portion of said first digital file to be copied and	This and all subsequent claim steps occur when the condition specified in the WMRMRights	
18	stored on a second device,	Object property is met	
19	(i) copying at least a portion of said first digital file;	Transfer to the SDMI or non-SDMI (or WM-D-DRM Compliant) portable device, if allowed by Windows Media Rights Manager	
20	(j) transferring at least a portion of said first digital file to a second device including a	Portable device necessarily includes at least a memory and audio output	
21	memory and an audio and/or video output;	•	
22	(k) storing said first digital file portion in said memory of said second device; and	Music file is stored in the portable device	
23	(l) rendering said first digital file portion through said output.	Portable device plays the music	
24			

Exhibit B

3		
4		Infringing products include Windows Media Player, Windows Media Player, Windows Media Rights Manager SDK
5	51. A method comprising:	
6	(a) receiving a digital file at a first device;	WMRM SDK, Step 3.
7	(b) establishing communication between said first device and a	WMRM SDK, Step 6.
8	clearinghouse located at a location remote from said first device;	
9	(c) said first device obtaining authorization information from said	WMRM SDK, Step 9.
10	clearinghouse; and (d) said first device using said	WMRM SDK, Step 11.
11	authorization information to gain access to or make at least one use of said first	
12	digital file; (e) storing said first digital file in a	WMA file stored on client
13	memory of said first device;	If device is based on WMD DPM it has a
14	(f) using at least a first control to determine whether said first digital file may be copied and stored on a second	If device is based on WM D-DRM, it has a certificate that is used to identify the device as compliant as well as the device's security
15	device, said determination based at least in part on (1) identification information	level. The security level indicates support on the device for such attributes as an internal
16	regarding said second device, and (2) the functional attributes of said second	clock.
17	device; (g) if, based at least in part on said	If License specifies that transfer of protected
18	identification information, said first control allows at least a portion of said	WMA file to WM-D-DRM-Compliant device is allowed, transfer may occur.
.19	first digital file to be copied and stored on a second device,	,
20	(h) copying at least a portion of said first digital file;	If transfer is a licensed right as indicated in the license, the song is copied to the device via
21	(i) transferring at least a portion of said	Windows Media Device Manager. Windows Media Device Manager transfers the
22	first digital file to a second device including a memory and an audio	content to the device:
23	and/or video output;	WMA file is stored on device
24	(j) storing said first digital file portion in said memory of said second device; and	WIVE THE IS STOTED ON DEVICE
25	(k) rendering said first digital file portion through said output.	WMA file is rendered.
26	Portion anough and output	

27

2

28

, D

Exhibit B

293482.02

_	FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 5,915,019	
3	CLAIM LANGUAGE SECTION OF INFRINGEMENT	
4	33.	Infringing products include all Microsoft tools that support the Microsoft ActiveX
5 6		licensing model, Visual Studio .NET, the Microsoft Installer SDK, and Operating System products that include the Microsoft
•		Installer technology.
7	A data processing arrangement comprising at least one storing arrangement that at	The first protected data is an ActiveX control.
3	least temporarily stores a first secure container comprising first protected data and a first set of rules governing use of said	The first alternative for the first secure container is the signed .msi in which the
)	first protected data,	ActiveX developer packaged the ActiveX control. The first set of rules is the
		conditional syntax statements of the signed .msi file.
	·	The second alternative for the first secure container is the signed and licensed
		ActiveX control. The first set of rules is the license support code in the ActiveX
ı		control.
		A third alternative for the first container is a signed cabinet file containing a (signed or
		unsigned) ActiveX control with license support code. The first set of rules is the license support code in the ActiveX
		control.
	and at least temporarily stores a second secure container comprising second	The second protected data is the application developer's application that includes/uses
	protected data different from said first protected data and a second set of rules	the ActiveX control. The application developer's signed .msi file (second secure
	governing use of said second protected data; and	container) contains the application (second protected data). The second set of rules is
	,	the signed .msi file's conditional syntax statements that will be governed the
	a data transfer arrangement, coupled to at	offer/installation of the application. Placing the licensed ActiveX control (first
	least one storing arrangement, for transferring at least a portion of said first	protected information) in a signed cabinet file (third secure container) that itself is
	protected data and a third set of rules governing use of said portion of said first	included in the application's signed .msi file (second secure container). The third
	protected data to said second secure container.	set of rules is the license support code in the ActiveX control.
	further comprising	
	means for creating and storing, in said at least one storing arrangement, a third secure container:	The ability of the application developer to package files in signed cabinet files.
7 3	means for creating and storing, in said at	

Exhibit B

293482.02

1	said data transfer arrangement further comprising means for transferring said	The third secure container is a cabinet file signed by the application developer and
2	portion of said first protected data and	including at least the licensed ActiveX
3	said third set of rules to said third secure container, and means for incorporating	control (first protected information. The licensing support code in the ActiveX
4	said third secure container within said second secure container.	control when its developer added licensing support to the ActiveX control is the third set of rules
5		
6	34. A data processing arrangement as in claim 33 further comprising means for	Before an ActiveX control will create a copy of itself, the calling application has to
7	applying said third set of rules to govern at least one aspect of use of said portion of	pass a license key to the ActiveX control. The license support code in the ActiveX
8	said first protected data.	control (third rule set) evaluates the authenticity of the calling application's
9		request.
10	35 1 34	WE down to the second s
11	35. A data processing arrangement as in claim 34 further comprising means for applying said second set of rules to govern	Windows Installer operating system service enforces the conditional syntax statements of the application's signed .msi file. These
12	at least one aspect of use of said portion of	statements govern the offer/installation of
13	said first protected data.	the ActiveX control.
14		
15	·	
16		
17		
18	· ·	
19		
20		. * *
21		
22		
23		
24	·	·
25	, ·	
26		
27		
28		

2	FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 5,915,019	
4	41	Infringing products include all Microsoft tools that support the Microsoft ActiveX licensing model, Visual Studio .NET, the
5		Microsoft Installer SDK, and Operating System products that include the Microsoft Installer technology.
6 7	A method comprising performing the following steps within a virtual distribution	The signed .msi file created by the ActiveX control developer is the first secure
8	environment comprising one or more electronic appliances and a first secure	container. The conditional syntax statement(s) of the ActiveX control
9	container, said first secure container comprising (a) a first control set, and	developer's signed .msi file is/are the first control set.
10	(b) a second secure container comprising a second control set and first protected	The first protected information is the ActiveX control.
11	information:	The first alternative for the second secure container is the signed and licensed
13	·	ActiveX control. The second control set is the license support code in the ActiveX
14		control.
5		The second alternative for the second secure container is a signed cabinet file containing the (signed or unsigned)
16	,	ActiveX control. The second control set is the license support code in the ActiveX control.
8	using at least one control from said first control set or said second control set to	The ActiveX control developer's conditional syntax statements (first control
9	govern at least one aspect of use of said first protected information while said first protected information is contained within	set) in the ActiveX developer's signed .msi file govern the offer/installation of the ActiveX control while it is in its signed
0	said first secure container;	.msi file.
1 2	·	Alternately, the license support code (second control set) in the ActiveX control governs use of the licensed ActiveX
3	creating a third secure container	control. The third secure container is a signed .msi
4	comprising a third control set for governing at least one aspect of use of protected	file. The application developer packages its application in a signed .msi file (third
5	information contained within said third secure container;	secure container) and includes conditional syntax statements (third control set) in the
6	incorporating a first portion of said first protected information in said third secure container, said first portion made up of some or all of said first protected.	signed .msi Placing the ActiveX control into the application developer's signed .msi file (third secure container).
8	some or all of said first protected information; and	
H	using at least one control to govern at least	The application developer's conditional

1	(
2	one aspect of use of said first portion of said first protected information while said	syntax statement(s) in its signed .msi file govern the offer/installation ActiveX
3	first portion is contained within said third secure container.	control while it is in the signed .msi file (third secure container).
د		(tima socure container).
4	42. A method as in claim 41, in which said first secure container further includes a	The second protected information is a second ActiveX control.
5	fourth secure container comprising a fourth control set and second protected	The first alternative for the fourth secure
6	information and further comprising the following step:	container is the signed and licensed second ActiveX control. The fourth control set is
7		the license support code in the ActiveX control.
8		The second alternative for the fourth secure
9	-	container is a signed cabinet file containing the (signed or unsigned) second ActiveX control. The fourth control set is the
10		license support code in the ActiveX
11 12	using at least one control from said first control set or said fourth control set to	The ActiveX control developer's conditional syntax statements (first control
13	govern at least one aspect of use of said second protected information while said	set) in the ActiveX developer's signed .msi file govern the offer/installation of the
14	second protected information is contained within said first secure container.	second ActiveX control while it is in its signed .msi file.
15		Altomotoly, the license dynamics and
16 17		Alternately, the license support code (second control set) in the ActiveX control governs use of the licensed ActiveX control.
18	47. A method as in claim 41, in which said step of creating a third secure container	
19	includes: creating said third control set by	The emplication development and distance
20	incorporating at least one control not found in said first control set or said second	The application developer's conditional syntax statements are not found in either the first control set or the second control
21	control set.	set.
	52. A method as in claim 41 in which said step of creating a third secure container	
23	occurs at a first site, and further comprising:	
24	copying or transferring said third secure container from said first site to a second	The application developer at first site distributes its application to other sites.
	site located remotely from said first site.	1. F
	53. A method as in claim 52 in which said first site is associated with a content	The application developer at the first site is the content distributor.
	distributor.	
	54. A method as in claim 53 in which said second site is associated with a user of	The application developer distributes the application to end-users.
	Ę	xhibit B 113
		•

1	content.	
2	55. A method as in claim 54 further	
3	comprising the following step: said user directly or indirectly initiating	For Internat described the second distance
. 4	communication with said first site.	For Internet downloads, the user initiates the communication with the first site.
5	64. A method as in claim 54 in which said third control set includes one or more	The application developer's conditional syntax statements (third control set) govern
6	controls at least in part governing the use by said user of at least a portion of said first portion of said first protected	the installation of the ActiveX control (first protected information).
7	information.	
8	76. A method as in claim 41 in which said	The third secure container is the application
9	creation of said third secure container further comprises using a template which specifies one or more of the controls	developer's signed .msi file and the third control set is the conditional syntax statements in that file.
11	contained in said third control set.	Microsoft supplies several template .msi
12		databases for use in authoring installation packages. The UISample.msi is the template recommended in the "An
13		Installation Example" on MSDN. This
14		template msi files contains several default conditional syntax statements. At least two of these conditional syntax statements
15 16		directly govern the installation by blocking progress until the EULA is accepted.
17	78. A method as in claim 52 in which said creation of said third secure container	The third secure container is the application developer's signed .msi file and the third
18	further comprises using a template which specifies one or more of the controls contained in said third control set.	control set is the conditional syntax statements in that file.
19	contained in said tipra control set.	Microsoft supplies several template .msi databases for use in authoring installation
20		packages. The UISample.msi is the template recommended in the "An
21 22	·	Installation Example" on MSDN. This template msi files contains several default conditional syntax statements. At least two
23		of these conditional syntax statements directly govern the installation by blocking
24 ·		progress until the EULA is accepted.
25		
26		÷
27		
28		
-		
	<u>I</u>	Exhibit B
		•••

INTERTRUST TECHNOLOGIE'S CORP. v. MICROSOFT CORP. INTERTRUST INFRINGEMENT CHART

	INTERTRUST TECHNOLOGIES CORP. v. MICROSOFT CORP.	
2	INTERTRUST INFRINGEMENT CHART FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 5,915,019	
3	81.	
. 4	01.	Infringing products include all Microsoft tools that support the Microsoft ActiveX licensing model, Visual Studio .NET, the
5		Microsoft Installer SDK, and Operating System products that include the Microsoft
6	A data processing among and a servicing	Installer technology.
7	A data processing arrangement comprising: a first secure container comprising first	The first alternative for the first secure
	protected information and a first rule set	container is the ActiveX control
8	governing use of said first protected information;	developer's signed .msi file containing a licensed ActiveX control (the first
9		protected information). The conditional syntax statements of the signed .msi file are
10		the first rule set.
11		The second alternative for the first secure
12		container is the signed cabinet file containing the ActiveX control. The license support code in the ActiveX control
13		is the first rule set.
14		The third alternative for the first secure container is the licensed and signed
15		ActiveX control governed by license support code in the ActiveX control.
16	a second secure container comprising a second rule set;	The second secure container is the signed
17	second rule set,	.msi file which the application developer package its application. The second rule
18		set is the conditional syntax statements of the application developer's signed .msi file.
	means for creating and storing a third	The third container is a signed cabinet file
19	secure container; and means for copying or transferring at least a	containing at least the ActiveX control. Putting the licensed ActiveX control (first
20	portion of said first protected information	protected information) in a signed cabinet
21	and a third rule set governing use of said portion of said first protected information	file (third secure container). The licensing support code in the ActiveX control is third
22	to said second secure container, said means for copying or transferring comprising:	rule set.
	means for incorporating said third	Packaging the signed cabinet file in the
23	secure container within said second secure container.	signed .msi file.
24	·	
25	82. A data processing arrangement as in claim 81 further comprising:	
26	means for applying at least one rule from said third rule set to at least in part govern	The third rule set ensures the user is licensed.
	at least one factor related to use of said	
27	portion of said first protected information.	
28	83. A data processing arrangement as in claim 82 further comprising:	
Į	•	

Exhibit B

	means for applying at least one rule from said second rule set to at least in part govern at least one factor related to use of said portion of said first protected information.	The second rule set governs the offer/installation of first protected information.
	·	
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
	•	•
	· · · .	
	•	
	•	
	·	
		•
11		

Exhibit B

3	FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 5,915,019	
. 4 . 5	85.	Infringing products include all Microsoft tools that support the Microsoft ActiveX licensing model, Visual Studio .NET, the Microsoft Installer SDK, and Operating
6		System products that include the Microsoft Installer technology.
7	A method comprising the following steps: creating a first secure container comprising	The first protected information is the
. 8	a first rule set and first protected information;	ActiveX control.
9		The first alternative for the first secure container is the signed and licensed
10		ActiveX control. The first rule set is the license support code in the ActiveX.
11		control.
12		The second alternative for the first secure container is an (signed or unsigned)
13		ActiveX control with license support contained within a signed cabinet file. The
14		first rule set is the ActiveX license support code.
15	storing said first secure container in a first memory;	The first secure container is stored at the ActiveX control developer's location.
16	creating a second secure container comprising a second rule set;	The second secure container is the application developer's signed .msi file.
17		The conditional syntax statements of the signed msi file are the second rule set.
18	storing said second secure container in a second memory;	The second secure container is stored at the application developer's location.
19	copying or transferring at least a first	The ActiveX control developer packages the control in a signed .msi file for
20	portion of said first protected information to said second secure container, said	distribution to the application developer's
21	copying or transferring step comprising: creating a third secure container	The third secure container is the ActiveX
22	comprising a third rule set;	control developer's signed .msi file containing a licensed ActiveX control. The
23		conditional syntax statements of the signed .msi file are the third rule set.
24	copying said first portion of said first protected information;	In preparation for using a msi authoring tool, such as Microsoft's Orca, copying the
25	transferring said copied first portion	ActiveX control to a package staging area. Using msi authoring tool to import the
26	of said first protected information to said third secure container; and	control into the signed .msi file.
27	copying or transferring said copied first portion of said first protected	The application developer installs the ActiveX control, which involves removing
28	information from said third secure container to said second secure	it from the ActiveX developer's signed .msi file and installing it into its
	container.	environment. Subsequently, the

Exhibit B

1

1 2		application developer places the ActiveX control into its signed .msi file when it is packaging its application.
3		раскадинд из аррисации.
4	87. A method as in claim 85 in which said copied first portion of said first protected	The entire ActiveX control is copied.
5	information consists of the entirety of said first protected information.	
6	89. A method as in claim 85 in which	·
7	said first memory is located at a first site,	The first memory is located at the ActiveX control developer's site.
8	said second memory is located at a second site remote from said first site, and	The second memory is located at the application developer's site.
9	said step of copying or transferring said first portion of said first protected	The ActiveX control developer's signed msi file is transferred from its site to the
10	information to said second secure container further comprises copying or transferring	site of the application developer.
11	said third secure container from said first site to said second site.	
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19	·	
20 21		
22		
23		
24		
25		
26		
27		
28	_	
- 11	•	•

3	FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 5,915,019	
4	85. (alternate infringing scenario)	Infringing products include all Microsoft tools that support the Microsoft ActiveX
5		licensing model, Visual Studio .NET, the Microsoft Installer SDK, and Operating
6	·	System products that include the Microsoft Installer technology.
7	A method comprising the following steps: creating a first secure container comprising	The first protected information is the
8	a first rule set and first protected information;	ActiveX control.
9	intomation,	The first alternative for the first secure container is the signed and licensed
10		ActiveX control. The first rule set is the
iı		license support code in the ActiveX' control.
12		The second alternative for the first secure container is a (signed or unsigned) ActiveX
13		control with license support contained within a signed cabinet file. The first rule
14		set would remain the ActiveX license support code.
15		The third alternative for the first secure
16		container is a signed msi file in which the ActiveX control developer packaged its
17		ActiveX control. The first rule set is the conditional syntax statement(s) of the
18		signed msi file.
19	storing said first secure container in a first memory;	The first secure container is stored at the ActiveX control developer's location.
	creating a second secure container	The second secure container is the
20	comprising a second rule set;	application developer's signed .msi file. The conditional syntax statements of the
21	-	signed .msi file are the second rule set.
22	storing said second secure container in a second memory;	The second secure container is stored at the application developer's location.
22	copying or transferring at least a first	The ActiveX control is placed in a cabinet
23	portion of said first protected information	file signed by the application developer and
	to said second secure container, said	the signed cabinet file is placed in a .msi
24	copying or transferring step comprising:	file signed by the application developer. The third severe container is signed cabinet.
25	creating a third secure container comprising a third rule set;	The third secure container is signed cabinet file in which the application developer
26		placed licensed ActiveX. The third rule set is the license support code in the ActiveX
27	copying said first portion of said first protected information;	Copying ActiveX control.
28	transferring said copied first portion of said first protected information to	Transferring ActiveX control to signed cabinet file.
ŀ	or said this projected information to	· · · · · ·

Exhibit B

293482.02

1

	·	
1	said third secure container; and	
2	copying or transferring said copied first portion of said first protected information from said third secure	The application developer places the signed cabinet file into its signed .msi file when it is packaging its application.
3	container to said second secure container.	is packaging its application.
5	87. A method as in claim 85 in which said copied first portion of said first protected information consists of the entirety of said	The entire ActiveX control is copied.
0	first protected information.	
7	93. A method as in claim 85 in which	
8	said step of copying transferring said copied first portion of said first protected	The ActiveX control is placed in a cabinet file signed by the application developer and
9	information from said third secure container to said second secure container	the signed by the application developer and the signed cabinet file is placed in a .msi file signed by the application developer.
10-	further comprises storing said third secure container in said second secure container.	
11	Container in Said Second Secure Container.	
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
8		
19		
20		
21		
22		•
23		•
24	÷	
25		
26		
27		
28	•	
Į.	•	•

. 4	l:	Infringing products include the .NET Framework SDK, Microsoft Visual Studio
5		.NET, the Microsoft Installer SDK, and products that include the Microsoft .NET
6	·	CLR, and the Microsoft Installer technology.
7	A method of operating on a first secure container arrangement having a first set of	The first protected content is a signed and licensed .NET component used by the
8	controls associated therewith, said first secure container arrangement at least in	.NET assembly. The .NET assembly is distributed with a signed and governed .msi
9	part comprising a first protected content file, said method comprising the following	file. The second protected content is another signed and licensed .NET
10	steps performed within a virtual distribution environment including at least one electronic appliance:	component that is used by the .NET assembly.
11	using at least one control associated with said first secure container arrangement for	The first protected content is signed and licensed .NET component (first secure
13	governing, at least in part, at least one aspect of use of said first protected content	container) contained within the .NET assembly. The one control is a declarative
14	file while said first protected content file is contained in said first secure container arrangement;	statement(s) within the assembly's header.
15	creating a second secure container arrangement having a second set of	The protected content is the same as the first protected content plus the additional
16	controls associated therewith, said second set of controls governing, at least in part, at	implementation information included in the signed .msi file. The second secure
·17	least one aspect of use of any protected content file contained within said second	container is the signed .msi file created for the .NET assembly. The signed .msi file's
18 19	secure container arrangement;	conditional syntax statements are the second set of controls that control the offer/installation of the .NET assembly.
20	transferring at least a portion of said first protected content file to said second secure	The entire .NET assembly is included in the signed .msi file.
21	container arrangement, said portion made up of at least some of said first protected	Packaging the .NET assembly in the signed
22	content file; and	.msi file involves the following process steps. In preparation for using a msi
23	· •	authoring tool, such as Microsoft's Orca, copying the .NET component to a package
24	-	staging area. Using msi authoring tool to import the .NET component into the signed .msi file.
25	using at least one rule to govern at least one aspect of use of said first protected content	The conditional syntax statement(s) of the signed .msi file (second secure container)
26	file portion while said portion is contained within said second secure container	control(s) the offer/installation of the .NET assembly.
27	arrangement:	
	in which	
28	said first secure container arrangement	The first alternative for the third secure
ŀ	comprises a third secure container	container is a licensed and signed .NET
ı		•

Exhibit B i

293482.02

1

2

2	arrangement comprising a third set of controls and said first protected content file, and	component governed by the set of declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute (third set of controls).
- 3 - 4 - 5		The second alternative for the third secure container is a .NET component whose hash is included in the header of the .NET assembly. The set of declarative statements comprising the
7		LicenseProviderAttribute is the third set of controls.
8	said first secure container arrangement further comprises a fourth secure container arrangement comprising a fourth set of	The first alternative for the fourth secure container is another licensed and signed .NET component governed by the set of
. 9	controls and a second protected content file.	declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute (fourth set of
10		controls).
11	·	The second alternative for the fourth secure container is the container created when the
12		hash of the .NET component is included in the header information of the .NET
13		assembly. The set of declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute is the fourth set
14		of controls.
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		•
21		
22		
23		· ·
24	*	
25		•
26		
27		
Į		

3	INTERTRUST INFRINGEMENT CHART FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 5,915,019	
33. Infringing products incl	lude the NIPT	
Infringing products incl Framework SDK, Micro NET, the Microsoft Ins	osoft Visual Studio	
products that include the CLR, and the Microsoft	e Microsoft .NET	
6 A data processing arrangement comprising The first protected infor	<u> </u>	
7 at least one storing arrangement that at least temporarily stores a first secure	iniation is the .ive1	
g container comprising first protected data The first alternate for the		
and a first set of rules governing use of said container is the signed at the .NET component de	veloper packaged	
its .NET component. To is the conditional syntax signed .msi file.		
The second alternative f	for the first secure	
container is a licensed a component governed by	and signed .NET	
declarative statements of License Provider Attribut	comprising the	
component (first set of c		
The third alternative for is a signed cabinet file c or unsigned) .NET comp	containing a (signed	
support. The first set of of declarative statement. LicenseProviderAttribut component.	controls is the set scomprising the	
and at least temporarily stores a second secure container comprising second The second protected da assembly developer's as		
protected data different from said first includes/uses the .NET of protected data and a second set of rules		
governing use of said second protected The first alternative for to container is a signed .ms	si file in which the	
22 .NET assembly develop multi-file assembly (sec	ond protected	
data). The second set of conditional syntax states	ments of the signed	
24 .msi file that governs the of the .NET assembly.	e offer/installation	
The second alternative f		
secure container is a sign assembly. The second so declarative rules within	et of rules is the	
header.		
28 a data transfer arrangement, coupled to at least one storing arrangement, for The third secure contain assembly governed by d		

Exhibit B

l	transferring at least a portion of said first	its header (third set of rules). An
2	protected data and a third set of rules	alternative third rule set is the set of
~	governing use of said portion of said first	declarative statements comprising the
3	protected data to said second secure	LicenseProviderAttribute. The .NET
	container,	assembly includes the .NET component. The secure .NET assembly is included in a
. 4		signed .msi file (second secure container).
5		signed initi me (second secure container).
J		An alternative third secure container is the
6		container created by hashing the .NET
		component and including the hash in the header information of a .NET assembly.
7		The .NET component is included in the
8		signed and governed .NET assembly
		(second secure container). The third set of
9		rules is the set of declarative statements
		comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute.
10		An alternative third secure container is a
11		signed cabinet file containing the .NET
		component and which is destined for a
12		signed .msi file (second secure container). The third set of rules is the set of
13		declarative statements comprising the
15		LicenseProviderAttribute.
14	further comprising	
16	means for creating and storing, in said at least one storing arrangement, a third	The first alternative for the third secure container is a signed .NET assembly. In
15	secure container;	this case, the second secure container is the
16		signed .msi file.
	·	The second alternative for the third
17		container is the container created by
18		including a hash of the .NET component in
		the header information of a .NET assembly.
19		In this case, the second secure container is
20		either the signed .msi file or the signed .NET assembly.
20		1.22 assumory.
21		The third alternative for the third container
		is a cabinet file signed by the .NET
22		assembly developer containing the .NET assembly and/or the .NET component. In
23	: 1	this case the signed .msi file is the second
23		secure container.
24	said data transfer arrangement further	The first alternative for the third secure
	comprising means for transferring said	container is the signed .NET assembly,
25	portion of said first protected data and said third set of rules to said third secure	which includes and/or uses the licensed .NET component (first protected
26	container, and means for incorporating	information). The third set of rules is a
20	said third secure container within said	declarative rule within the .NET
27	second secure container.	assembly's header. The .NET assembly is
		placed in a signed .msi file (second secure
28		container).
ı		

1		The second alternative for the third secure
2		container is the container that results when the hash of the .NET component is added
3		to the .NET assembly header information. The third set of rules is the set of
. 4		declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute added to the
5		assembly.
6		The third alternative for the third secure container is a cabinet file signed by the
7	·	NET assembly developer containing the NET assembly and/or the NET
8		component. The third set of rules is a
9		declarative rule(s) within the .NET assembly's header and/or the set of
. 10		declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute added to the
		assembly
11	34. A data processing arrangement as in	When the third rule set is the declarative
12	claim 33 further comprising means for applying said third set of rules to govern at	statement(s) of the assembly header, the runtime CLR enforces the statements.
13	least one aspect of use of said portion of said first protected data.	When the third set of rules is the set of
14		declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute added to the
15		assembly, the license support code in the .NET component evaluates the authenticity
16		of the calling assembly's request.
17	35. A data processing arrangement as in	When the second set of rules is the
18	claim 34 further comprising means for applying said second set of rules to govern	conditional syntax statements of the signed .msi file, the Windows Installer operating
19	at least one aspect of use of said portion of said first protected data.	system service enforces the conditional syntax statements of .NET assembly's
		signed .msi file, which govern the offer/installation of the .NET component.
20		
21		When the second set of rules is the declarative statement(s) within the
22		assembly's header, the runtime CLR enforces the statements.
23	_	•
24		
-25		
26		·
27		
28		
	117	#
·		#

•	FOR U.S. I A.	1EN1 NO. 5,915,019
3	41.	Infringing products include the .NET
4		Framework SDK, Microsoft Visual Studio
		.NET, the Microsoft Installer SDK, and
5	·	products that include the Microsoft .NET CLR, and the Microsoft Installer
6		technology.
U	A method comprising performing the	The signed .msi file created by the .NET
7	following steps within a virtual distribution environment comprising one or more	component developer is the first secure container. The first conditional syntax
8	electronic appliances and a first secure container, said first secure container	statement(s) of the .NET component developer's signed .msi file is/are the first
9	comprising (a) a first control set, and	control set.
10	(b) a second secure container comprising a	The first protected information is the .NET
11	second control set and first protected information:	component.
1 1		The first alternative for the second secure
12		container is the signed and licensed .NET
13		component. The second control set is the set of declarative statements comprising the
13	·	LicenseProviderAttribute.
14		The second elementing for the second
,,		The second alternative for the second secure container is a signed cabinet file.
15		The second control set remains the set of
16		declarative statements comprising the
	using at least one control from said first	LicenseProviderAttribute. The .NET component developer's
17	control set or said second control set to	conditional syntax statements (first control
18	govern at least one aspect of use of said	set) in its signed .msi file governs the
	first protected information while said first	offer/installation of the .NET component
19	protected information is contained within said first secure container;	while it is in the signed .msi file.
20	data first boom o committee,	Alternately, the set of declarative
- [statements comprising the
21		LicenseProviderAttribute (second control set) of the licensed .NET component
22	·	governs use of the .NET component.
	creating a third secure container	The first alternative for the third secure
23	comprising a third control set for governing	container is a signed .NET assembly, the
24	at least one aspect of use of protected information contained within said third	protected information is the .NET component and the third control set is the
24	secure container;	declarative statement(s) within the .NET
25	ŕ	assembly's header.
	·	The second alternative for the third secure
26		container is a signed .msi file in which the
27		.NET assembly developer packages its
		.NET assembly and the third control set is
28		the conditional syntax statement(s) in the signed .msi file.
		signed .msi nie.

Exhibit B

293482.02

,		
1	incorporating a first portion of said first protected information in said third secure	In the first alternative, placing the .NET component into the signed .NET assembly.
2	container, said first portion made up of	
3	some or all of said first protected information; and	In the second alternative, placing the NET component into the. Net assembly
4		developer's signed msi file.
5	using at least one control to govern at least one aspect of use of said first portion of said first protected information while said	In the first alternative, the .NET assembly developer's declarative statement(s) within the .NET assembly's header govern(s) the
6	first portion is contained within said third secure container.	use of the .NET component while it is in the signed .NET assembly.
· 7		In the second alternative, the conditional
8		syntax statements of the .NET assembly developer's signed .msi file govern the
.9		offer/installation of the .NET component while it is in the signed .msi file.
10	42. A method as in claim 41, in which said	The second protected information is a
11	first secure container further includes a fourth secure container comprising a fourth	second .NET component.
12	control set and second protected information and further comprising the	The first alternative for the fourth secure container is the signed and licensed second
13	following step:	.NET component. The fourth control set is the set of declarative statements comprising
14		the LicenseProviderAttribute of the second .NET component.
15		The second alternative for the fourth secure
16		container is a second signed cabinet file. The fourth control set is the set of
17		declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute.
18	using at least one control from said first control set or said fourth control set to	The .NET component developer's conditional syntax statements (first control
19	govern at least one aspect of use of said second protected information while said	set) in its signed .msi file governs the offer/installation of the second .NET
20	second protected information is contained within said first secure container.	component while it is in the signed .msi file.
21		Alternately, the set of declarative
22		statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute (fourth control
23		set) of the licensed second .NET component governs use of the second .NET
24		component.
· 25	47. A method as in claim 41, in which said	
26	step of creating a third secure container includes:	
27	creating said third control set by incorporating at least one control not found	The .NET assembly developer's declarative statements (first alternative for third control
	in said first control set or said second	set) and/or the developer's conditional
28	control set.	syntax statements (second alternative for the third control set) are not found in either
- [1!

1 2		the first control set or the second control set.
3	52. A method as in claim 41 in which said	
4	step of creating a third secure container occurs at a first site, and further comprising:	·
5	copying or transferring said third secure container from said first site to a second	The .NET assembly developer at first site distributes its assembly to other sites.
6	site located remotely from said first site.	1
7 _.	53. A method as in claim 52 in which said first site is associated with a content distributor.	The .NET assembly developer's business module is used to create and distribute its assembly.
	54. A method as in claim 53 in which said	
9	second site is associated with a user of content.	The .NET assembly developer distributes the assembly to end-users.
11	55. A method as in claim 54 further comprising the following step:	i i
12	said user directly or indirectly initiating communication with said first site.	For Internet downloads, the user initiates the communication with the first site.
13	64. A method as in claim 54 in which said	When the third control set is the .NET
14 15	third control set includes one or more controls at least in part governing the use by said user of at least a portion of said	assembly developer's declarative statement(s) within the .NET assembly's header, it governs the user's use of the
16	first portion of said first protected information.	NET component (first protected information).
17 .		When the third control set is the .NET
18	·	assembly developer's conditional syntax statements of the .NET assembly developer's signed .msi file, it governs the
19 20		user's offer acceptance/installation of the .NET component (first protected information).
21 22	76. A method as in claim 41 in which said creation of said third secure container further comprises using a template which	When the third secure container is the .NET assembly developer's signed .msi file and the third control set is the conditional
23	specifies one or more of the controls contained in said third control set.	syntax statements in that file.
24	·.	Microsoft supplies several template .msi databases for use in authoring installation
25.		packages. The UISample.msi is the template recommended in the "An Installation Example" on MSDN. This
26		template msi files contains several default conditional syntax statements. At least two
27 28		of these conditional syntax statements directly govern the installation by blocking
-0	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	progress until the EULA is accepted.

1 78. A method as in claim 52 in which said When the third secure container is the creation of said third secure container .NET assembly developer's signed .msi file and the third control set is the conditional further comprises using a template which specifies one or more of the controls syntax statements in that file. contained in said third control set. Microsoft supplies several template .msi 4. databases for use in authoring installation packages. The UISample.msi is the 5 template recommended in the "An-Installation Example" on MSDN. This 6 template msi files contains several default conditional syntax statements. At least two 7 of these conditional syntax statements directly govern the installation by blocking 8 progress until the EULA is accepted. 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

Exhibit E

293482.02

2	FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 5,915,019	
3 4 5	81.	Infringing products include the .NET Framework SDK, Microsoft Visual Studio .NET, the Microsoft Installer SDK, and products that include the Microsoft .NET CLR, and the Microsoft Installer technology.
•	A data processing arrangement comprising:	
7	a first secure container comprising first protected information and a first rule set governing use of said first protected	The first protected information is the .NET component.
0	information;	The first alternative for the first secure
9		container is the signed .msi file in which the .NET component developer packaged its assembly. The first rule set is the
11		the .NET component developer and placed into the signed .msi file.
12		
13		The second alternative for the first secure container is the signed cabinet file containing the (signed or unsigned).NET
14		component. The set of declarative
15		statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute when its developer added licensing support to the
16		assembly is the first rule set.
17		The third alternative for the first secure container is the licensed and signed .NET
18		declarative statements comprising the
19		LicenseProviderAttribute (first rule set) added by the .NET component developer.
20	a second secure container comprising a second rule set;	The first alternative for the second secure container is the signed .msi file in which
21		the .NET assembly developer packaged its .NET assembly. The second rule set is the
22	ý.	conditional syntax statements written by the .NET assembly developer and placed
23		into the signed .msi file.
24		The second alternative for the second secure container is the signed .NET
25		assembly. The second rule set is the declarative statements in the .NET
26	means for creating and storing a third	assembly's header. When the second secure container is the
27	means for creating and storing a third secure container; and	signed msi file, the third secure container is the the signed .NET assembly.
28		
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	When the second secure container is the
ł	.	1

Exhibit B

1	·	signed NET assembly, the third secure
2		container a .NET component secured by placing it in a signed cabinet file or by
. 3		including its hash in the header of the assembly.
. 4	means for copying or transferring at least a portion of said first protected information	When the second secure container is the signed msi file and the third secure
5	and a third rule set governing use of said portion of said first protected information	container is the signed NET assembly, the third rule set is the set of declarative
6	to said second secure container, said means for copying or transferring comprising:	statements within the assembly's header.
7	for copying of transferring comprising.	When the second secure container is the
8	·	signed .NET assembly, the third rule set is the set of declarative statements comprising
9		the LicenseProviderAttribute (third rule set) added to the .NET component by its developer.
10	means for incorporating said third secure container within said second	When the second secure container is the signed msi file and the third secure
11	secure container.	container is the signed .NET assembly, the assembly is placed in the signed .msi file.
12		When the second secure container is the
13		signed .NET assembly and the third secure container is a .NET component contained
14		in a signed cabinet file or a .NET component whose hash is included in the
15		header of the assembly, the third secure container is incorporated within the NET
16		assembly.
17	82. A data processing arrangement as in claim 81 further comprising:	
18	means for applying at least one rule from said third rule set to at least in part govern	When the third rule set is declarative statements within the assembly's header, it
19	at least one factor related to use of said portion of said first protected information.	governs the use of the .NET assembly which includes the first protected
20		information.
21		When the third rule set is the set of declarative statements comprising the
22	·	LicenseProviderAttribute added by the .NET component by its developer, it
23		ensures the user is licensed.
24	83. A data processing arrangement as in claim 82 further comprising:	:
25	means for applying at least one rule from said second rule set to at least in part	When the second rule set is the conditional syntax statements written by the .NET
26	govern at least one factor related to use of said portion of said first protected	assembly developer and placed into the signed .msi file, it governs the
27	information.	offer/installation of the .NET component.
28		When the second rule set is the declarative statements in the .NET assembly's header,
Ì		# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #

Exhibit B

293482.02

3		<u></u>
	85. A method comprising the following	Infringing products include the .NET
. 4	steps:	Framework SDK, Microsoft Visual Studio
		NET, the Microsoft Installer SDK, and
5		products that include the Microsoft .NET
_		CLR, and the Microsoft Installer technology.
6	creating a first secure container comprising	The first protected information is the .NET
7	a first rule set and first protected	component.
,	information;	
8		The first secure container is a signed .NET
		component (first protected information)
9		governed by the set of declarative
		statements comprising the
· 10		LicenseProviderAttribute (first rule set).
11		The second alternative for the first secure
11		container is a cabinet file signed by the
12		.NET component developer containing a
		(signed or unsigned) .NET component with
13		license support. The first rule set is the set
1.4	•	of declarative statements comprising the
14	storing said first secure container in a first	LicenseProviderAttribute. The first secure container is stored at the
15	memory;	.NET component developer's location.
	creating a second secure container	The first alternative for the second secure
16	comprising a second rule set;	container is a signed .NET assembly and
		the second rule set is declarative
17		statement(s) within the assembly's header.
18		The second alternative for the second
. 10		secure container is the signed .msi file in
19		which the .NET assembly developer
	·	packages its (signed or unsigned)
20	••	assembly. The second rule set is the
0.1		conditional syntax statement(s) written by
21	· ·	the .NET assembly developer and placed into the signed .msi file.
22	storing said second secure container in a	The second secure container is stored at the
	second memory;	.NET assembly developer's location.
· 23	copying or transferring at least a first	The .NET component developer packages
	portion of said first protected information	its module in a signed .msi file for
24	to said second secure container, said	distribution to the .NET assembly
~ . l	copying or transferring step comprising:	developer's site.
25	creating a third secure container	The third secure container is the signed
26	comprising a third rule set;	.msi file in which the .NET component developer packaged its .NET component.
20		The third control set is the conditional
27		syntax statements written by the .NET
i	: 	component developer and placed into the
28		signed .msi file.
	copying said first portion of said	In preparation for using a msi authoring
i i		!!

...Exhibit B

293482.02

1

1	first protected information;	tool, such as Microsoft's Orca, copying the
2		.NET component to a package staging area.
3	transferring said copied first portion of said first protected information to	Using the msi authoring tool to import the .NET component into the signed .msi file.
4	said third secure container; and copying or transferring said copied	The .NET assembly developer installs the
5	first portion of said first protected information from said third secure	.NET component, which involves removing it from the .NET component
6	container to said second secure container.	developer's signed msi file and installing it into its environment. Subsequently, the
7		.NET assembly developer places the .NET component into its .NET assembly and/or
8	•	signed .msi file when it is packaging its . .NET assembly.
9	87. A method as in claim 85 in which said	The entire .NET component is copied.
10	copied first portion of said first protected information consists of the entirety of said	
11	first protected information.	<u></u>
	89. A method as in claim 85 in which	
12	said first memory is located at a first site,	The first memory is located at the .NET component developer's site.
13	said second memory is located at a second site remote from said first site, and	The second memory is located at the .NET assembly developer's site.
14	said step of copying or transferring said first portion of said first protected	The .NET component developer's signed .msi file is transferred from its site to the
15	information to said second secure container	site of the .NET assembly developer.
16	further comprises copying or transferring said third secure container from said first	
17	site to said second site.	
18	94. A method as in claim 85 further comprising:	
19	creating a fourth rule set.	When the second secure container is not a signed .NET assembly, the fourth rule set is
20	·	declarative statements within the assembly's header.
21		When the second secure container is not
22		the signed .msi file in which the .NET assembly developer packages its (signed or
23		unsigned) assembly, the fourth rule set is the conditional syntax statements written
24		by the .NET assembly developer and placed into the signed .msi file.
25		
26		• •
27	-	
28		
	·	
11		

INTERTRUST TECHNOLOGIES CORP. v. MICROSOFT CORP. INTERTRUST INFRINGEMENT CHART

INTERTRUST INFRINGEMENT CHART FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 5,915,019

2		
3	85 (alternate infringing scenario)	
4	A method comprising the following steps:	Infringing products include the .NET Framework SDK, Microsoft Visual Studio
5		NET, the Microsoft Installer SDK, and products that include the Microsoft .NET CLR, and the Microsoft Installer
6		technology.
7	creating a first secure container comprising a first rule set and first protected	The first protected information is the .NET component.
8	information;	The first alternative for the first secure
9		container is the signed and licensed .NET component. The first rule set is the set of
10 -		declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute in the .NET
11		component.
12		The second alternative for the first secure container is a (signed or unsigned) .NET
13		component with license support contained within a cabinet file signed by the .NET
14		component developer. The first rule set is the set of declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute in the .NET
15 16		component.
17		The third alternative for the first secure container is the signed .msi file in which
18		its assembly. The first rule set is the
19		the .NET component developer and placed into the signed .msi file.
20	storing said first secure container in a first memory;	The first secure container is stored at the .NET component developer's location.
21	creating a second secure container comprising a second rule set;	The first alternative for the second secure container is a signed .NET assembly and
22		the second rule set is declarative statement(s) within the assembly's header.
23	i i	The second alternative for the second
24.	•	secure container is the signed .msi file in which the .NET assembly developer packages its (signed or unsigned)
25	· ·	assembly. The second rule set is the conditional syntax statement(s) written by
26 27	•	the .NET assembly developer and placed into the signed .msi file.
28	storing said second secure container in a second memory;	The second secure container is stored at the .NET assembly developer's location.
20	copying or transferring at least a first	The .NET assembly developer places the
ı		ia ·

Exhibit B

293482.02

,	· ·	
2	portion of said first protected information to said second secure container, said	.NET component into the third secure container, which is either a signed cabinet
3	copying or transferring step comprising: creating a third secure container	file or a signed .NET assembly. When the second secure container is the
3	comprising a third rule set;	signed .msi file, the third secure container is the signed .NET assembly. The third
5		rule set is the declarative statement(s) in the .NET assembly's header.
6		When the second secure container is either
7		a .NET assembly or the signed .msi file, the third secure container is a signed cabinet
8		file in which the .NET assembly developer placed licensed .NET component. The
9		third rule set is the set of declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute in the .NET
10 -		component.
11	copying said first portion of said first protected information;	Copying the .NET component to either the .NET assembly or to the signed cabinet file.
12	transferring said copied first portion	Transferring the .NET component to either
13	of said first protected information to said third secure container; and	the .NET assembly or the signed cabinet file.
14	copying or transferring said copied first portion of said first protected	When the second secure container is the signed .msi file and the third secure
15	information from said third secure container to said second secure container.	container is the signed .NET assembly, the .NET assembly is placed into the signed .msi file.
1.6		When the second secure container is either
17		the .NET assembly or the signed .msi file and the third secure container is the signed
18	`	cabinet file, the signed cabinet file is placed into either the .NET assembly or the signed .msi file.
19		inisi me.
20	87. A method as in claim 85 in which said copied first portion of said first protected	The entire .NET component is copied.
21	information consists of the entirety of said first protected information.	
22	93. A method as in claim 85 in which	
23	said step of copying transferring said copied first portion of said first protected	When the third secure container is the signed .NET assembly, it is placed in the
24	information from said third secure container	signed .msi file.
25	further comprises storing said third secure container in said second secure container.	When the third secure container is a signed cabinet file, it can be placed in either the
26		.NET assembly and/or the signed .msi file.
27	94. A method as in claim 85 further comprising:	
28	creating a fourth rule set.	When the second rule set is declarative statement(s) within the assembly's header,
	-	

1		
2	·	the fourth rule set is the conditional syntax statement(s) written by the .NET assembly developer and placed into the signed .msi file.
4.		When the second rule set is the conditional
5		syntax statement(s) written by the .NET assembly developer and placed into the signed .msi file, the fourth rule set is
6		declarative statement(s) within the assembly's header or the set of declarative
7		statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute in the .NET
8		component.
9	95. A method as in claim 94 further comprising:	
10	using said fourth rule set to govern at least one aspect of use of said copied first	If the fourth rule set is the .NET assembly developer's declarative statement(s) within
11	portion of said first protected information.	the .NET assembly's header, it governs the use of the .NET component.
12		If the fourth rule set is the conditional
13		syntax statements of the .NET assembly developer's signed .msi file, it governs the
14		offer/installation of the .NET component.
15		
16		·
1.7.		
18		·
19		·
20		•
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		
26	÷	
27		
28		
		· ·

	3	2, 12 110. 23,713,017
	85 (second alternate scenario for .NET) A Method comprising the following steps:	Infringing products include the .NET Framework SDK, Microsoft Visual Studio .NET, the Microsoft Installer SDK, and products that include the Microsoft .NET CLR, and the Microsoft Installer technology.
•	creating a first secure container comprising	T. C.
8	a first rule set and first protected	The first protected information is a .NET component.
. 9		The first alternative for the first secure container is the signed and licensed .NET
10 11		component. The first rule set is the set of declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute in the .NET
1 1		component.
12 13		The second alternative for the first secure container is a (signed or unsigned) .NET component with license support contained
14		within a cabinet file signed by the .NET assembly developer. The first rule set is the set of declarative statements comprising
15 16		the LicenseProviderAttribute in the .NET component.
17		The third alternative for the first secure container is a .NET component whose hash is included in the assembly header of a
18 19	·	NET assembly. The first rule set is the set of declarative statements comprising the
20		LicenseProviderAttribute in the .NET component.
21	storing said first secure container in a first memory; creating a second secure container	The first secure container is stored at the .NET assembly developer's location.
22	comprising a second rule set;	The second secure container is the signed .msi file in which the .NET assembly developer packages its signed assembly.
23		The second rule set is the conditional syntax statement(s) written by the .NET
24		assembly developer and placed into the signed .msi file.
25	storing said second secure container in a second memory;	The second secure container is stored at the .NET assembly developer's location.
26	copying or transferring at least a first portion of said first protected information	The .NET assembly developer places the
27	to said second secure container, said copying or transferring step comprising:	.NET component into the third secure container, which is the signed .NET
28	creating a third secure container	assembly.
-"	comprising a third rule set;	The third secure container is a signed .NET assembly and the third rule set is
1	•	:

Exhibit B

1

	1	
1		declarative statement(s) within the assembly's header.
2	copying said first portion of said first protected information;	Copying the .NET component to the .NET assembly.
3	transferring said copied first portion of said first protected information to	Transferring the .NET component to the .NET assembly.
4	said third secure container; and	When the second secure container is the
5	copying or transferring said copied first portion of said first protected information from said third secure	signed .msi file and the third secure container is the container is the signed .NET assembly, the
6 7	container to said second secure container.	.NET assembly is placed into the signed .msi file.
8	87. A method as in claim 85 in which said	The entire .NET component is copied.
9	copied first portion of said first protected information consists of the entirety of said	The entire aver component is copied.
10	first protected information.	
	90. A method as in claim 85 in which	First and second memory is at the .NET
11	said first memory and said second memory are located at the same site.	assembly developer's location.
12		
13	93. A method as in claim 85 in which said step of copying transferring said	When the third secure container is the
14	copied first portion of said first protected information from said third secure	signed .NET assembly, it is placed in the signed .msi file.
15	container to said second secure container further comprises storing said third secure	signed this inc.
16	container in said second secure container.	
17		
18		
19		
20		•
21		
22		
23		
24.		
25		
26		•
27		
28		
		,

3		•
	96. A method comprising performing the	A signed and licensed .NET component .
.4.	following steps within a virtual distribution	(first container) is part of a .NET assembly
	environment comprising one or more	(second container), which is packaged in a
5	electronic appliances and a first secure	signed .msi file (third container).
•	container, said first secure container	
6	comprising a first control set and first	
•	protected information:	
7	using at least one control from said first	The first secure container is a licensed and
•	control set to govern at least one aspect of	signed .NET component governed by the
8	use of said first protected information	set of declarative statements comprising the
	while said first protected information is	LicenseProviderAttribute (one control).
9	contained within said first secure container;	
,	creating a second secure container	The second secure container is a .NET
10	comprising a second control set for	assembly, the protected information is the
	governing at least one aspect of use of	assembly and the second control set is
11	protected information contained within said	declarative statement(s) within the
	second secure container;	assembly's header.
12	incorporating a first portion of said first	Included in the .NET assembly is the .NET
	protected information in said second secure	component.
13	container, said first portion made up of	-
	some or all of said first protected	· .
14	information;	
	using at least one control to govern at least	The declarative statement(s) govern the use
15	one aspect of use of said first portion of	of the .NET component and the custom
	said first protected information while said	LicenseProvider class (first control set)
16	first portion is contained within said second	controls the .NET component.
	secure container; and	
17	incorporating said second secure container	The third secure container is the signed
	containing said first portion of said first	.msi file in which the .NET assembly
18	protected information within a third secure	developer packages its assembly. The third
	container comprising a third control set.	control set is the conditional syntax
19	·	statements written by the assembly
		developer and placed into the signed .msi
20		file.
٫, ا		
21	·	
22		
22		

Exhibit B

3	FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 5,949,876	
4.		·
5	2.	Infringement is based on Microsoft's Visual Studio .NET and/or the .NET Framework licensing tools (in the .NET Framework SDK) and/or Microsoft Installer
6	·	SDK
7	A system for supporting electronic commerce including:	
8	means for creating a first secure control set at a first location;	The first location is a .NET component developer's site.
9		The first secure control set is the set of declarative statements comprising the <i>LicenseProviderAttribute</i> of
10		a first .NET licensed component that provides for a design-time license to use the control. This attribute
11		also specifies the type of license validation that occurs. The component is encapsulated in a signed .NET
12		assembly.
13	means for creating a second secure control set at a second location;	The second location is the .NET application developer's site where a .NET application comprising
1.4		one or more assemblies is created.
14		The second secure control set comprises the declarative statement(s) (including licensing
15		statements, and code access security statements) of a signed .NET assembly using or calling the first .NET
16 17		component. The control set can include a set of security permissions demanded by the .NET assembly
18		containing the licensed component, whereby the permissions are demanded of components that call the
19		application components. The control set can also be extended by controls expressed as conditional syntax
20		statements in a signed .msi file containing a click through end-user license (the end-user license
	means for securely communicating said	scenario). The first .NET control set is securely communicated
21	first secure control set from said first	from the first location developer to the .NET solution
22	location to said second location; and	provider by either being contained in a signed assembly, within a signed cabinet file or within a
23	means at said second location for	signed .msi file. At the second location, the solution developer uses the
24	securely integrating said first and second control sets to produce at least a	.NET runtime that includes the LicenseManager.
25	third control set comprising plural elements together comprising an	Whenever a class (control or component) is instantiated (here, an instance of the first .NET
26	electronic value chain extended agreement.	licensed component), the license manager accesses the proper validation mechanism for the control or
27	agreement.	component. A value chain is created through the creation of a run-time license for use of the first .NET
28		component in the context of use of the .NET
	: <u>.</u>	application developed at the second location. The

Exhibit B

1

1 2 3		license controls for the runtime license (derived from the design time license) are bound into the header of the .NET application assembly, along with the second control set.
. 4		The creation of runtime license controls is securely
		handled by Visual Studio.NET or the LC tool. Runtime licenses are embedded into (and bound to)
		the executing assembly. The license control attribute included in the first .NET component is customized in
6		the second location to express and require the runtime license. In a different scenario, the LC tool is used to
7		create a ".licenses file" containing licenses for
8		multiple components, including runtime licenses for components and classes created by the license
9		provider. This .licenses file is embedded into the assembly.
. 10		The third control set is an extended value chain agreement that comprises the runtime license controls
11		for the first .NET licensed class (that had been bound to the assembly), the declarative controls provided by
12		the solution provider in the solution provider's assembly, and any runtime licenses for other
13		components included by the solution provider in the solution provider's assembly, and any end user license
14		agreement provided by the application provider. The controls are typically integrated into the header of the
15		.NET application assembly calling the first .NET licensed component.
16		
17		A further "end user licensing scenario" occurs when, at the second location, the application developer
18		packages the application into a signed .msi file that includes conditional syntax statement controls that
19		require that a user read and agree to an end user license agreement for the application and the
20		embedded first component. The third control set includes a plurality of elements that include the run-
	·	time licenses mentioned above, security permissions controls, EULA controls (a fourth control set), all
21	<u>.</u>	securely bound into the signed .msi file.
22		
23	11. A system as in claim 2 in which said	The Microsoft .NET Framework provides a
24	first location and said second location are contained within a Virtual Distribution	nodes are the Common Language Runtime
25	Environment.	instances that interpret the controls contained within .NET assemblies (among
26		other functions).
27		
28	29. A system as in claim 2 in which said first secure control set includes required	The licensing control in the first control set specifies the method required to validate
	mar secure control set includes required	specifies are mediod required to validate
		Exhibit B
1		142

terms.	the license.
32. A system as in claim 2 in which said	The security permissions demanded (as
second secure control set includes required terms.	described above) are required terms for execution of the application code elements.
60. A system as in claim 2 in which said means for securely integrating said first and second control sets includes a fourth	
control set.	file, the secure integration of the first and second control sets is enhanced by the tamper protection afforded by the signed
	.msi file. In the end user license scenario, a fourth control set consisting of conditional
	syntax statements is included in the .msi file.
130. A system as in claim 2 further including means for executing said third	The third control set is executed under the auspices of the CLR
control set within a protected processing environment.	1
132. A system as in claim 130 in which said protected processing environment is	The third control set is executed at an end- user site within the CLR.
located at a location other than said second location.	
161. A system as in claim 2 in which said third control set includes controls	In the end user license scenario, the third control set includes a fourth control set that
containing human-language terms corresponding to at least certain of the	requires that the human user agree with license terms displayed to the user. These
machine-executable controls contained in said third control set.	human readable terms are referenced in the conditional syntax statement controls contained in the signed .msi file.
162. A method as in claim 161 in which said human-language terms are contained in one or more data descriptor data structures.	The .msi file is a data descriptor data structure.
Structures.	
170. A system as in claim 2 in which said means for creating a first secure control set includes a protected processing	The creation of the first licensed component, including its licensed controls is carried out under the auspices of the
environment.	CLR.
171. A system as in claim 2 in which said means for creating a second secure control	The application design time environment and the creation of the .NET application is
set includes a protected processing environment.	carried out under the auspices of the CLR.
172. A system as in claim 2 in which said means at said second location for securely	The means for integrating the runtime license with the application controls is
integrating includes a protected processing environment.	carried out under the auspices of the CLR.

	means for creating a first secure control set	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	2 Includes an operating system based on or compatible with Microsoft Windows.	
	330. A system as in claim 2 in which said means for creating a second secure control	VS.NET runs under Windows.
5	set includes an operating system based on or compatible with Microsoft Windows.	
6	331. A system as in claim 2 in which said means at said second location for securely	VS.NET runs under Windows.
7	integrating said first and second control sets includes an operating system based on	
8	or compatible with Microsoft Windows.	
9	comprising means by which said third	The third control set in the scenario described in the claim map for claim 2
10 11	control set governs the execution of at least one load module.	designed to be loaded into the CLR
12	347 A system on in this 2.5 d	environment (a CLR host).
13	347. A system as in claim 2 farther comprising means by which said third control set governs the execution of at least	
14	one method.	executable contains one or more methods.
15	349. A system as in claim 2 further comprising means by which said third control set governs the execution of at least	The third control set in the scenario described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a .NET executable. This
16	one procedure.	executable contains one or more procedures.
17		•
18		
9		
20		
1		
2		
3		•
4	·	
5		
6		
7		
8		
		ii

- 3		·
4	CLAIM LANGUAGE	CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT
5	48.	Infringing products include Microsoft SMS (Systems Management Server) 2.0 and subsequent versions.
6	A method for narrowcasting selected digital information to specified recipients, including:	30000403.1.151515151
7 8	a) at a receiving appliance, receiving selected digital information from a	The receiving appliance is the client (e.g., end user computer in an Enterprise setting)
9	sending appliance remote from the receiving appliance,	receiving digital information (packages and/or advertisement files) from the sending
10		appliance, the centralized SMS database via a Client Access Point and/or Distribution Point set up on a server.
11		
12	the receiving appliance having a secure node and being associated with a specified recipient;	The "node" is "secure" as a result of SMS security, as well as how it identifies and selects clients.
13		The "specified recipient" is the result of the collection identifying a specific client that
14 15		meets the criteria for a package or advertisement.
16	i) the digital information having	The digital information is a software package or advertisement. The "first class membership"
17	been selected at least in part based on the digital information's membership in a first class, wherein the first class	was determined in part using rights management information" reads on creating
18	membership was determined at least in part using rights management	software packages (or advertisements) based on attributes of the software.
19	information; and	•
20 21	ii) the specified recipient having been selected at least in part based on	The "specified recipient" is the client selected to receive a package or advertisement. That
22	membership in a second class, wherein the second class membership was determined at least in part on the basis	or on the recipient's possession of a license.
23	of information derived from the specified recipient's creation, use of, or	
24	interaction with rights management information; and	
25	b) the specified recipient using the receiving appliance to access the	The receiving appliance is the client computer. The SMS agents on the client computer
26	received selected digital information in accordance with rules and controls, associated with the selected digital	receive, evaluate and take the appropriate action based on rules and controls governing the package and/or advertisement (i.e. the
27	information.	selected digital information).
28		
	the rules and controls being enforced	Rules and controls are enforced by Agents on

l

1 2	by the receiving appliance secure node.	the client (the secure node)
2		
3 4 5	59. The method of claim 48 wherein said received selected digital information is at least in part event information.	Event information includes SMS event information, including Scheduling Classes.
6	63. The method of claim 48 wherein said received selected digital information is at least in part executable software.	All SMS packages must include a minimum of one program.
8	70. The method of claim 48 wherein said rules and controls at least in part govern usage audit record creation.	A control governs whether a MIF (management information file) is sent back to the SMS db after installation is done to report
9		on the success or failure of the installation.
10.	89. The method of claim 48 wherein said receiving appliance is a personal	The primary purpose of SMS is to manage software on personal computers throughout the
11	computer.	Enterprise.
12	,	
13		
14		•

Exhibit B

· :.

-17

. 3		
4	E FALL STORY OF THE STORY OF TH	MARGINAL MORINIFIEM GENERAL SERVICE
.4	48.	Infringing products include Windows Media Player and Windows Media Rights Manager
6	A method for narrowcasting selected	This claim pertains to Windows Media
7	digital information to specified recipients, including:	Player with Individualized DRM Client and Windows Media Rights Manager used in the context of a narrowcast pay-per-view
8		(hear) media distribution service., simulcast and/or subscription services.
.9	(a) at a receiving appliance, receiving	Receiving appliance is a user's PC with
··10	selected digital information from a sending appliance remote from the receiving	individualized DRM client (secure node). Specified recipient is a user using the
11	appliance, the receiving appliance having a secure node and being associated with a	specific individualized DRM client to access and render narrowcast pay-per-view
12	specified recipient	media, simulcast and/or subscription services for which the user acquires a license.
13		incense.
14	(i) the digital information having been	The digital information is media that is
15	selected at least in part based on the digital information's membership in a first class,	narrowcast to licensed recipients. These narrowcast streams are licensed to users who have acquired licenses and whose PCs
16 17	wherein the first class membership was determined at least in part using rights management information; and	(appliances) support WMPs that have individualized DRM clients. This attribute
18		is included in the signed WMA file header and is used in the process of acquiring licenses for access to the media. Media that
19		are licensed to the recipient have their licenses bound to the recipient's
20	(ii) the specified recipient having been	Individualization module. The recipient is selected for this content
21	selected at least in part based on membership in a second class, wherein the	based on the fact that the recipient is a member of the class of recipients who have
22	second class membership was determined at least in part on the basis of information	a license for the narrowcast media and whose devices support WMP and
23	derived from the specified recipient's creation, use of, or interaction with rights	individualized DRM clients. The recipient's machine must indicate support
24	management information; and	for individualization in challenges that are
25	(1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1)	sent as part of requests for media in this narrowcast class.
26	(b) the specified recipient using the receiving appliance to access the received	Recipient's machine uses WMP and the individualized DRM client to access the
27	selected digital information in accordance with rules and controls, associated with the	narrowcast media in accordance with all rules associated with the media and
28	selected digital information, the rules and controls being enforced by the receiving appliance secure node.	contained in the media license – in particular, requirements that individualization be supported.

Exhibit B

1	ALTO COMPANION OF SECURITION OF SECURITICS OF SECURITION O		
3	61. The method of claim 48 wherein said received selected digital information is at least in part entertainment information.	The digital information is Windows Media, which encodes audio/visual entertainment content.	
5	62. The method of claim 61 wherein said entertainment information is at least in part music information.	Reads on narrowcast Windows Media Files that are music or audio/visual.	
6	67. The method of alaim 40 ml min id		
7	67. The method of claim 48 wherein said rules and controls at least in part use digital certificate information.	The license contains a digital certificate. The DRM client uses the certificate in the license to verify this signature and to verify	
8		that the header has not been tampered with.	
9	.72. The method of claim 48 wherein said rules and controls in part specifying at least	The signed header contains at least one URL that indicates to the Windows Media	
10	one clearinghouse acceptable to rightsholders.	Rights Manager the license clearinghouse to be used in acquiring licenses.	
11		·	
12	75. The method of claim 72 wherein said at least one acceptable clearinghouse is a rights and permissions clearinghouse.	This clearinghouse is a license clearinghouse responsible for mapping rights and permissions onto requested	
13	rights and permissions elearnighouse.	content or narrowcasts and binding them to the requesting client environment or user of	
14		this environment.	
15	89. The method of claim 48 wherein said	Windows Media Player and the	
16	receiving appliance is a personal computer.	Individualized DRM client run on a personal computer.	
17	•	-	
18	,	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	

	FOR U.S. FATERT NO. 0,112,101	
3	91	Infringing products include Windows
	³¹	Media Player and Windows Media Rights.
4.		Manager
5	A method for securely narrowcasting selected digital information to specified	This claim pertains to Windows Media Player with Individualized DRM Client and
6	recipients including:	Windows Media Rights Manager used in the context of a narrowcast simulcast, payper-view (hear) media distribution service.
7		and/or subscription services. The content is delivered in a Protected Windows Media
9.		File.
10	(a) receiving selected digital information in a secure container at a receiving appliance remote from a sending appliance, the	Narrowcast content is received in a Protected Windows Media File. Receiving appliance is user's PC with individualized
11	receiving appliance having a secure node, the receiving appliance being associated	DRM client (secure node).
12	with a receiving entity	
12	(i) the digital information having	The digital information is media that is
13	been selected at least in part based	narrowcast to licensed recipients (for
	on the digital information's	example, a sold-out concert is narrowcast
14	membership in a first class,	on the Internet to "the class of" licensed (or ticketed) viewers).
15	(ii) the first class membership	These narrowcast streams are licensed to
10	having been determined at least in part using rights management	users who have acquired licenses and whose PCs (appliances) support WMPs
16	information	that have individualized DRM clients. This
17		attribute is included in the signed WMA
18	·	file header and is used in the process of acquiring licenses for access to the media.
10		Media that are licensed to the recipient have their licenses bound to the recipient's
19	٠.	individualization module.
20	(b) the receiving entity having been	The recipient is selected for this content
.	selected at least in part based on said	based on the fact that the recipient is a
21	receiving entity's membership in a second	member of the class of recipients who has a
	class	license for the narrowcast media.
22	(i) the second class membership	The recipient class is determined by the
_	having been determined at least in	license bound to the user's device that
23	part on the basis of information	supports WMP and individualized DRM
24	derived from the recipient entity's creation, use of, or interaction with	clients. The recipient's machine must indicate support for individualization in
47	rights management information	challenges that are sent as part of requests
25	· ·	for media in this narrowcast class.
	(c) receiving at the receiving appliance	Receives a protected Windows Media File
26	rules and controls in a secure container,	
I	(i) the rules and controls having	Receives a license that is bound to the file
27	been associated with the selected	as well as to the specific DRM client
	digital information; and	individualization information.
28	(d) using at the receiving appliance the	Recipient's machine uses WMP and the
H	selected digital information in accordance	individualized DRM client to access the
ll ll	•	:1

Exhibit B

293482.02

1

1		
2	with the rules and controls,	narrowcast media in accordance with all rules associated with the media and contained in the media license – in
3		particular, requirements that individualization be supported.
4 5	(i) the rules and controls being enforced by the receiving appliance secure node.	The WMP and DRM client enforce the rules embedded in the Protected Windows Media File License.
. 6	104. The method of claim 91 wherein said received selected digital information includes entertainment information.	The digital information is Windows Media, which encodes audio/visual entertainment content.
•		
8	109. The method of claim 91 wherein said rules and controls at least in part use digital	
. 9	certificate information.	license to verify this signature and to verify that the header has not been tampered with.
10	114. The method of claim 91 wherein said	The signed header contains at least one
11	rules and controls specify at least one clearinghouse acceptable to rightsholders.	URL that indicates to the Windows Media Rights Manager the license clearinghouse
12		to be used in acquiring licenses.
13	117. The method of claim 114 wherein said at least one acceptable clearinghouse is a	This clearinghouse is a license clearinghouse responsible for mapping
14	rights and permissions clearinghouse.	rights and permissions onto requested content or narrowcasts and binding them to
15		the requesting client environment or user of this environment.
16	131. The method of claim 91 wherein said	Windows Media Player and the
17	receiving appliance is a personal computer.	individualized DRM client run on a personal computer.
18		
19		•
20		•
21		·
22	*	
23		
24	·	
25 26	•	•
20	·	

27

,		
4	CLAIM LANGUAGE TO SECOND	CEAIM OF INFRINGEMENTS
5	1.	Products infringing: Microsoft Visual Studio NET, NET License Compiler, NET
6	•	Framework SDK, and .NET Common Language Runtime
7	A method including	A method for producing a third .NET component (application) that incorporates first
8		and second .NET component whose distribution is license controlled.
9	creating a first secure container including a	The first secure container is a first signed
10 11	first governed item and having associated a first control;	.NET component that includes a license control. The governed item is the .NET component.
12		The first control is the set of declarative
13	·	statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute of a first .NET licensed component that provides for a design-
14		time license to use the control. This attribute also specifies the type of license validation that
15		occurs.
16	creating a second secure container including a second governed item and having associated a	The second secure container is the second signed .NET component that includes a license
17	second control;	control. The governed item is the .NET component.
18		The second control is the set of declarative
19 20		statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute of a second .NET licensed component that provides for a design-
21		time license to use the control. This attribute also specifies the type of license validation that occurs.
22		
23	transferring the first secure container from a first location to a second location;	The creator distributes a signed and licensed .NET component.
24	·	An application developer at a second location
25		downloads a first .NET component for inclusion into an application.
26	transferring the second secure container from a	A creator distributes a signed and licensed
27	third location to the second location;	.NET component from a different location.
28		Application developer downloads a second .NET component for inclusion into an application.
1	c	

Exhibit B

293482.02

1

2

1		
1		
2	at the second location, obtaining access to at least a portion of the first governed item, the access being governed at least in part by the	At the second location, the application developer uses the .NET runtime that includes the LicenseManager to access a first governed
4	first control;	item.
5		Whenever a class (control or component) is instantiated (here, an instance of the first .NET licensed component), the license manager accesses the proper validation mechanism for the control or component.
7		
8		The first control comprises the declarative statement(s) (including licensing statements, and code access security statements) of the first NET component.
9		INET Component
10 11	at the second location, obtaining access to at least a portion of the second governed item, the access being governed at least in part by the	At the second location, the application developer uses the .NET runtime that includes the LicenseManager to access a second
12	second control;	governed item. Whenever a class (control or component) is
13		instantiated (here, an instance of the second .NET licensed component), the license manager accesses the proper validation
14		mechanism for the control or component. The second control comprises the declarative
15 16		statement(s) (including licensing statements, and code access security statements) of the second .NET component.
17	at the second location, creating a third secure container including at least a portion of the first	At the second location, the application developer uses the .NET runtime that includes
18	governed item and at least a portion of the second governed item and having associated at least one control, the creation being governed	the License Manager to access a first governed item and second governed item to construct an application, the third secure container.
19	at least in part by the first control and the second control.	Creation governance is accomplished by
20		invoking the .NET runtime to access the first governed item and the second governed item.
21		Whenever a class (control or component) is
23		instantiated the license manager accesses the proper validation mechanism for the control or component.
24		The portions of the first governed item and
25		second governed item that are being included in the third secure container will typically include the governed items themselves, ie. the
26		.NET components.
27		The associated control in this case is the LicenseProviderAttribute, created and inserted